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MILITARY-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX: EISENHOWER'S UNSOLVED PROBLEM

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

One hundred and sixty-eight years ago, the first President of the United States presented his farewell address to the country which he had served so well and which he, as much as any other person, had changed from a divided group of self-oriented states into a cohesive nation. George Washington's principal advice to this young nation was to stay clear of permanent alliances with foreign nations. With a vast and growing territory to the west to settle; with an ocean protecting her eastern shore, and another ocean protecting her western shore; with a peaceful neighbor to the north except for one short interlude of a few years, culminating in the War of 1812; with a much weaker neighbor to the south who would be forced to cede by conquest additional land for settlement to the west; with a foreign policy relying on the most powerful navy in the world, that of Great Britain, with a favorable balance of power in Europe---the United States for over a century found it to her best interest to follow her first President's sage advice. A small group of nostalgic citizens believe it still to be the best policy.

The Atlantic and the Pacific Oceans no longer offer adequate protection. Geographic distance between potential enemies has lost its protective importance. Salvos of intercontinental supersonic missiles with thermonuclear warheads can destroy the largest cities in a matter of minutes. The British Navy no longer protects the United States; rather the nuclear missiles of the United States now protect Great Britain. Two superpowers have transformed the political world. Each of them is seeking to convince the neutral and uncommitted nations that its way of life, economically and politically, offers the best hope for

each individual nation, as well as the entire world. The United States, as one of these two leaders, now instead of avoiding alliances, is in competition with the U.S.S.R., the other leader, spending billions of dollars annually to obtain additional allies and to bind her existing allies by new means and methods into stronger and more permanent alliances—economic, political and military.

The United States continues to support the United Nations, in which all nations are potential members, hoping that this world organization would eventually produce, as was hopefully predicted by its most ardent founders, a world of peace governed by law with justice. The failure of the United Nations to produce effective agreements or to fulfill its expected role made it necessary for the United States to shift its foreign policy from primary reliance on the United Nations to an interlocking system of alliances and multilateral treaties encircling the "Iron and Bamboo Curtains".¹ United States maintains a preminent position in all these alliances.

With planes traveling at 2000 miles per hour connecting world capitals in hours instead of days; with instantaneous telephone and telegraph communications between all countries; with basic diplomacy changed to special meetings including special emissaries and even heads of state; with a world-wide interlocking economic structure; and, above all, with some nations shifting their emphasis between the two poles for political or economic advantage; with other

¹United States is a member of OAS (Organization of American States) which includes all Central and South American states except Cuba; NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) consisting of United States, United Kingdom, West Germany, France, Canada, Italy, Belgium, Netherlands, Norway, Denmark, Iceland, Portugal, Luxembourg, Greece, Turkey; SEATO (South East Asia Treaty Organization) consisting of United States, United Kingdom, France, New Zealand, Australia, Thailand, Pakistan, Philippines; and CENTO (Central Treaty Organization) consisting of United Kingdom, Turkey, Pakistan, Iran with the United States pledged to co-operate for military defense. Bilateral treaties exist between United States and Japan, United States and South Korea, United States and Taiwan, United States and Philippines, United States and Australia and New Zealand.

nations fostering alternatives to the policies of the United States and the Soviet Union, as France and China are doing; with still others creating special groupings such as the neutralist or African nations are doing to enhance their own special influence—it remains increasingly impossible for any nation to live in isolation or even exist as a self-sufficient nation. Under these conditions, which are the result of changes vast and unforeseen by the "founding fathers", another loved and respected President gave his farewell address to the citizens of the United States. The speech was directed to the citizens of the United States, but its background and implications were dictated by the changes in world relationships.

Sherman Adams says President Eisenhower was the greatest influence for peace in the world.² President Eisenhower hoped that furtherance of world peace would determine his eventual place in history; consequently his greatest disappointment was that he could not say after eight years in office that permanent peace with justice was in sight. Nevertheless he felt that his greatest achievement was the avoidance of war in a hopelessly divided world, when, as he said, any display of weakness, moral or physical, could have meant the possible spread of nuclear war.³ But above all, he seemed to think that his efforts in keeping the peace had also created a domestic problem that threatened the individual liberties of Americans as well as the nation's traditional democratic processes. In his farewell address he said:

A vital element in keeping the peace is our military establishment. Our arms must be mighty, ready for instant action, so that no potential aggressor may be tempted to risk his own destruction . . .

Until the latest of our world conflicts, the United States had no armaments industry. American makers of plowshares could, with time and

² Sherman Adams, First Hand Report, p. 462.

³ New York Times, January 19, 1961, p. 1.

as required, make swords as well. But now we can no longer risk emergency improvisation of national defense; we have been compelled to create a permanent armaments industry of vast proportions. Added to this, three and a half million men and women are directly engaged in the defense establishment. We annually spend on military security more than the net income of all United States corporations.

This conjunction of an immense military establishment and a large arms industry is new in American experience. The total influence--economic, political, even spiritual--is felt in every city, every State-house, every office of the Federal Government. We recognize the imperative need for this development. Yet we must not fail to comprehend its grave implications. Our toil, resources and livelihood are all involved; so is the very structure of our society.

In the councils of government, we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military-industrial complex. The potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists and will persist.

We must never let the weight of this combination endanger our liberties or democratic processes. We should take nothing for granted. Only an alert and knowledgeable citizenry can compel the proper meshing of the huge industrial and military machinery of defense with our peaceful methods and goals, so that security and liberty may prosper together.⁴

President Eisenhower was not the first to cite the danger of the growing military-industrial complex caused by the emphasis on military security. In 1947 Hanson Baldwin warned of "the militarization of our Government and of the American state of mind."⁵ H. D. Lasswell⁶ in 1950 and Associate Justice William O. Douglas⁷ in 1952, among many other serious and respected authors, wrote critically on various aspects of the military-industrial complex which was new to the United States and brought on by World War II but continued since then, even growing and consolidating its position in American society because of the continuation of the "cold war". Following the Presi-

⁴ Public Papers of The President of the United States, Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1960-1961, p. 1037. See Appendix I for entire speech.

⁵ Hanson Baldwin, "The Military Move In," Harper's Magazine, December, 1947, p. 481.

⁶ Harold D. Lasswell, National Security and Individual Freedom, New York, McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1950.

⁷ William O. Douglas "Should We Fear The Military?" Look Magazine, March 11, 1952, p. 34.

dent's speech there appeared among commentators, scholars, legislators, and writers of all types a growing number who wrote even more critically of military and industrial leaders. There is substantial evidence of an increasing concern among thoughtful people that the effects of the military-industrial complex are detrimental, if not actually changing or destroying the traditional American freedoms of our democratic society. Some members of the "anti-war" group⁸ quote Eisenhower's speech as evidence of a militaristic state. As his speech is being quoted and mis-quoted and, further, is the basis for this paper, it is necessary to know precisely what the President said. He made three principal points in the section of the speech on the military-industrial complex. First, that the need of an immense military establishment and a large arms industry is, to use his exact word, "imperative". Second, that the potential for misplaced power exists and the influence of the military-industrial complex is felt in every structure of our society--economic, political, and even spiritual. The important word in the preceding sentence is "potential". President Eisenhower didn't say that misplaced power exists, as many infer he did, but that only the potential exists. If he had said that misplaced power actually existed, it would have indicted his entire administration and we, as Americans, would have expected him as President to have done something more than just call such a condition to the attention of the nation upon his retirement from public office.

⁸ Robert A. Levine, The Arms Debate, New York, Columbia University Press, 1961. In this book Levine identifies five groups of thought: the liberal left which is generally anti-war, the conservative right which is generally anti-communist, and the middle three groups which are both anti-communist and anti-war to different degrees. I have only used the terms anti-war and anti-communist in this paper as the finer gradations are not necessary.

President Eisenhower's recommendation to the problem was that in the councils of government, acquisition of unwarranted influence and misplaced power, must be guarded against whether sought or unsought. Further, he said that only an alert and knowledgeable citizenry could compel the proper meshing of the huge military machinery of defense so that security and liberty could prosper together. The President didn't elaborate on how the public could gain this knowledge. The purpose of this paper is to determine if Eisenhower's thesis is correct by examining in successive chapters the main points he has raised in his speech. First, "the imperative need" will be examined from the viewpoint of the American public as well as its elected officials. Second, examination will be made of the "potential unwarranted influence and misplaced power" in both industry and the military. Particular attention will be given to evidence of changes in the political and economic conditions affecting the complex. Third, examination will also be conducted into the generally accepted theories of the operation of industry and the military which may be founded on misconceptions. Safeguards already within the democratic system which nullify or retard the potential rise of undemocratic tendencies in the complex will also be enumerated. As Eisenhower's recommendation is not considered sufficient to produce results an attempt will be made to show why it is untenable. Finally, a possible solution which could produce meaningful results and still be within the framework of United States democratic tradition is presented. (1)

One of the conclusions reached is that there is actually a third member of the military-industrial complex, namely the Congress of the United States. For at least (three)^{two} reasons this thesis will seem weighted toward the military side: (1) as a result of the changed international position of the United States beginning with World War II, the military's place has radically changed from the traditional one of a relatively non-political, socially isolated,

even distrusted group to one of political influence, prestige, and respect;
(2) in the scholarly literature dealing with the complex more attention is
paid to the military than to the other two members, the Congress and industry;
(3) the author is a soldier who is personally involved in the military point
of view and is more familiar with military sources. The latter reason may
produce an unconscious bias as the author views the military from the inside
of the organization while he views the Congress and industry from the outside.

The Congressional Record and Congressional Quarterly have been used to find out what Congressmen have said on this and related subjects. The words of military scholars, industrial economists, social and political scientists have been studied. As the subject is a current one and the President specifically said the danger was potential, the New York Times, Kansas City Star and Times, Newsweek, U. S. News and World Report and Time have been read daily or weekly, as the case may be, from March 1964 to March 1965, and the material evaluated. To get the viewpoint of the military and industry, the author has reviewed each issue of The Journal of the Armed Forces, Army, Airpower, Aviation Week, Business Week, and Missiles and Rockets for the same period. Additional trade and leading scholarly magazines in political science, economics, and sociology have also been consulted.

CHAPTER II

IMPERATIVE NEED

The traditional reason for a national military establishment is protection from an external threat. The United States has only one external threat in the world today and that is the U.S.S.R. Beyond doubt the Russians could devastatingly cripple the United States, in a matter of hours at most and probably in less time, by a supersonic, thermonuclear missile attack. The only defense the United States has against such an attack is the assurance of the U.S.S.R. that this type of attack would automatically trigger a retaliatory one which would bring as much or more damage to itself than the U.S.S.R. could possibly accomplish against the United States by instigating a thermonuclear exchange.¹

The President, Congress, and the American People

Congress is responsible to provide for the common defense: to raise, support, and appropriate money for the military establishment. The President is Commander-in-Chief of the military forces and the only elected official to represent all the people. Except for a few vocal members of the anti-war group who feel that the possibility of nuclear war is so awesome that the United States should destroy its own weapons and attempt to gain world

¹Herman Kahn, On Thermonuclear War, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1960. This book gives a detailed and thorough discussion on all phases of nuclear war, including minimum and finite deterrents, first strike capabilities, preattack mobilization base, limited war, and balance of terror. It has been criticized that it is an attempt to make thermonuclear war acceptable. This is not quite accurate, but it is easy to see how an "anti-war" advocate could reach this conclusion. Kahn's main thesis is that the United States is not preparing adequately for any type of nuclear war. The book is valuable for a student who desires to understand all the alternatives that must be considered in reaching a national policy that will assure survival in case of a nuclear war.

leadership through moral suasion and example, the goal of American nuclear superiority over the U.S.S.R. undoubtedly has overwhelming public support.² The 1964 Presidential Campaign daily provided evidence that this last statement is true. On a single day (October 12, 1964) Senator Barry Goldwater made three separate speeches attacking the Johnson Administration for (1) being "soft on Communism," (2) eliminating manned bombers to the detriment of United States military strength, and (3) destroying NATO confidence by refusing use of tactical nuclear weapons by NATO commanders under specified conditions without President Johnson's approval.³ President Johnson immediately answered all three charges, as he had many times before. His sensitivity on the subject of United States military strength not only brought Defense Secretary McNamara in particular, but the military civilian chiefs as a whole, into politics to a degree never before witnessed in United States history.⁴ Political commentators of Newsweek were typical in assessing the war and peace issue as the most decisive in the campaign. Both candidates emphasized peace through strength with Goldwater arguing for a "muscle-flexing" pursuit, while Johnson said "the key to peace is to be found in strength and the good sense of the United States."⁵ In addition, Johnson was insisting that "his opponent makes 'reckless' accusations about America's military power" and that "the Democrats have 'vastly increased' American power."⁶

²Ibid., and Robert A. Levine, The Arms Debate, p. 285. Only the student, the policy makers and military are interested in the various degrees of nuclear deterrent. The public as a whole is interested in assurance of survival and responsibility in handling nuclear weapons. Levine and Kahn (See Note #1) provide a summary of the entire spectrum of nuclear warfare with detailed ramifications.

³Kansas City Times, Associated Press Dispatches, October 12, 1964, pps. 1,2,12.

⁴Journal Memo, Journal of The Armed Forces, October 24, 1964, p.4.

⁵"The Peace Issue," Newsweek, November 2, 1964, p. 24.

⁶Journal of The Armed Forces, loc. cit.

The Republican and Democratic platforms since 1948 have called, as a minimum, for an adequate defense⁷ which, to Americans, means a defense establishment superior to that of the U.S.S.R. in all respects. In 1960 Kennedy argued, when campaigning for the Presidency, that the United States was becoming a second-rate military power under the Republicans and was preparing for the wrong kind of war,⁸ at the same time Nixon was saying, "We must not cut the defense budget. It must remain and increase if we are to remain a free and the most important nation in the world."⁹ Johnson, on becoming President, said he was going to follow President Kennedy's military policy which the latter stated as, "There is no discount price on defense. The Free world must be prepared at all times to face the perils of a global nuclear war, limited conventional conflict, and covert guerrilla activities."¹⁰ President Johnson specifically said, "We shall keep the peace by maintaining both the strength of our arms and the initiation of our diplomacy."¹¹ And in his budget message to Congress on January 21, 1964, he said further, "We have chosen not to concede our opponents' supremacy in any type of potential conflict, be it nuclear war, conventional warfare, or guerrilla conflict."¹²

Congress, as a whole, has willingly supported the military goals of the administration, whether it be Republican or Democratic. Although some Congressmen have criticized the size of defense appropriations, individual projects and poor management, and the ease with which defense appropriations gain legislative

⁷ Platforms of the Democratic Party and the Republican Party, 1964, U. S. Government Printing Office, p. 56.

⁸ Newsweek, October 3, 1960, p. 44.

⁹ Richard M. Nixon, The Challenges We Face, p. 8.

¹⁰ John F. Kennedy, Speech at Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, Military Review, July 1963, p. 66.

¹¹ Lyndon B. Johnson "On The Offensive For Peace", Army, December 1963, p. 27.

¹² Jack Raymond, Power At The Pentagon, p. 6.

approval in comparison with other measures, no Congressman gained national recognition in the 1964 campaign by advocating a reduction in defense. Instead the reverse was true. Congressmen seeking reelection stood for a defense establishment second to none. Foreign military aid is supported without question by Congress while economic foreign aid programs backed by the executive branch only pass Congress with deductions, usually after personal appeal for passage by the President. A study of defense appropriations since 1948 reveals that Congress (which supposedly knows best the desires of its constituents), in spite of several cuts in selected areas, has had only one overall effect on the military budget and that is to increase it. In fact, the Chief Executive has several times impounded appropriated money and refused to use it as Congress desired.¹³ The actions of Congress have produced more defense but its actions have also produced duplication or pluralism. One example of this effect is the 1964 debate between Senator Goldwater and Secretary McNamara. Goldwater questioned the reliability of missiles. Actually he was not against missiles but wanted additional money to produce sizable quantities of the B-70, or another intercontinental manned bomber.¹⁴ Air Force Chief of Staff, General Curtis LeMay, said that he would accept present missiles even if they were less reliable than they are, but he supported Goldwater before Congress by saying it would be dangerous for the United States to place total reliance on missiles. Both are for development and procurement of a bomber to replace the B-52 and B-58.¹⁵ Congress has consistently supported appropriations for a diversified military establishment that will maintain United States military superiority in all fields and with all possible weapons

¹³Samuel P. Huntington, The Common Defense, p. 41.

¹⁴U. S. News and World Report, March 9, 1964, p. 28.

¹⁵Katherine Johnsen, "New Bomber Funds Win Early Approval," Aviation Week & Space Technology, February 24, 1964, pps. 26-27.

systems, including airplanes, missiles, submarines, aircraft carriers and any equipment it takes for all types of special forces. The actions of Congress point to the conclusion that this pluralistic, diversified type of defense is what the country needs and wants.

Scientific Superiority

Nuclear weapons superiority is at present a clear-cut aim of the United States. Solitary possession of the atomic bomb after World War II gave the United States an initial sense of security which to the American public was dismayingly destroyed when Russia exploded an atomic bomb in 1949, followed by a hydrogen bomb in 1953, and lastly when the achievement in space propulsion demonstrated by "Sputnik" in 1957 which confirmed a lead in space propulsion which the United States 8 years later still has not overtaken. As each scientific success of the Russians has become known, the leaders of the nation and the American public have demanded an effort by the military-industrial complex (augmented by scientific research and development) which would not only equal but surpass the Russians. National pride, while hard to measure, has also abetted such an effort.

Undetectable chemical and biological weapons, more powerful thermonuclear weapons, predictions of cobalt, neutron, and more sophisticated hydrogen weapons, manned orbiting space ships carrying atomic bombs--all already on the future scientific time table; only accentuate the imperative need for the United States to stay ahead of the U.S.S.R. in scientific progress as far as it relates to military supremacy. True, there is a minority point of view that is growing larger, that exploration of space, not having an immediate military value, should be curtailed. However, at the present time there is no absolute

agreement on which space projects should be military and which strictly scientific and civilian. Congress has not cancelled any budgeted space projects; but, by cut-backs in appropriations, it has delayed some of them. A persuasive point of view is the latest statement of the Chairman, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, J. W. Fulbright that the war on poverty and education and welfare programs are more important than a "voyage to the moon."¹⁶ The military has been unsuccessful in its attempts to control all space exploration; rather, it has supported government space exploration by NASA (National Aeronautical Space Administration) and, in return, received priority whenever a project is recognized as having a definite military application. A Russian space success which appears to have a military application will undoubtedly have Congress appropriating additional money and applying the pressure not only on the military and industry, but also on NASA, to equal or surpass Russian claims to success which are not necessarily justifiable. Congress, in the present climate of opinion, will support all proven needs for the military's scientific demands.

But space developments are not the only areas in which military scientific progress is being made. Scientific progress is being made in all military fields. This progress runs the entire gamut of conventional weapons, missiles, submarines, planes, helicopters, munitions, and many others. In fact scientific progress is making military hardware obsolete, in many cases even before it is used. The imperative need of a huge military establishment and an industrial base to support it definitely includes scientific

¹⁶ Kansas City Star, Associated Press Dispatch, April 6, 1964, p. 9.

superiority in research and development in all fields, including nuclear.

World Leader and Foreign Policy

The United States is the accepted leader of the so-called free world or anti-communist nations. The foreign policy of the United States is that allies are indispensable. This policy stresses keeping the alliances encircling the "iron curtain" militarily and economically functional, but also continually strengthening them wherever possible. By bitter experience, it was learned that United States leadership in these alliances could be maintained only by forces-in-being. Industrial capacity is no longer decisive in keeping allies or deterring aggression.

Immediately after World War II the U.S.S.R. did not demobilize her Army as did the United States, with the result that Eastern Europe was sealed off and became a Soviet preserve. Secretary of State George Marshall at Moscow and Secretary of State James Byrnes at Berlin tried to modify or alleviate these actions by negotiation, but they could not gain any concessions, nor could they remedy or weaken the Soviet domination. The accepted reason for this failure was, as stated by both Secretaries, simply that they had no negotiating power. Marshall found his basis for negotiating in China in 1947 even less rewarding, and this with a much weaker foe.¹⁷ Coincident with Communist expansion in Europe and China were the actions of the U.S.S.R. in the Security Council of the United Nations where United States proposals on a military force to maintain world peace or on control of nuclears, whether realistic or unrealistic, were met only with successive "nyets" by the Soviet Union. China was lost to the Communists in 1948; only a military effort in 1947 by the United States

¹⁷Huntington, op. cit., p. 40.

saved Turkey and Greece from becoming Communist. The Korean War from 1950 to 1953 emphasized the bipolarization of the world between the two protagonists--U.S.S.R. and United States and the formation of NATO in 1949 has been given credit for stopping Soviet expansion in Europe. The Americans learned the lesson well that Stalin's remark to Franklin D. Roosevelt, "How many divisions has the Pope got?"¹⁸ was not a facetious remark on the part of the Soviet leader. The international successes of the United States in stopping Communist expansion have been accomplished because military power was ready for action and used while the failures can be attributed to the lack of sufficient military power or failure to use available force. The only answer has been to increase the size of our own forces as well as those of our allies.

Samuel P. Huntington, one of the most competent scholars writing on the military today, says that since World War II the dominant goal of United States foreign policy has been national security, with the aims of national security having a veto on every foreign policy decision and foreign policy now even often defined as a branch of national security policy.¹⁹ There is no doubt that national security policy and foreign policy are inextricably intertwined. And the consequences of separate foreign and national security policies would only produce confusion and lack of direction at the national level and also among our allies.] Gone are the days when a Secretary of State can act as Henry Stimson did in implementing the policy of non-recognition of Manchoukuo without even notifying the Navy Department,²⁰ or as Secretary Cordell Hull did when he refused to read the Army plans for occupying Iceland because (as he said) if

¹⁸ C. L. Suizberger, "When The Pope Was Infallible," New York Times, May 16, 1948, p. 34.

¹⁹ Huntington, op. cit., p. 426.

²⁰ Walter Millis, Harvey C. Mansfield, Harold Stein, Arms and The State, p. 20.

he didn't know then he wouldn't be embarrassed before Congress.²¹ And similarly, gone are the days when the State Department could abdicate its responsibilities, or be forced to do so by a President, and allow General Joseph Stilwell to supplant the appointed ambassador to China Clarence Gauss in all World War II dealings with Chiang Kai-shek or when determination of access routes to Berlin or the occupation of Prague and Berlin would be considered as strictly military decisions to the entire exclusion of the political point of view.²² The NSC (National Security Council) provides us with the coordinating organization, whether we think it is functioning to its highest potential or not, where foreign policy-military security problems are discussed and formulated from both political and military points of view.

[Allies have another significant effect on the military-industrial complex. Concentration on nuclear weapons as the only means of conducting warfare produces one kind of military establishment. If the United States would adopt this strategy, then the military establishment could be limited to ICBM's (intercontinental ballistic missiles), anti-missile defense against Soviet nuclear missiles, and civilian defense structures to protect cities and the non-combatant citizens of the United States. But the type of military establishment which places emphasis on a single type of warfare--that of massive retaliation] as advocated by the Eisenhower administration [fails to protect all our allies and, of course, is unsatisfactory to them, as the reason for alliances is mutual security. In some cases, as in Vietnam and Laos, overwhelming nuclear superiority fails even to deter the opposition. Allied

²¹ Ibid., pps. 49, 51.

²² Ibid., pps. 95, 129, 132.

troop concentrations in Germany have certainly influenced Soviet policy. Again, having available troops to move to Lebanon and Cuba changed conditions in these two countries. Even in these areas where a war, if started, might well escalate to a thermonuclear war, conventional forces are considered vital and probably more useful as a shield (if anything else). The United States, in order to stop the spread of Communism and to protect allies, is committed to any possible type of warfare commensurate with that used by Communists any place in the world.]

C. Wright Mills bluntly states that only a great nation can threaten decisive warfare and that military power determines the political standing of nations.²³ The United States is a great nation and to maintain its preeminent position in world councils must have commensurate military power. Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., has expressed the same idea in a more subtle and interesting way and indicates the reason this country must have a diversified military posture in order to have a viable foreign policy with military policy subordinate to foreign policy.

It is now evident that military power becomes the master of foreign policy not when there is too much of it but when there is too little. It is the absence or lopsidedness of armed strength that allows the military situation to run foreign affairs. When our military policy is inadequate to meet a variety of crises, our foreign policy must become constrained, rigid, and inflexible. Balanced and ample military power is consequently the price we must pay for freedom of national action.²⁴

American diplomatic prestige and leadership require that the United States be recognized as the superior military force in all types of warfare, whether strategic missile warfare, conventional warfare with large troop concentrations,

²³C. Wright Mills, The Power Elite, p. 85.

²⁴Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., "Military Forces: How Much and Where?," The Reporter, August 14, 1953, p. 13.

or small troop concentrations of the guerrilla or special force type, and whether on land, or sea, or in the air. The imperative need for a huge military-industrial complex is complicated and enhanced by the United States national policy of world leadership, by the necessity for allies in all parts of the world, and by the requirement to stop the spread of Communism. The United States cannot concentrate on one type of military force, but must become proficient in all types (of warfare). This has one principal effect--that is enlargement and profusion of the military establishment and the industrial structure to support it.

Economic Necessity

[Defense industry is an important factor in the economy of the United States. As it is doubtful that the defense budget will increase in the near future without a Soviet political or military offensive, and since, for the moment, the U.S.S.R. is engaged in domestic problems and in maintaining its leadership in competition with China in Communist-controlled countries, only a decrease in the defense budget need be considered. Any sudden, large adjustments downward in defense expenditures would drastically affect the American economy. That this is true can be proved by a few facts. Defense, if it can be considered a single industry, is admittedly the leading one today.²⁵ With assets three times the combined assets of U. S. Steel, Metropolitan Life Insurance, American Telephone and Telegraph, General Motors, and Standard Oil of New Jersey,²⁶ with 22 out of 50 states depending heavily on defense

²⁵It has become common to speak of Defense industry as one industry similar to the auto industry. This is not accurate; the defense industry is, according to Jack Raymond in his book, *Power At The Pentagon*, "a hybrid arms industry, financed by the government, controlled by the government, but labeled free enterprise, is one of the characteristics of the military-industrial complex," (p. 166).

²⁶Fred J. Cook, *The Warfare State*, p. 22.

spending;²⁷ with space (which has many military implications), now the second industry in the United States after having passed steel and steel products in 1963, and at its present rate of growth about to surpass the leading auto industry within the next two years;²⁸ it can be expected that over \$20 billion in new contracts will be negotiated through the Defense Department annually²⁹ for the foreseeable future, excluding the contracts NASA will negotiate.

Defense contracts are also important internationally. As the world leader in the production of military equipment, the United States is a foremost advocate for the standardization of all military equipment for our allies. This is without doubt a desirable military objective. With all nations using the same equipment, interchangeability of not only equipment but of spare parts is possible and maintenance, repair, and supply depots can not only be integrated but become much more efficient. This is important as part of our military policy, but selling military equipment to our allies is also a significant factor in maintaining the balance of payments in a favorable ratio.³⁰

Only one other related fact is necessary to show the importance of defense industry to our present economy. President ^{Nixon} Johnson is advocating a war on poverty. With 5 billion unemployed, is the President or Congress willing to sacrifice the leading industry of the United States? Would the President or Congress allow a prolonged strike in the auto industry, let alone its elimination or partial elimination? The concern of the President and the country over a strike in the steel, rail, or any other large industry should be

²⁷ Ibid., p. 176.

²⁸ William Beller, "Missile/Space Industry Rapidly Outdistancing Automotive," Missiles and Rockets, October 28, 1963, p. 22.

²⁹ Cook, loc. cit.

³⁰ "Have Gun, Will Sell," The New Republic, June 5, 1965, p. 5.

sufficient proof that the acceptance by the public or government officials of the elimination of the defense industry or even of a large-scale reduction in it would be unacceptable. Defense spending will continue until unemployment decreases or until defense industry can be shifted to other pursuits, which will take time. Defense spending will probably increase if even a slight depression appears as it did under Eisenhower in 1958.³¹ As unsympathetic a commentator of the present Administration as David Lawrence says that it would be disastrous to our national economy if the arms budget was cut suddenly, although he, like many others, including respected economists and industrialists, thinks it could be cut gradually, but only after detailed plans were made and effected to shift the economy with a corresponding cut in taxes.³² The 1964 cut in taxes stimulated business. There is every reason to believe that additional cuts would have the same beneficial effect upon the national economy. Defense spending only represents 10% of the GNP, so 90% has to come from other areas. Defense spending does not enter into consumption and is, on the whole, a wasteful method of government expenditure to produce prosperity. In 1945-46 there was transferred more than twice as much in resources and manpower from war to civilian employments as would be involved in complete disarmament now without disruption of the economy.³³ There are many suggestions and methods to reduce the size of the military-industrial complex. Many economists believe with Kenneth E. Boulding that if the government would spend as much on research and training for human welfare as is spent on defense that the results would be

³¹Huntington, *op. cit.*, p. 276.

³²David Lawrence, "If - -", *U. S. News and World Report*, October 21, 1963, p. 124.

³³Donald G. Brennan, ed., *Disarmament and National Security*, p. 156.

dramatic.³⁴ Nevertheless to cut the military budget will not be a simple task and will at best require detailed planning for conversion.

Conclusion

LEIRD

According to McNamara, the President and Congress are providing the means to fill this imperative defense need of the American public. He summarizes the situation pragmatically in this fashion:

The U. S. has 750 intercontinental ballistic missiles on the pads as against less than 200 Soviet ICBM's. There are 192 Polaris missiles deployed, in contrast to a far fewer number of Russian sublaunched missiles which have only one-third as much range and must be fired from the surface. The U. S. has 540 strategic jet bombers on 15 minute alert, while Russia has no more than 120 heavy bombers capable of hitting U. S. targets on two-way missions.³⁵

There are wide differences in the various estimates by economic experts of the GNP (Gross National Product), industrial capacity, per capita income, and the amount of money spent on defense by the U.S.S.R. as compared to the United States. These estimates place the U.S.S.R. GNP at a high of one-half to a low of one-fourth of that of the United States.³⁶ And the amount being spent on defense in the U.S.S.R. ranges from a low of around \$15 billion annually, which is identifiable, to a high of a much larger amount which is hidden in the Russian budget, but no experts believe the Russian defense budget reaches the \$50 billion being spent annually by the United States.³⁷ General Thomas Power, United States Air Force, says Russia spends 40% of its GNP on defense while the United States has been "moving away from [them]" and only spending 10% of her GNP on defense.³⁸ The average per capita income in

³⁴Ibid., p. 161.

³⁵William J. Coughlin, "The Philosophy of Chance," Missiles and Rockets, April 20, 1964, p. 46.

³⁶Henry Rowen, Study Paper No. 18, "National Security and the American Economy in the 1960's", 86th Congress, 2d Session, p. 1.

³⁷Charles H. Hitch, "National Security Policy as a Field for Economics Research," World Politics, April 1960, p. 437.

³⁸John G. Hubbell, "Tough Tommy Power--Our Deterrent-In-Chief," The Reader's Digest, May 1964, p. 75.

the U.S.S.R. is around \$858³⁹ compared to \$2570 for the United States as of 1962.⁴⁰ Although Russia's per capita income is gaining compared to that of the United States, Russia's industrial production ranges from only 30% to 50% of that of the United States.⁴¹ These figures indicate that there is no economic reason why the United States cannot stay superior to the U.S.S.R. militarily if the desire to use her wealth for this purpose continues. In fact, the United States spent 40% of her GNP for defense in World War II compared to an estimated 10% in 1963; that the United States could return to this type of economy if necessary for national survival is not questioned.⁴²

Even though United States can economically support its own military security and can provide leadership based on military power, it is a mean goal for a great nation. Peace, security, and justice for all nations is certainly a higher goal for a truly great nation. This is actually what the United States is striving for. President ^{Nixon} Johnson (has several times reiterated that peace is the goal of the United States;⁴³ certainly] ^{PAST PRESIDENTS HAVE} President Kennedy and President Eisenhower both [shared this goal. In fact, a world of law in which the United Nations would be influential in settling international disputes is a cardinal policy of the United States.

Political beliefs and ideas in America change slowly. The United States ~~X~~ is a conservative nation. Our form of government, particularly the legisla-

³⁹Abram Bergson, The Great Economic Race, Challenge, March 1963, p. 6.

⁴⁰The World Almanac, New York World Telegram & Sun, p. 748.

⁴¹Interview with Dr. G. Warren Nutter, "U. S. News and World Report", April 13, 1964, p. 53.

⁴²Charles J. Hitch, "National Policy as a Field for Economics Research," World Politics, April 1960, pps. 438 and 440.

⁴³John R. Cauley, "Peace Pledge by L.B.J.," Kansas City Star, Dec. 17, 1963, p. 1, and "Johnson Pledges Drive For Peace," New York Times, Dec. 15, 1963, p. 21.

tive branch, with its preeminent interest localized to its members' state or district, is not conducive to rapid and radical changes. A strong military establishment has become, since World War II, a firmly-rooted goal considered absolutely necessary by both the Congress and the President of the United States, as well as a great majority of the American people. Although dissenting voices are being raised, mainly as to the degree of defense spending and its deleterious effect on American democratic institutions, they have not been effective to date in changing the consensus that absolute security without qualification is essential and that the best way to maintain security, and for that matter peace, is through an overwhelmingly superior military establishment. If the thinking of Americans is to be reoriented toward peaceful solutions that are not based on military power, it will have to gain vocal advocates in our press as well as with Congressional leaders, and particularly, it must obtain a grass roots acceptance probably starting in our educational institutions. Eisenhower is correct in that the majority of Americans and their elected officials consider a huge military establishment with the industrial base to support it to be an imperative need for national security, national existence, world leadership, international prestige, protection of our allies, and, while not universally accepted, most politicians believe defense industry an imperative to maintain our present national economy, and economists believe any reduction in defense spending must be done gradually over a long period of time after detailed planning.

CHAPTER III

POTENTIAL MISPLACED POWER AND UNWARRANTED INFLUENCE

There seems little doubt that a consensus in the United States supports the need for an immense military-industrial complex. The next question to be analyzed is the President's contention that the total influence of this complex is felt economically, politically, and spiritually in every city, state, and office of the federal government and that this influence represents a potential for misplaced power that is inimical to democratic processes. First will be presented evidence to support the President's contention and in the following chapter will be discussed conditions which nullify or mitigate the President's argument.

Militarism

Corruption by an individual or a small group is the common inference when the words "misplaced power" and "unwarranted influence" are used in connection with government. In every government office, whether it be national, state, or local, this potential for corruption exists. No one would argue with the statement that every day, somewhere in the United States, on some government level, an official is being investigated and charged with corruption. "Teapot Dome Scandals" and individuals like Billie Sol Estes or Bobby Baker involve government officials directly, or even more often indirectly, through official lassitude in the wrongful use of power and influence. On a lesser degree there are the Talbotts, Adamases, Macks, and Korths,¹ who leave government service not charged with criminal offenses but with tarnished reputations because they applied influence gained through government position

¹"Self Deceivers," Newsweek, November 11, 1963, p. 114.

in a doubtful manner. There certainly is nothing new in this. While this condition is unsanctioned, undesirable, and impossible to completely eliminate, the United States is almost daily showing, as it has many times in the past, that the means for controlling this type of misconduct and illegal action are available through the proper functioning of an alert, free, and vigilant press and the normal legal and investigative powers present at all levels of government.

Unwarranted influence and misplaced power in the military-industrial complex, as evidenced by corruption of individuals, is not the subject of President Eisenhower's warning. Although, if individual corruption is present and particularly if corruption is a part of a general lowering in the moral tone of defense officials, either civilian or military, with a combination of industrial leaders motivated solely for personal power or economic profit, the problems connected with the military-industrial complex are undoubtedly magnified. However, the President's problem is of a much greater magnitude than that of a comparatively few individuals seeking power or money for their own aggrandizement. It is a power and influence felt simultaneously at all levels of government--federal, state, and local; and in all segments of society--economic, political, even spiritual; and by its very weight has the power to endanger not only individual liberties but democratic processes.

An influence so all-encompassing as that described by President Eisenhower is traditional militarism, whether he wishes to name the disease or not. A freely paraphrased definition of a militaristic state taken from A History of Militarism by Alfred Vagts is one in which military thinking permeates all elements of the society and becomes influential in education, arts, science, and industry with undue consideration to military requirements, resulting in a corresponding neglect of welfare and culture.² The similarity between President

² Alfred Vagts, A History of Militarism, p. 13.

Eisenhower's warning and Vagts' definition is striking. If we accept the President's description of the prevalence of the influence of the military-industrial complex throughout the country, as many writers and public leaders do, instead of just a potential influence, then it would seem that only one additional item of proof is necessary to show that the United States has become a militaristic state. This missing detail is that military requirements are taking a disproportionate share of the country's wealth to the detriment of welfare and culture. There is no way to prove that Congress would appropriate additional money for education, welfare, and culture if cuts in military appropriations were made. However, a case can be made that a decreased military budget would result in an increased welfare budget. Congressman Morris K. Udall remarked that in 1939, forty-four cents of the budget dollar was spent for labor, health, education, and other welfare programs--whereas in 1963, only seven cents of the budget dollar went for these purposes. Based on the 1939 dollar, federal welfare expenditures have shrunk from thirty dollars per citizen to sixteen dollars.³

Several points stressed by the President in his speech have been overlooked by writers and commentators who discuss militarism in the context of this speech.

First, the President said the combination of industry and the military is a complex. This problem is usually considered strictly as a military one, while occasionally, considered as an industrial problem, but for the President it was the combination that presented the potential for misplaced power. Secondly, even though the complex has within it the seeds of militarism, it

³Douglass Cater, Power in Washington, p. 249.

fulfills, as has been previously shown, an imperative need of our country, so that the problem is not to destroy the complex but, as Eisenhower has succinctly said, to compel its proper meshing so that "liberty and security can prosper together." Thirdly, historical militarism is not necessarily or even predominantly confined to the military. Civilian militarism of the Hitler, Mussolini, and Stalin type can be just as dangerous to a democracy and is more applicable to the United States, if industry is the controlling partner of the military-industrial complex, than the military militarism which existed in pre-World War II Japan or exists in Franco's Spain today. In fact, no industrial state in modern times has become militaristic without the participation and cooperation of its industrial leaders, and there is considerable proof that civilians are more militaristic than the military.⁴

The Third Member of the Complex

Admiral Hyman Rickover identified Congress with the military-industrial complex. Before a Congressional Subcommittee he said there were actually two complexes--the military-industrial and the political-industrial. He implied that the political portion was controlled by Congress making its own rules and said that if Congress would control the industrial portion through its investigative powers that the military would be automatically controlled.⁵ Admiral Rickover would have been more precise if he had said that there was a single complex: Congressional-military-industrial. There are many examples that prove this concept is more accurate, but none more illustrative than the inter-relationship of Congress, industry, and the military in the production of the B-70.

⁴Vagts, op. cit., pps. 452, 453.

⁵Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964), pps. 467, 469, 512-516.

This prototype piece of military hardware was to be used to develop future supersonic planes and the contract was \$13 billion.⁶ North American Aviation in California was the prime contractor for the B-70 or, as it was renamed, the RS-70. Subcontracts included upper fuselage in Georgia, lower fuselage in Ohio, wings in Washington, stabilizers in Texas, and navigation system in New York. Altogether twenty states had important subcontracts. Capitol Hill, led by Congressman Carl Vinson of Georgia, gave this airplane extraordinary support for over five years. The Air Force's big bomber men doggedly fought for it.⁷ Nixon announced a major increase for the B-70 one week before the election in 1960. Newspapers said it would mean 3,000 more jobs in California. Where did Nixon make the announcement? In California.⁸ Whether North American carefully selected the subcontractors in order to influence as many Congressmen as possible cannot be proven, but there is a good case that this can be assumed as correct because, in the case of the later TFX, according to an executive's assessment, Douglas tried to locate a substantial portion of its subcontracts in Missouri and Oklahoma, whose Senators, Stuart Symington and the late Robert Kerr, were influential in military matters.⁹ Twice Congress tried to override Secretary McNamara's veto on the B-70 and once President Kennedy refused to spend money appropriated for it.¹⁰ Still, money for the first prototype was provided and in October 1964 the plane was flown. Finally, the Air Force didn't want the plane. According to Newsweek, "The B-70 now has become a big disadvantage for the Air Force. The project must be terminated if we are going to make any

⁶ Aircraft: Humiliating Triumph, Newsweek, May 18, 1964, p. 90.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ New York Times, November 1, 1960, p. 1 and November 3, 1960, p. 33.

⁹ Richard Austin Smith, "The \$7-Billion Contract that Changed the Rules," Fortune, March, 1963, p. 184.

¹⁰ Cater, op. cit., p. 45.

real progress on new manned bombers."¹¹ This is not the only example of expensive military hardware, costing millions, becoming obsolete before use. The B-70 development program was continued as a compromise between Congress representing themselves, as well as industry and the military represented by the Air Force, and the executive branch represented by Secretary McNamara and the Defense Department.

In a July 1964 report, House Republican leaders charged Secretary McNamara with planned weapons obsolescence. Admittedly much of the material was for 1964 campaign purposes, but every single recommendation made would increase the defense budget. Their principal recommendation was for new manned airplanes to operate in the earth's environment or near space and for full exploration of the military implications of outer space. Secretary McNamara's position was that Minuteman and Polaris had made manned strategic bombers of lesser importance. The Air Force was undoubtedly for manned bombers in addition to missiles as they would increase its influence. Also the Republican Congressional Committee recommended an anti-ballistic-missile system, which would support the Army who had wanted to go into production with Nike Zeus, its anti-missile missile, for some time. But Secretary McNamara was insisting upon more tests. Another recommendation was an attack aircraft carrier with nuclear instead of conventional power. Considerable money had already been spent on this project with little evidence of success. The concluding Republican recommendation was a comprehensive antisubmarine warfare program to result in end products. The Navy certainly agreed with this. So the Republican leaders had actually recommended large increases in areas advocated by each service and a large segment of industry. These projects were among the most expensive and were among those which had either been eliminated by the executive branch or had shown little progress in

¹¹Loc. cit., Newsweek.

spite of large expenditures.¹² These recommendations had been made at a politically sensitive period (July 1964) and were clear evidence of the political importance as well as the close connection of Congress with defense industry and weapons systems proposed by the military.

Economic and Political Importance of Congressional-Military-Industrial Complex

Fifty billion dollars is being spent for defense this year (FY 1965), or one-half of our national budget, or approximately 8% of an over \$600 billion GNP compared to 1% or an \$83 billion GNP in 1936. The military budget has increased \$48.5 billion since 1936.¹³ The growth and size of the defense budget staggers the imagination. If there were no other considerations, the size of the defense budget alone makes it an overriding political issue. As an example of the effect of defense industry on an entire area in the midwest east of the Mississippi--the auto industry was booming in Detroit and the steel industry was up in Gary, yet this area lagged behind the average growth record of the United States as a whole for the years 1952-1962, as far as gains in population, non-farm jobs and personal incomes were concerned. The reason given was that prime defense contracts were down 26.5% in this area for the same period.¹⁴ No Congressman can afford to ignore such facts as these. Congressmen are reelected on the basis of what they do for their districts. Defense installations exist in nearly two of every three congressional districts, averaging two and one-half per each district.¹⁵ And every district wants more. No one doubts the

¹²Heather M. David, "Republican Body Charges DOD With Planned Weapons Obsolescence," Missiles and Rockets, July 6, 1964, p. 18.

¹³U. S. Department of Commerce, Historical Studies of the United States: Colonial Times to 1957, p. 793.

¹⁴"What's Happening to the Middle West?", U. S. News and World Report, October 14, 1963, pps. 55-58.

¹⁵Cater, op. cit., p. 30.

importance to a Congressman of a reputation that he is able to get industry for his district. This is accepted by Americans as part of a Congressman's job, but the extent to which elected officials pursue this quest certainly provides ample opportunity for unwarranted influence and misplaced power. A few additional examples, that could be duplicated many times, should prove this point.

In the case of the MM RBM (mobile medium-range ballistic missile) the Defense Department asked for \$143 million. The House Appropriations Committee cut the funds to \$43 million. Secretary McNamara never appeared enthusiastic for the weapon, so he decided not to fight for the remaining sum. But the contractors got busy. The work would be done in Arizona by the Hughes Aircraft and a subsidiary of Goodyear. Additional work would be done in Utah by Thiokol. General Precision would bring jobs to New York and New Jersey. Ford's Aeronautical Division, as well as Hughes Aircraft, would bring work to California. The contractors presented the case to interested Senators and Representatives, beginning with the statement of the importance of this weapon in defense of the free world and ending by reminding at least one Senator that their company had contributed to the Senator's last campaign.¹⁶

The Army, as stated, pressed for early production of the Nike-Zeus anti-missile missile. Army magazine featured an entire issue praising Nike-Zeus and containing advertisements from Western Electric, the prime contractor, and eight aeronautical subcontractors. Contained in the issue was a map showing thirty-seven states which would get more defense dollars when production started on a project estimated to cost \$20 billion before it was completed.¹⁷

¹⁶Julius Duscha, "Arms and the Big Money Men," Harper's Magazine, March, 1964, p. 43.

¹⁷Ibid., p. 45.

Senator Ted Kennedy campaigned on the slogan, "He can do more for Massachusetts." There was no doubt in anyone's mind that the slogan meant Kennedy could do more in Washington by getting more business for Massachusetts, and under our present budget, this means defense business. Even before Kennedy took office, he went to Grumman Aircraft on Long Island to partially fulfill his campaign promises. Ordinarily such actions by a freshman Senator would be deeply resented in the Senate, but censure was limited; no doubt being the President's brother assisted young Kennedy. At least he was successful, as he announced that Grumman had awarded a \$50 million subcontract to the RCA (Radio Corporation of America) in Massachusetts.¹⁸

Convair Division of General Dynamics, employing about 18,000, was the largest single employer in Fort Worth. The company was in serious financial difficulties and was facing personnel reductions if B-58 procurement tapered off as planned by the Defense Department. Congressman James Wright tried to influence the Executive branch, members of Congress, and in fact, all Washington officialdom as to the importance of the B-58 to national security. It is reported he allowed General Dynamics to use his office as its headquarters and he even privately visited General Curtis LeMay to convince him of the strategic necessity of the B-58. He was successful in Congress but President Kennedy refused to spend the money.¹⁹

Senator Jacob Javits of New York complained that statistics revealed that New York was receiving only 9.9 per cent of military procurement compared to 23.9 per cent in California.²⁰ Representative Ken Hechler rose in the House

¹⁸Ibid.

¹⁹Cater, *op. cit.*, p. 39.

²⁰Ibid., p. 38.

and announced:

I am firmly against the kind of logrolling which would subject our defense program to narrowly sectional or selfish pulling and hauling. But I am getting pretty hot under the collar about the way my state of West Virginia is shortchanged in Army, Navy, and Air Force installations . . . I am going to stand up on my hind legs and roar until West Virginia gets the fair treatment she deserves.²¹

The allocation of military installations and bases still retains its economic appeal to Congressmen. President Johnson last January announced the closing of 33 bases and later increased the number to over 60. Within a week he said he had changed his mind on three naval bases because of additional information received from Congressional leaders.²² Every Congressman was in favor of closing the bases--except for that installation or base in his own district. Both Nelson Rockefeller and Barry Goldwater indicated, while campaigning in New Hampshire, that the Portsmouth, New Hampshire, Naval Base should not be closed.²³ This wasn't one of the bases President Johnson had decided to keep open.

In a frank statement that could apply to two-thirds of the Congressional districts in the country, Martin Miller, the county district attorney in Denver, home of the Martin plant, said:

The principal issue in the last Congressional campaign for our district turned on the question of whether or not the United States Government should spend more money for military appropriations on defense, or less.²⁴

It is well known that President Kennedy campaigned in 1960 in West Virginia and Pennsylvania strictly on the issue that he would relieve unemployment there by transferring defense contracts. Later in 1962 he told a Pennsylvania

²¹ Study by Defense Procurement Subcommittee of the Joint Economic Subcommittee of the Joint Economic Subcommittee, 1960, Congressional Quarterly, XIX, March 24, 1961, p. 467.

²² Kansas City Star, Associated Press Dispatch, April 24, 1964, p. 1.

²³ New York Times, February 26, 1964, p. 14, and February 27, 1964, p. 1.

²⁴ Jack Reynolds, Power In The Pentagon, p. 219.

audience that "working with Governor David Lawrence since 1960, we have increased by 50 per cent the number of prime defense contracts that come to Pennsylvania."²⁵

This political interest in defense industry is expected by Americans. The Portland Oregonian editorially criticized Senator Wayne Morse as follows:

"Washington State's working Senators won a billion dollars in military spending in one year for their people. . . Oregon's talking Senator has won only 6½ percent of what Washington received."²⁶ Republican nominee Jean Bradshaw of Missouri tried to unseat the incumbent Senator Stuart Symington in 1964 and several times charged that Senator Symington has done nothing to get defense industry into Missouri.²⁷ The charge was made despite the fact that Senator Symington is recognized as one of the most influential Senators in Congress in defense matters. Similar charges are repeated by political opponents throughout the nation.

Similarly Congressmen still retain their interest in the traditional "pork barrel" legislation of military construction and civil works but these combined programs are less than \$2 billion,²⁸ compared to the military procurement contracts running annually between \$20 and \$25 billion. Interest of Congressmen in government money to be spent in their district is not of itself evidence of unwarranted influence, it is a part of their job and does have this potential. Defense Department carefully notifies Senators and Congressmen of approved contracts so that they can get the credit at home even though they had nothing to do with the contract. This has been going on at least since the days of WPA

²⁵Duscha, op. cit., p. 42.

²⁶Cater, op. cit., pps. 38-39.

²⁷Kansas City Star, August 11, 1964, pps. 4-5.

²⁸Budget of The United States Government, Fiscal Year Ending June 30, 1965,
p. 357.

(Works Progress Administration)²⁹ when Roosevelt tried to eradicate the depression through public works and other projects. Some people believe that the publicity a Congressman receives from such actions objectionable, particularly as the Congressman should be interested in legislation not defense contracts, while others agree that it is just good politics.³⁰ If the Administration played favorites in notification, then certainly objections by Congress would be heard.

Even if it is accepted that most Congressmen and Senators are a group of men dedicated to the best interests of the United States, it must be admitted that, even with dedicated men, personal interests and the also dedicated interest to their states or districts may often achieve an unwarranted or illogical priority. None of the illustrations given have definitively proven misplaced power or unwarranted influence, but they do show that the opportunity is present, and the tendency to do whatever is necessary to accomplish a desired result is also evident. The influence of individual Senators and Representatives varies greatly, and it is doubtful if the actions of a single Senator or Congressman, unsupported by his colleagues, could achieve a result sufficiently detrimental to the best interests of the United States to require notice by a retiring President. But a group of perhaps misguided but dedicated and convinced Congressmen, working in concert with industrialists and the military, certainly has the power and influence for this abuse.

Particularly is this power important when the size of the military budget has such an overriding effect on what is recognized by officials as the major political issue--the economic welfare of their constituents. Year in and

²⁹The author, as a clerk in WPA from 1935-39, had the duty of notifying Senators and Congressmen of all projects approved in their states or districts at least one day in advance of the Administration's announcement. The status of some projects was followed closely by some Congressmen, while at other times the Congressmen called to have the project explained to them. This was done purely to give the elected legislators publicity, but Republicans and Democrats were treated exactly the same as far as notification was concerned.

³⁰Duscha, op. cit., p. 41.

year out, economic prosperity is probably the underlying decisive issue in electing or defeating more Representatives, Senators, and Governors than any other single issue. Prosperity brings reelection and conversely economic depressions are certainly conducive to political change of the party in power.

Changed Relationship Between Congress and the Military

Congressmen have always been, as they must be, vitally interested in any federal money spent in their districts or states, and military appropriations do not differ from any other type of federal grants. "Pork barrel" legislation refers to appropriations for the development of harbors, flood control, and the general development of water resources to be supervised by the Army Corps of Engineers. Between Congressmen and the Army Engineers a close and understanding association developed. Outside of this special relationship, prior to World War II, Congress and the military had been to a large degree, antagonists. Traditionally the military have been concerned with an improved military establishment, while Congress was interested solely with the effect of the military establishment on the well-being of their constituents. Consequently we find the 125 pre-World War II Army posts scattered throughout the country. All attempts to consolidate them in order to train a more efficient Army met immediate and successful resistance by Congressmen, each of whom would not willingly submit to the financial loss of an Army post to his district. Similarly Senator Alben Barkley protested the elimination of the number of horses allocated to officers and the reduction of the Cavalry because these actions meant a decrease in the number of Army horses, many of which were raised in Kentucky. Likewise farmers raising hay had the support of their Congressmen in resisting the mechanization of the Army.³¹ These are typical examples of Congressional

³¹Edward Pendelton Herring, The Impact of War. See Chapter V for a complete analysis of the inter-relationship of Congress and the military before World War II.

influence considered as normal in our political traditions before World War II.

Since World War II this has changed. Now no Congressman can afford to fight against a more efficient military establishment. Further, as is now recognized, it is an imperative need of our country to have the finest military establishment in the world. A Congressman now needs support of the military for whatever action he proposes. The \$20 billion annually in military contracts represents economic survival for many communities, as much defense industry has no civilian counterpart and, in other communities, it takes time to switch to civilian production even if it is feasible. No Congressman is doing any more than his predecessors did when he attempts to get and keep as much military business in his community as he possibly can. The important fact now is that Congressmen go to the Defense Department for assistance to get projects while formerly Congress closely controlled all increases in defense expenditures. The military and Congress are no longer antagonists. If a Congressman is to succeed in getting military industry, he must have the military on his side. Consequently, the result is that Congressmen now seek military support whenever possible, just to get or keep military industry in their district. The history of the TFX contract, already related, is a prime example of this willing and special pleading.³²

The Military Side

Military leaders have studied their military history well. They know the United States has never been prepared for any war it has fought. Now with supersonic atomic missiles threatening instant destruction, they have the responsibility for the security of the nation. This is their job. Unpreparedness

³²Duscha, op. cit., This article gives additional examples of Congressmen and Senators in dealing with Defense Department officials on defense contracts.

in this missile age may not only mean defeat, but invites attack. The Air Force recognizes the danger to the country that can come through the air. The Navy recognizes the danger that potential warfare at sea offers. The Army recognizes the danger to our country of the constant nibbling expansion of Communists on the periphery of areas once considered part of the free world. Under these conditions, the Army recommends UMT (Universal Military Training), more and better atomic missiles for the ground soldier, more and better tanks, more and better trained soldiers, more and better helicopters; the Navy recommends more and better atomic submarines, more and better nuclear-powered ships, more and better means to fight enemy submarines; the Air Force recommends more and better planes of all types, more and better strategic missiles. Scientific advances are constantly producing recommendations from both industry and the military for improvement and changes on equipment and hardware. To guarantee security, only the latest and best equipment is acceptable. In fact, the American public feels that the American soldier, sailor, and airman deserve the very finest equipment. A Congressional investigation almost followed the report from Vietnam that American airmen were being killed because they were being forced to use second rate equipment.³³ No longer will Americans be satisfied with the use of a thirty-year-old rifle, as they were in World War II with the use of the famous Springfield rifle. As Charles J. Hitch, Comptroller of the Defense Department, says:

There can be no question regarding the crucial importance of promoting military technology in the nuclear era. Any power that lags significantly in military technology, no matter how large its military budget or how efficiently it allocates resources, is likely to be at the mercy of a more progressive enemy. Both weapons and systems for delivering them have gone through several revolutions in the few years since the end of the Second World War. Individual bombs are now 1,000 times as powerful as those dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, which were themselves 1,000 times as powerful as the largest dropped on Germany. Breakthroughs in missile

³³New York Times, May 13, 1964, p. 2 and May 14, 1964, p. 1.

technology are continually threatening the whole offensive or defensive apparatus of one side or the other. Keeping ahead in the technological race is not in itself a guarantee of security in these circumstances; it remains essential to incorporate the technology in operational hardware ("forces in being") and to deploy them and use them with skill and intelligence. But no amount of production, skill and intelligent use can compensate for significant technological inferiority.³⁴

With this scientific revolution in military equipment and the general rise in prices since World War II, defense equipment costs have skyrocketed. For instance, a World War II Sherman tank cost \$50,000; a tank to do its equivalent job today costs \$236,000. The jeep and $2\frac{1}{2}$ -ton truck of World War II cost \$1,400 and \$2,300 respectively; today the costs are \$2,850 and \$8,513.³⁵ Airplanes present even greater variations. Fighters late in World War II cost \$50,985; their replacements today cost \$5,200,000. The late World War II bomber cost \$509,465 compared to the \$8,000,000 cost of a modern bomber.³⁶ An Army Air Assault Division has eliminated many vehicles and replaced them with aircraft many of which cost \$3,000,000 apiece.³⁷ Radios, individual equipment, crew weapons, and all other equipment show the same type of increase. Prices in the civilian economy have also risen, and in some areas even doubled. The dollar lost 43% of its purchasing power between 1945 and 1965 which accounts for about one-half of the increased costs. The great strides in technological development offer no price comparisons that are valid with the civilian economy but it does not appear that prices have risen proportionately. But the American soldier, sailor, and airman must have the latest and best of everything. This thesis is praiseworthy and the only acceptable one but there does seem to be evidence that defense equipment and hardware costs have risen out

³⁴ Charles J. Hitch and Roland N. McKean, The Economics of Defense in the Nuclear Age, pps. 243-244.

³⁵ Department of the Army, U. S. Army and National Security, p. 71.

³⁶ History of U. S. Air Force, 1907-1957, pps. 92, 117 and Aviation Week, August 26, 1963, p. 32 and November 25, 1963 p. 28.

³⁷ Newsweek, April 27, 1964, p. 36.

of proportion with the general rise in prices. Certainly equipment with the latest scientific advances and huge contracts present opportunities as well as difficulties to defense contractors.

Military men are fully cognizant of the threat to this nation, recognize their responsibility as an awesome task, and it is not too much to say that many of them are honestly afraid for the consequences to our country posed by the enemy threat. Being dedicated to the security of the nation and knowing the possibility of enemy air, sea and ground power, Army, Navy and Air Force leaders would consider they had failed in their mission if they hadn't done everything possible to maintain their service at its highest potential. And this means using every worthwhile improvement or advancement science and industry can produce. Further, the military firmly believes that any enemy who recognizes that the superiority of the United States is unquestioned will never attack. Every budget presented by the military since World War II has had the military recommendations pared down by civilian chiefs. The military will never feel they have sufficient arms and equipment to give the people of the United States the assurance of security they would like to offer. Under these conditions, any recommendations for curtailment in defense funds must come from the civilian Secretaries in the military departments, Bureau of the Budget, or the President and be implemented by Congress. If left to the military, the military-industrial complex will grow in size and importance. If the amount of money spent on defense contracts presents a potential for misplaced power and unwarranted influence, unchecked military influence will increase this potential.

Industry and the Military

The effect of industry on defense spending is to increase it. Individual industrialists often advocate a decrease in government spending and even

decreases in the defense budget, but this advocacy consists of a general recommendation which does not affect their own specific product or industry. In this latter case, it is strictly in the American tradition for businessmen to use every method possible including Congressional pressure, to sell their product. One of the widely accepted beliefs, which undoubtedly has much truth in it, is that industry has made America a great country and that anything that legally promotes profits is acceptable.

It is, in fact, a prime duty of government to protect and promote industry. On the other hand, Americans have also recognized that control of business is necessary to prevent preferential treatment and unfair competition, to protect the individual citizen, and to prevent panics and recessions. Beginning with the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887 and the Sherman Anti-Trust Act of 1890, there has been continuing legislation to regulate business, to create new commissions, and even to allow the government to enter business where industry has failed to provide what the government thinks is necessary, as in the case of the TVA (Tennessee Valley Authority) and the REA (Rural Electrification Administration). Most of this original legislation came during the administration of Franklin D. Roosevelt.

During World War II economic controls were extensive and, while they were relaxed after World War II, no Congress now adjourns without new or amending legislation which affects industry; particularly is this true with the relationship of workers or unions with industry, as in the case of the Taft-Hartley Act. The twin propositions, which may at first appear antithetical, that industry must be controlled as well as promoted by government, is no longer questioned.

Unlike Congress, business always had a close relationship with the military although, except in time of war, the amount has been so small as not to affect

the industrial community as a whole. Beginning in 1844 with the "Treaty of Wanghia" the United States was guaranteed equal opportunity for American businessmen in China. The Navy, Army, and Marines were each present at different times to protect American interests. Japan was opened up for trade by Perry in 1854, although the Spanish-American War may not have been mainly expansionist, business interests in the Philippines and Hawaii were furthered by close collaboration with the military. Until recently Latin America has been considered a special province of American businessmen. "Dollar Diplomacy" was the name given to this policy. "This name had stuck to the efforts of the Taft Administration to force other nations to accept American investments and then to employ Navy and Marines to protect American capital."³⁸

Wars have always resulted in big profits. George Washington complained of the lack of patriotism and the price-gouging of those who supplied our first Army. Almost the same conditions existed in 1812 and 1848. Throughout the settlement of the west, the Army had difficulty supplying posts at what they considered a fair price. Large fortunes were made in expanding wool and cotton industries, shoes, food processing, and iron industries during the Civil War, legally for the most part, but with the knowledge and assistance of the government. Suppliers again became rich during the Spanish-American War.

After World War I a Congressional Report, in five small volumes, of the Senate Munitions Investigating Committee, chaired by Senator Gerald P. Nye of North Dakota, stressed the heavy profits made by American financiers and armament makers during World War I and attempted to prove, (though most present commentators consider its proof to be inconclusive) that the United States entry into World War I was due to the covert pressure exerted by the munitions makers.

³⁸William A. Miller, A New History of the United States, p. 339.

The Nye Committee Report was unanimous in its presentation of facts, but its recommended solutions presented a variety of opinions. Among the accepted allegations were that American companies adopted methods of bribery of foreign government officials to secure business after World War I. One agent (Cole Arms Company) "brought into play the most despicable side of human nature, lies, deceit, hypocrisy, greed, and graft occupying a most prominent part in the transactions." The report further said that the munitions companies were more interested in selling armaments than in furthering peace, and that they never aided any proposal for limitation of armaments but rather actively opposed it.³⁹

In 1929 William D. Shearer told the press that he had been hired by certain shipbuilders to break up the Disarmament Conference. He insisted that he had done his work well, but that he had not been properly compensated for his pains and hence he was willing to betray his former employers.⁴⁰ The Committee pointed out that munitions people were opposed to the arms embargo as were the Army and Navy Department, inferring that they were in league. Sales abroad were assisted by the War, Navy, Commerce, and even State Departments. War scares were even created, toppling some Latin American countries.

Today with Military Assistance Advisory Groups (MAAG's) in 40 countries and with the United States bound by treaties with countries surrounding the iron curtain, no one censures American military men for actively selling American military equipment.⁴¹

³⁹U. S. Cong., Senate Report 944, Report of the Special Committee on Investigation of the Munitions Committee, 74th Cong., 2nd Session (1936), Parts 3 and 7., *passim*.

⁴⁰Herring, *op. cit.*, p. 188.

⁴¹Kansas City Star, Associated Press Dispatch, May 9, 1964, p. 1.

No member of NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) would purchase American equipment unless it was recommended and used by the United States Army, Navy, or Air Force. Some of the smaller underdeveloped countries are willing and forced to take obsolete equipment but, even in these cases they prefer the latest and best for prestige reasons, if nothing else. Most large companies have representatives in Europe, usually retired military men acting as their salesmen. General Joe W. Kelly, who recently retired from the Air Force, will be Senior European Representative for General Dynamics Corporation in Paris. He will work for Roger Lewis, General Dynamics President, a former Air Force Assistant Secretary.⁴² This type of announcement is a frequent occurrence. American arms industry is truly a world-wide concern.

It is claimed that World War I created 23,000 new millionaires, with one estimate as high as 29,000.⁴³ It appears that if this is so, and considering the relative costs of World War I and World War II, there must have been at least as many as 290,000 new millionaires after World War II.

William O. Miller sums up World War II experience as follows:

Taxes covered an unprecedented forty percent of American wartime expenditures. Federal corporation and graduated personal income taxes reached record highs, which brought a good deal of grumbling but few criminal attempts at evasion. Yet corporation profits after taxes, swollen by the standard 'cost plus' contracts, rose from \$5,000,000,000 to nearly \$10,000,000,000 five years later.⁴⁴

There is no doubt that wars bring profits to industrialists. And the cold war appears to be no exception. The M. A. Hanna company made 57 percent profit on selling nickel to the government for defense stockpiling from 1955 to 1960, while the mining industry as a whole was making only 8.4 percent. This cost the government \$20 million, while at the same time 12 copper companies that

⁴²The Journal of The Armed Forces, August 15, 1964, p. 6.

⁴³Edwin S. Corwin, Total War and The Constitution, p. 85.

⁴⁴Miller, op. cit., pps. 396-397.

had agreed to furnish copper for stockpiling were excused from their contracts and able to make a quick \$3 million profit because of a temporary increase in the price of copper. The government is interested in industry making profits. One example that can be duplicated many times is that of Western Electric, the prime contractor for Army's Nike performing only about 25% of the work, yet earning a profit of \$112,500,000. Industry, of course, would say that this is an invalid comparison and that profits must be compared with investment and not work. Cost-plus-fixed-fee contracts which are necessary in war time continue in the cold war period. In these contracts the government is taking all the risk. In 1952 13% of defense contracts were of this type but by 1961 they had increased to 38%. McNamara says he hopes to cut this type of contract to less than 20% with a goal of 12% within a year. Savings through competitive bidding have proven to be substantial, but still over 85% of the defense contracts are negotiated.⁴⁵ The Defense Department appears to be a good customer well worth keeping. And of course, its patronage is vital to the businesses which have no civilian counterparts and of which the military is the sole customer.

It is an unarguable truth that a disregard for profits means business failures and, without profits, there would be no private American industry. But there is also evidence that the dollar is without conscience and its accumulation can become an overriding motive of industrialists to the detriment of the general welfare. The fact that the stock market went down when Khrushchev and Eisenhower proclaimed the "Geneva Spirit" and skyrocketed when the Summit Conference failed after the U-2 incident seems to indicate that those people interested in the stock market are able to evaluate the effects of the cold war.⁴⁶

⁴⁵Julius Dusha, "The Costly Mysteries of Defense Spending," Harper's Magazine, April, 1964, pps. 59-65 passim.

⁴⁶Fred J. Cook, The Warfare State, p. 168.

And above all, it appears reasonable to state (as was stated) of the military, that any reduction in the military-industrial complex will never be accomplished by the willing cooperation of defense industry but will be resisted by every means and pressures that industry can employ.

Combination in Place of Separation

C. Wright Mills whose theory of a ruling "power elite" is probably the most quoted theory among those who believe that traditional American liberties are endangered, points out that at one time our economy was a scattering of small productive units but is now dominated by two or three hundred giant corporations; that our political order was once decentralized among the states, but is now controlled by an executive establishment reaching into every cranny of social structure; and that the military order was once a small, distrusted establishment, but is now the largest bureaucratic domain in the government. American capitalism is now to a considerable degree, military capitalism. All decisions of national consequence are made by a small coterie of political, economic, and military men. Congressmen whose prestige must be based on their location are now in the second tier of power and have been superseded by approximately fifty men in the executive branch who have never been elected to office, but are strictly appointive. This "power elite"

exists all over the country, and it is a coalition of generals in the roles of corporation executives, of politicians masquerading as admirals, of corporation executives acting like politicians, of civil servants who become majors, of vice-admirals who are also assistants to a cabinet officer, who is himself, by the way, really a member of the managerial elite.⁴⁷

Mills' arguments, undoubtedly appear plausible to some but are unproved.

⁴⁷C. Wright Mills, The Power Elite, p. 278. This entire paragraph is a consideration of several points made by Mills and in some cases follows closely his actual wordage. Passim and pps. 8, 10, 18, 224, 231, 252, 275, 276.

To prove his thesis, he would have to analyze important decisions, show who was responsible for them, and demonstrate that these decisions were adverse to the concept of democratic government or individual liberty and freedom. This he has not done, and it would be impossible to do until government files are declassified; even then positive proof will be, at best debatable, and more probably still unproven.

Admittedly the largest single impact on the United States economy today comes from defense and allied industries such as those connected with the space program. It is also true that the executive establishment is increasingly concentrated on the national level with a corresponding decrease in power of state governments. Whether this fact has increased or decreased individual liberties is arguable. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 and proposed one for 1965 are good examples. They are taking considerable authority away from some states, but are increasing greatly the freedom of American Negroes. Other examples of concentration of power at the national level have accomplished vital jobs because they were left undone by the states, such as TVA, social security and aid to education, or because their regulations must be national in scope in order to work, such as the regulation of business performed by the Federal Trade Commission, Interstate Commerce Commission, etc.

It is also true that there has been a shift in the background of the Presidential appointee. Beginning with Roosevelt's "Brain Trust" there has been a growing tendency for the cabinet heads and personal advisors to the President to be non-political, at least concerning ambition for an elective office. There are many exceptions to this statement, but it is certainly true that Truman had a predilection for the military, as Eisenhower did for the businessman,⁴⁸ and Kennedy did for the scholar. It is too soon to judge the

⁴⁸ Richard Neustadt, "The President at Mid-Century," Law and Contemporary Problems, Autumn 1956, p. 634.

Johnson appointees, as the few appointments he has made have been men who have been close to him for years, but they have not gained their reputations through elective office.) This brings up the most important point made by Mills--that decisions of national importance are made by a small group of men in the industrial, executive, and military hierarchy whose positions are interchangeable.

To assure that power at the national level does not become concentrated, the Constitution is based on the "separation of powers" and "checks and balances." If the power of the legislative branch, as Mills and others claim, has been superseded by the executive branch and the power of decision of the executive branch is in turn in the hands of a small, non-elective, inextricably mixed group of men whose positions are at times in the military establishment, at times in the industrial complex, and at times in the executive branch, not only has there been an erosion of the principle of the "separation of powers" as envisioned by the framers, but the coordinate powers of legislative and executive are no longer applicable and also there is certainly a greater potential for misplaced power and unwarranted influence than if these three segments of our society were separate and distinct and operated with a check on each other. As previously stated, Mills has not proved this conclusion because he has not shown what decisions were made by whom. Still there is evidence of interpenetration of the military, industrial, and executive segments of our society to a greater degree than before.

From early in American history, Army and Navy officers have conducted negotiations and concluded treaties with foreign countries, attended international conferences and carried out foreign military occupations; at home, starting with the Civil War, officers became responsible for, and experienced in, the new demands of military logistics in the era of the industrial revolution; and in the

westward expansion, Army engineers in particular associated with government and private business in the building of the nation; finally, military officers in Washington were no strangers to politics either, as it effected them personally or as it influenced their responsibilities.⁴⁹ In the Roosevelt Administration many Army and Navy officers were brought into WPA to organize and supervise its growth. But these numbers seem minuscule compared to those of military men now used in the executive establishment.

In 1953 nine Army Generals and 58 Colonels were assigned to civilian agencies of government; in 1957 about 200 Generals or Admirals were serving in international or interservice agencies, with more than 1300 Colonels or naval officers of comparable rank and about 6000 officers of lower grade as support.⁵⁰

The CIA (Central Intelligence Agency) was originally directed and largely staffed by military men.⁵¹ George Marshall became Secretary of State; Major General John H. Hildring became Assistant Secretary of State; General Bedell Smith became head of CIA and then Assistant Secretary of State; General Maxwell Taylor has been made Ambassador to South Vietnam, probably the most sensitive political assignment in the foreign service; and there are General Herbert B. Powell, Ambassador to Australia; Admiral Jerald Wright, Ambassador to the Republic of China; Admiral George Anderson, Ambassador to Portugal;⁵² General James Gavin recently resigned as Ambassador to France. Military men have penetrated the executive establishment and are being used in responsible jobs.

The 1960 House investigation on conflict of interest reveals some interesting facts. This report lists 33,326 regular officers on the retired list.

⁴⁹Raymond, op. cit., p. 8.

⁵⁰John M. Swomley, Jr., The Military Establishment, p. 9.

⁵¹Raymond, op. cit., p. 81.

⁵²Army-Navy-Air Force Register, June 27, 1964, p. 4.

This list does not include retired career reservists, other reservists, or National Guard officers. Of this number 1,426 are employed by 72 of the leading corporations queried by the committee. The number employed in corporations not queried is unknown. At this time 100 corporations were receiving 75% of all defense contracts and 86% of these defense contracts are decided by the Defense Department without competitive bidding. In order of priority, the top five companies receiving defense contracts have hired the following retired officers: General Dynamics, 186 retired officers, including 27 Generals or Admirals, and Frank Pace, a former Secretary of the Army, Chairman of the Board; Lockheed, 171 officers, including 27 Generals or Admirals; Boeing, 61 officers, including 5 Generals or Admirals; General Electric, 26 officers, including 7 Generals or Admirals; North American Aviation, 92 officers, including 8 Generals or Admirals.⁵³

A few of the Generals or Admirals who accepted positions in industry in other than the top five companies include General Lucius Clay, who was Military Governor in Germany, who became head of Continental Can Corporation and later a senior partner in Lehman Brothers; General Douglas MacArthur, who became Chairman of the Board at Remington Rand; Admiral Ben Moreel went to Jones and Laughlin Steel Corporation; General Brehon Somervell became head of Koppers Company; General Omar Bradley headed Bulova Watch Company.⁵⁴ Taking at random one issue of the Journal of the Armed Forces (September 5, 1964), one finds announcements of 11 officers accepting jobs in industry.⁵⁵ This happens practically each week on a comparable scale.

⁵³U. S. Cong., House, Subcommittee for Special Investigations of the Committee on Armed Service, Hearings on Employment of Retired Military and Civilian Personnel By Defense Industries, 86th Cong., 1st Sess (1959) passim, hereafter called Hebert Committee.

⁵⁴Raymond, op. cit., p. 83.

⁵⁵Journal of The Armed Forces, September 5, 1964, p. 28.

There is no doubt that industry finds retired officers valuable employees. The easing of military professionals into the top echelons of industry seems to underscore both the caliber of the individual officer and the similarities between military and industrial management. For officers to continue after retirement an association with industry begun while in uniform is profitable to both and only natural. Industry is continually looking for men who understand military procurement and officers retiring, on the average between 40 and 55, are looking for a second career. The possibility for unwarranted influence in this condition has been expressed by Admiral Hyman Rickover in a remark that retired officers frequently leave their jobs to men "who are dear friends, or . . . whom they have been influential in appointing and naturally they will be listened to."⁵⁶

If this is true of military officers, it is also true of industrial leaders; they do not change their friends when they enter the executive branch. Mills probably goes too far when he says it would be ridiculous to seriously believe that Charles Erwin Wilson of General Electric (as an example of all businessmen in government) represented anyone or any interest other than that of the corporate world. And this is not because he is dishonest, but probably because he is a man of solid integrity--"as sound as a dollar."⁵⁷ Businessmen in government sincerely believe that what is good for business is good for the country, as the military believe that the United States cannot have too much defense. Even if both the military and industry sincerely attempt to be entirely dispassionate, they would find it difficult to divorce themselves from a lifetime of professional experience. Increasing the danger is the greater size of the defense budget, the greater number of industrialists in government, and the

⁵⁶Congressional Quarterly, op. cit., p. 464.

⁵⁷Mills, op. cit., p. 285.

greater number of military men in industry as well as in the executive branch, which conditions present additional opportunities for unwarranted influence or misplaced power by their very multiplicity.

Lobbying

Lobbying for the military and for defense industry comes from all angles and is probably as ruthless as any at the Capitol. Presentations by teams of experts and expensive brochures are given to Congressmen in their offices where the briefers are not adverse to describing the importance of their weapon to the defense of the free world, the economic benefits that production would bring to the Senators or Representative's constituency, and, at least in one case, reminding the Senator of contributions to his last campaign.⁵⁸ The NAM (National Association of Manufacturers) has a lobbying office in Washington which presents the viewpoint of industry to the legislators. It spends \$2 million yearly in advertising and as defense industry is the largest, its viewpoint is undoubtedly well represented.⁵⁹ Space, aircraft, and many other industries now have their own magazines, well prepared by experts, which are influential in industry, and also have a national circulation.

Industry also supports all three national military organizations with advertising. These organizations are operated by retired officers for the most part. The Navy League is the oldest and smallest, having 25,000 members, was an early and consistent supporter of Polaris and aircraft carriers, and offered resistance to service unification. The Air Force Association, with 58,000 mem-

⁵⁸ Julius Duscha, "Arms and the Big Money Men," Harper's Magazine, March, 1964, p. 43.

⁵⁹ James MacGregor Burns and Jack Walter Peltason, Government By The People, p. 298.

bers, has backed the Air Force position on bombers, missiles, and favored military unification and counterforce strategies. The Army Association, with 55,000 members, advocates weapons for fighting ground warfare to include a larger standing Army.⁶⁰

President Truman said in 1945, "The veterans of this war are going to run the country."⁶¹ Veterans' organizations include the American Legion (the largest and most durable), Veterans of Foreign Wars, AMVETS, Disabled American Veterans, Disabled Officers Association and Retired Officers. In 1960 the Veterans of World War I of the U.S.A., or "Wonnies," as they were known, headed the list of lobby registrants, representing 930,000 persons.⁶² It is difficult to gauge the effectiveness of the military associations and veterans organizations, as the legislators already are committed to maintenance of a large military-industrial complex. At one time the veterans associations were considered among the most influential in Washington, but it is doubtful that this is still true; however, by concentrating on programs of direct benefit to their members, such as cash payments and tax benefits, their influence is for greater defense appropriations.

Two organizations, though, that are powerful are the ROA (Reserve Officers' Association) and the National Guard. The latter derives its importance from its close link to the community, its origin and its status as a state militia while the ROA gets a great deal of its importance from the fact that its membership includes over 70 Congressmen, five of whom are flag or field grade.⁶³ The great majority of ROA members are businessmen, many of whom are influential in their community. It is not unreasonable to say that Senator Goldwater's interest

⁶⁰Raymond, *op. cit.*, p. 192.

⁶¹Burns and Peltason, *op. cit.*, pps. 288-289.

⁶²Raymond, *op. cit.*, p. 193.

⁶³Tristram Coffin, *The Passion of the Hawks*, Appendix I.

and promotion of manned bombers for the Air Force stems from his experience as a World War II bomber pilot and his continued training since then in the Air Force.⁶⁴ The National Guard and ROA do not always accept the Pentagon's view, but the Congressional members of these organizations are at least susceptible to military indoctrination and as each of them, as a rule, is active in his own military organization, he is well informed on military objectives. As far as appropriations are concerned, the ROA and National Guard have had the sole effect of increasing them.

Another lobbying group of importance is formed from the offices that each individual service maintains at the Capitol. Their job is to keep Congress informed and to solicit its interest in particular problems. With defense problems growing more complicated, this is an important and often worthwhile practice.⁶⁵ At the Pentagon are two supplemental organizations of rather large proportions. These are the legislative liaison representatives and the public relations organizations. These two offices handle a multitude of duties, including Congressional inquiries of all types, but they also execute vast public affairs programs consisting of press releases, pamphlets, documentary films, orientation trips for reporters, industrialists, and government officials, and arrangements for speakers throughout the country. The official count of military men performing these jobs in May 1963 was as follows: Office of Secretary of Defense, 149; Army, 119; Navy, 99; Marine Corps, 24; and Air Force, 116, for a total of 507; and in Legislative Liaison: Office of Secretary of Defense, 13; Army, 23; Navy and Marine Corps, 20; and Air Force, 40.⁶⁶

⁶⁴The Kansas City Star, Associated Press Dispatch, January 9, 1964, p. 1.

⁶⁵Raymond, op. cit., p. 202.

⁶⁶Ibid., p. 201.

The focus of military activities in Congress is the appearance of the JCS (Joint Chiefs of Staff) and their aides before the committees to answer questions. It is doubtful if there will ever be hearings again similar to the Navy's defense of its aviation requirements in 1949 against the administration's disposition to side with the Air Force. Undoubtedly this was lobbying of the most blatant type. Admirals presented lengthy, well-rehearsed statements and Captain Walter Karig, a reserve officer on active duty, held regular briefings for newsmen.⁶⁷ This type of lobbying is simply not necessary in most cases but the publicity is usable. With industrialists applying pressure and making certain that Congressmen have all the information necessary to get contracts for their companies; with each service having ambitious officers on duty at the Capitol looking for ways to assist their service and also please Congressmen, and with large staffs in the Pentagon whose only job is to provide information to Congressmen and particularly friendly Congressmen; with Congressmen who also hold National Guard or Reserve commissions and who also have many friends at the Pentagon; only a disinterested legislator could fail to be well prepared to elicit the type of information he desires from a member of the JCS at a hearing. And of course, some questions are carefully planted in advance with favorite and cooperative Congressmen.⁶⁸

When Congressmen show particular prescience in extracting statements from the military inimical to the administration, the press often attributes this to leaks. This accusation may or may not be true, as a knowledgeable Congress has sufficient opportunities, as has been shown, to get all the information it desires. Furthermore, Congressmen are very adept at getting into the record.

⁶⁷Ibid., p. 199.

⁶⁸Ibid., p. 203.

statements to support their position. Recently McNamara called it a disgrace that a secret vote of the JCS was, as he said, leaked to Congress. Hanson Baldwin said that this was nothing new, as it had happened innumerable times before, to his knowledge.⁶⁹ General Taylor says it is the duty of the military chiefs to tell Congress the truth while remaining loyal to the decisions of the President and the Secretary of Defense. However, he says this is an impossible ethic to apply in practice. Congress listens attentively and seriously to the views of the Secretary of Defense. When the JCS or their aides appear, Congress is not interested in hearing a repetition of the views of the administration. They are interested in the original views of the individual Chiefs, and particularly in differences of opinion. This places the military men in impossible situations. They either appear to be withholding information from Congress, which Congress feels strongly entitled to receive and which, in many cases, they need in order to legislate wisely, or they appear to be opposing their civilian superiors.⁷⁰

This situation has one effect on military appropriations--it tends to increase them. Undoubtedly more and better defense is provided by Congressmen dedicated to Naval strategy, to manned bombers, to certain missile systems, and to the ground Army; but those often divergent interests also apply pressures in the opposite direction on a President or a Secretary of Defense trying to limit appropriations. New bomber funds approved by the Congress and never requested by the administration provide only the latest example of many similar appropriations.⁷¹

⁶⁹ Army-Navy-Air Force Journal and Register, "Secretary McNamara Calls JCS Disgraceful," December 21, 1963, pps. 4, 13.

⁷⁰ Maxwell Taylor, The Uncertain Trumpet, pps. 111-114. General Taylor gives a frank discussion of the dilemma facing a member appearing before Congress.

⁷¹ Kansas City Times, Associated Press Dispatch, March 10, 1964, p. 21.

Cultural or Spiritual Militarism

To recapitulate, President Eisenhower said that the military-industrial complex was influential economically, politically, even spiritually throughout the country and that this influence provided the potential for misplaced power. It should now be evident that this complex has disturbing implications in the country economically and politically and implications of overriding economic control in some sections of the country, and that this combination, with the approval of the majority of Congress, has the opportunity for misplaced power and unwarranted influence. As to the allegation of spiritual effect on the country, President Eisenhower seemed to explain this by saying, "There is becoming a great influence, almost an insidious penetration of our minds, that the only thing this country is engaged in is weaponry and missiles."⁷²

If this interpretation is correct, President Eisenhower has some rather strange supporters, at least for a Republican President, who are using his speech as evidence of militarism in the United States. This group of thinkers are categorized in the "Arms Debate" by Robert A. Levine as the "anti-war" group.⁷³ While this group has many theories in disagreement, its members are to the left and liberal side of the American political spectrum. They seek, in the main, a political and military detente with Communism. They do not think that Communism is the greatest threat to the United States and that its threat is subordinate to the dangers of thermonuclear war. But there is general agreement among them that the United States is in danger of being dominated by a militaristic psychology and the political power of the military.⁷⁴ John M.

⁷²Public Papers of The President, Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1960-61, p. 1045.

⁷³Robert A. Levine, The Arms Debate. Throughout this book, in discussions of the "anti-war" group, you would expect Pres. Eisenhower to be on the opposite side and this is exactly where his beliefs place him on most questions.

⁷⁴Ibid., p. 215.

Swomley, Jr. has written a book, the thesis of which is that the new influence of the military is a result of conscious planning for power.⁷⁵ Fred J. Cook, in "The Warfare State," used President Eisenhower's speech as the subject for his opening chapter and insists that the military has a vested interest in creating and prolonging tension, that its power is growing, and that the behind-the-scenes actions of the military are just as dangerous to democratic liberties as an actual coup d'etat.⁷⁶ Senator Fulbright says, "The American people are not now exercising effective control over the military, and neither is Congress."⁷⁷ He further believes that the war on poverty, education-welfare programs, foreign cultural exchanges, and other domestic programs could be accelerated by eliminating superfluous defense funds. Associate Justice Douglas says that "we have taken the military rather than the political approach to these world problems. . . that we have become victims of the military mind. . . the civilian heads by and large are merely spokesmen for what the military want."⁷⁸ Mills says "The American Elite does not have any real image of peace-- other than as an uneasy interlude existing precariously by virtue of the balance of mutual fright. The only accepted plan for 'peace' is the fully loaded pistol."⁷⁹

It takes only a reading of one of the weekly news magazines or the daily paper to note that defense and related subjects is certainly the main subject in America. It is doubtful if even the subject of civil rights has occupied as many columns. With Vietnam, the Congo, Cyprus, Cuba, NATO--America is

⁷⁵Swomley, op. cit., p. 7.

⁷⁶Cook, op. cit., This is a paraphrase of the thesis of his book.

⁷⁷Kansas City Star, Associated Press Dispatch, April 6, 1964, p. 9.

⁷⁸William O. Douglas, "Should We Fear The Military?", Look Magazine, March 11, 1952, p. 34.

⁷⁹Mills, op. cit., p. 184.

deeply concerned, by necessity, with war or lack of peace. With announcements of new missiles, missile firings and new military scientific achievements appearing almost daily, it is easy to see how President Eisenhower and others would think that the country is thinking of nothing but conflict, weaponry, and missiles. With an average of \$20 billion in defense contracts yearly, with each company trying to get maximum support for its proposal, with Congressmen determined that the publicity in their community will advertise their efforts, with almost continuous Congressional hearings concerning the defense budget or some other military subject, with the livelihood of entire communities determined by defense contracts, there is no doubt that America is preoccupied with defense.

The prestige of the military has risen considerably since World War II. It was normal for military men to keep in the background. This is not so at present. The military leaders are in demand as speakers in all types of meetings, conventions and celebrations. According to Senator Fulbright, a 1958 NSC document authorized the military to hold seminars and to educate the public to the dangers of Communism. President Eisenhower says this is an error.⁸⁰ Regardless of the source from which the authority is derived, the military is involved to a considerable extent in such education. Senator Fulbright said in a speech before Congress that it was not the job of the military to educate the public on political issues. This was for elected officials. He cited 11 instances of education and propaganda activities by military personnel. To quote the Senator:

There are many indications that the philosophy of the program is representative of a substantial element of military thought and has great appeal to the military mind. A strong case can be made, logically, that this type of activity is the inevitable consequences of such a directive. There is little in the education, training, or experience of most military officers

⁸⁰U. S. Cong. Senate, Special Preparedness Subcommittee of the Committee of Armed Services, Hearings Military Cold War Education and Speech Review Policies, 87th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1962), Part 1, p. 6.

to equip them with the balance of judgment necessary to put their own ultimate solutions--those with which their education, training, and experience are concerned,⁸¹ into proper perspective in the President's total strategy for a nuclear age.

Among others, Senators Goldwater and Thurmond took exception to Fulbright's speech, saying that it was "shocking," that the military men were the most loyal and dedicated Americans, that they composed the best informed group on the dangers of the cold war and that, as the fight against Communism required a total effort, they should be used to the maximum to educate the public.⁸²

Perhaps Fulbright wasn't completely informed because, if he had been, he could have pointed to many more than these 11 cases of military support for cold war seminars or speeches to civilian groups about the dangers of Communism and he could also have pointed out that one of the missions of the Industrial College of the Armed Forces is to present a two-weeks symposium, based on the material of its ten months course, to selected reserve officers, executives of industry and labor, representatives of business, professions, religion, education, agriculture, women's organizations, government, and community life. These seminars have been going on since 1948. The 1964-65 schedule includes 14 cities, with expected attendance of between 800 and 1000 for each two-week period. A partial list of the subjects covered are civil defense, counterinsurgency, space exploration, national security financing, geoeconomics, geopolitics, international relations, mutual security, public opinion, techniques of Communism, technological progress, and organization and perspectives of national security.⁸³ This comprehensive program covers many subjects which, since World War II, have been considered in the province of the military. This program has been thoroughly investigated by Congress and passed the test.⁸⁴ Both former Presidents, Eisenhower

⁸¹ Cong. Rec., 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961), Vol. 107, Part II, p. 14433.

⁸² Ibid., p. 14398.

⁸³ National Security Seminar, Presentation Outlines and Reading List, Industrial College of the Armed Forces, 1964-1965, pps. VIII, X.

⁸⁴ Owen G. Birtwistle, Personal Letter to Thomas J. Badger, 30 October 1964.

and Kennedy, enthusiastically endorsed the program.⁸⁵ In the foreword to the lesson manual for these seminars, President Johnson says,

An enlightened citizenry is our greatest hope in meeting this challenge. It is the high mission of the Industrial College of the Armed Forces to promote a broad understanding of the various elements of our national security--economic, political, and military. The College is a major instrument for instilling in growing numbers of our people the essential principles of a free society.⁸⁶

These seminars have been received with high praise by the conferees. Two examples of many are from a Salt Lake City engineer who says, "It should be required for everyone in the teaching profession and a required course in every college in the country," and a New Orleans realtor who says,

The seminars are an outstanding accomplishment on the part of the Industrial College to provide the civilian--industrialist--business--executive with comprehensive and timely data and statistics on U. S. and world resources and on important influences in our nation and the world.⁸⁷

It appears that the military are in the field of public education with the authority, cognizance, and approval of the President of the United States to include the political and economic factors that affect the security of the United States in connection with Communism, both as an external and internal threat. The extent to which the military has engaged in this educational effort is accepted with unstinting praise by the conferees who not only recommend its continuance but favor increased presentations so that more people can receive the instruction. Fulbright's criticism brought on a Congressional investigation with the result that Congress also approved of military efforts as follows: "That military participation in and support of proper and appropriate cold war or anti-Communist seminars for the public be continued." Furthermore the report

⁸⁵National Security, Seminar Prospectus--1964-65, Industrial College of the Armed Forces, p. 3.

⁸⁶National Security Seminar, op. cit., p. XI.

⁸⁷Handout, What Others Have Said, Industrial College of Armed Forces.

recognized that it is not the primary responsibility of the military to educate the public on the menace of Communism but, because of its experience and specialized knowledge, the military still has a legitimate function in this field.⁸⁸

Besides the military being able to carry its thinking personally to the public, all three services have highly respected citizens, dedicated and patriotic, mostly retired, who tour the country at their own expense to tell the military story. In the Army these civilians are called "Civilian Aides to the Secretary of the Army". As examples of the type of man that serves in this capacity are Charles S. Stevenson, Civilian Aide for Western Missouri, who is also Chairman of the Board of Hallmark Cards, Edward C. Logelin, Vice-President, United States Steel Corporation from Chicago, Walter K. Koch, President, Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Company from Colorado, John Slezak, Chairman of the Board, Kable Printing Company from Chicago, Kermit R. Hansen, Vice-President, U. S. National Bank of Omaha and Carlisle P. Runge, Special Assistant to the President, University of Wisconsin. They receive special briefings and are well qualified to present the military picture.

Civil Defense presents another important aspect of the "cold war" which has been given little attention but is an area which extends the military's influence into cities, counties, and states. At the present time, planning for Civil Defense is a responsibility of OEP (Office of Emergency Planning) whose head is a member of the NSC, but operations are under the Defense Department where a civilian is also in charge. But the Army, Navy, and Air Force have important operational missions and in an emergency their duties would

⁸⁸U. S. Cong. Senate, Report by Special Preparedness Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services, Military Cold War Education and Speech Review Policies, 87th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 7, 8.

increase. No one doubts that the military would be needed badly in a thermonuclear exchange involving the continental United States. In this cold war interim there are many advocates of more military activity in this sphere, of military responsibility being as much a part of national security as training soldiers, sailors, and airmen, and of close coordination and planning between the military and local civilians.⁸⁹

The Defense Department publishes 125 different kinds of indoctrination pamphlets, books, magazines, and newspapers each year with a total distribution of eight million copies. For the most part these are scrupulously handled to avoid giving servicemen and their families any feeling of propaganda intent, even in international affairs.⁹⁰ The Pentagon is busy in other fields. In the Audio-Visual Division it is continually assisting private producers of film projects and television serials which, at this time, number 35 and 10 respectively. It also extends assistance to documentaries prepared for school use and to cartoon strips, such as "Steve Canyon" and "Terry and The Pirates" which show a consistent partiality for Air Force doctrine. Over a five-year period the Air Force Book Branch claimed credit for spawning more than four hundred air and space books. At a recent date, more than 115 volumes were under commercial contract. One such project, The Manned Missile, The Story of the B-70 by Ed Rees, who was former military correspondent for Time was written at the express suggestion of the Chief of the Air Force Book Branch. Ed Rees now works for the manufacturer of the B-70.⁹¹

⁸⁹Herman Kahn, On Thermonuclear War, pps. 626-640.

⁹⁰Raymond, op. cit., p. 133.

⁹¹Cater, op. cit., pps. 33-34.

In 1960 there were 248 colleges and universities with Army ROTC (Reserve Officer Training Corps) programs which enrolled a total of 155,871 cadets.⁹² These do not include institutions with Air Force and Navy ROTC programs. These cadets are the chief source of officers for the services and every opportunity is used to indoctrinate these cadets toward a military career. In addition, the three million men in the services receive special indoctrination. Over one-half of all young men in the United States will have had some type of military training. The Army Reserve, not even counting Air Force and Navy, has 442,000 Ready Reservists, 270,000 in Standby Reserve, and 20,000 students who are not in a Reserve unit. The Army National Guard maintains a strength of 400,000. Retired military personnel in 1945 were 180,000 and have grown at least at a rate of 10,000 a year. In 1955 alone, 2,000 officers retired and took another job in industry.⁹³ The services have plenty of opportunity to penetrate the minds of Americans with military thinking.

Our educational institutions, which have long prided themselves upon a tradition of freedom of thought and action, have also been invaded by the military through defense contracts for research and development. While not a subject of this paper, this danger is also treated in President Eisenhower's speech. It is sufficient to state that, with Massachusetts Institute of Technology receiving nearly \$75 million in defense research money and Harvard receiving 25% of its income (more than \$21 million) from Federal funds,⁹⁴ there is the potential that government contracts become so important to the educational institution that its freedom of thought may be impaired.

⁹²Swomley, op. cit., p. 28.

⁹³Hebert Committee, passim.

⁹⁴Raymond, op. cit., pps 139-141.

Summary

Military thinking is paramount in the United States today. The 1964 Presidential election dramatized this. Both candidates, Johnson and Goldwater, said that the subject of peace and war was the single most important issue. The continuance of the cold war with its thermonuclear possibilities has made it absolutely necessary that the United States remain ahead in all scientific developments so that no "breakthrough" will give the U.S.S.R. a commanding position of strength in international power politics and has created an interconnected military-industrial-scientific team that appears invulnerable. The costs of this defense establishment, and particularly of the military equipment involved, affect every governmental budgetary decision. Entire communities are dependent upon defense industry. Military men hold prominent positions in practically every defense industry, including those industries mainly research in nature, in the country. Military implications are considered in all national governmental decisions and, in international relations, these considerations undoubtedly receive priority. Military men are used generously throughout the federal government in position of responsibility.

The prestige the military has traditionally enjoyed for a short time immediately after a war, only to find this prominence receding to unimportance in peacetime, continued to grow after World War II, enhanced by the Korean War, the Vietnamese combat, and most significantly by the cold war until now its leaders are influential in all areas of society. The size of the armed forces and their deployment all over the world, with the requirement for large reserves, has a personal effect upon practically every home in the country.

The relationship of the military and industry to Congress has been completely changed. Congressmen, in many cases, now seek the support of the

military to bring industry to their communities. This all-pervasive military atmosphere combined with the actual military presence and the size of the military-industrial complex presents untold opportunities for misplaced power and unwarranted influence. Furthermore, the ingredients for traditional militarism are undoubtedly present. However, the opportunity for misplaced power and unwarranted influence does not prove that the opportunity has been used. Nor does the presence of the ingredients that have produced militarism in other states rule out the possibility that this country has inherent traits and governmental methods that are safeguarding the democratic processes of the nation. These aspects will be considered next.

CHAPTER IV

MISCONCEPTIONS AND SAFEGUARDS

What is meant by "the military"? Is it limited to the professional officer, or does it include every man in uniform, willingly or unwillingly, active, retired, or reserve, or does it embrace the entire military establishment from the Secretary of Defense to the lowest paid civilian? Does Secretary McNamara represent the civilian control of the military or is he merely a part of the military chain-of-command? What is meant by civil-military relations? Discussion of these questions is not purely semantic but should prove valuable in determining whether there are inherent safeguards in our government operating against the formation of a militaristic state. Similarly a new ideology is evolving in industry. This new ideology of social responsibility must be examined as to its validity and contrasted with the generally accepted doctrine of American capitalism to see if this new doctrine represents a different influence than expected within the complex.

The Military

The armed forces consist of a conglomeration of professionals, reservists, draftees, and enlistees as well as Presidential appointees and civil servants. In discussing the military, only the opinions, ideas, and actions of the leaders who are influential in making decisions or forming policy are of importance as far as the military-industrial complex is concerned. These are the Presidential appointees and the top men among military professionals and in Civil Service. The civilian secretaries represent the military point of view in government councils but symbolize the civilian control within the military establishment. No difficulty in this regard is experienced until civil-military relations are

considered. Congress and the press are most apt to draw a sharp line between the two if there seems to be any difference of opinion. The term military, in this thesis, intends no distinction between the military and civilian portions of the military establishment unless so specified.

There is a similar misunderstanding in regard to military influence.

Military factors are considered by the State Department in making foreign policy.

Military security may be the dominant factor but as Burton M. Sapin and Richard C. Snyder state:

It is quite possible that United States foreign policy could be overbalanced toward military objectives or the use of military techniques without this necessarily being a result of Military Establishment thinking or influence. It is interesting to note that oftentimes some members of Congress are more prone to argue for quick, military solutions of problems than the high-ranking officers who testify before their committees.¹

It is also noteworthy that foreign policy is not the only area in which military decisions may be principally civilian. George C. Marshall is considered the prime mover for UMT but this does not concur exactly with President Truman who considered this program as his own and concluded his account by stating,

I am morally certain that if Congress had enacted this program in 1945, when I first recommended it, we would have had a pool of basically trained men, which would have caused the Soviets to hesitate and perhaps not bring on the Berlin crisis or the Korean aggression.²

In judging decisions and influences that are military in character it must be recognized that they may or may not be espoused or originated within the military establishment.

¹ Burton M. Sapin and Richard C. Snyder, The Role of the Military in American Foreign Policy, p. 23.

² Harry S. Truman, The Memoirs of Harry S. Truman: Years of Trial and Hope, p. 55.

Types of Militarism

Militarism is flourishing throughout the world today. It has practically as many different faces as there are militaristic countries. Each country has its own brand of militarism, but all militaristic countries, whether China under Mao Tse-tung, Indonesia under Sukarno, Ghana under Kwame Nkrumah, Ethiopia under Haile Selassie, Yugoslavia under Tito, Egypt under Gamal Abdel Nasser, Pakistan under Ayub Khan, Algeria under Ahmed Ben Bella, or the Congo under Moise Tshombe, possess one distinguishing characteristic--they are all dictatorships. A militaristic state and a dictatorship are synonymous. Either the military is the dictator or the dictator controls the military.

Prior to World War II the Axis Powers (Germany, Japan, Italy) were all militaristic in different ways. Germany under Hitler was predominantly a civilian dictatorship; Italy under Mussolini was a broad-based dictatorship having both military and civilian support; Japan was strictly a military dictatorship--at first the top government positions were held by civilians and controlled by the military, but after Pearl Harbor the military took over in name as well as in fact. Except for East Germany where the U.S.S.R. was in control, militarism was eliminated from these three countries after World War II. But in Eastern Europe civilian dictatorships were employed by Russia, except in Yugoslavia where Marshal Tito was able to maintain independence from Russia and was both the military and political leader.

Militarism can occur in a variety and combination of ways. The coup d'etat is the most common in underdeveloped countries. Two occurred in 1964 in Latin America. In Bolivia General Rene Barrientos Ortuño ousted the government of President Victor Paz Estenssoro³ and in Brazil President (General) Humberto

³"Huge Task in Bolivia," Kansas City Star, New York Times News Service, November 8, 1964, p. 12A.

Castelo Branco replaced Joao Goulart as head of the government.⁴ A recent article by General Benjamin Rattenbach of Argentina says that the theory of militarism is changing in United States and that by some authorities it is being recognized that the military is the only group to foster peace and order and necessary in order to prevent chaos.⁵ The United States accepts the theory that some dictatorships may represent the only available solution, as the military represents the only source of stability; but the U.S. also hopes the result of a military dictatorship will ultimately be an initial step toward democracy. Examples are Pakistan and South Korea.

However, militarism can come gradually, as has happened in Saudi Arabia where, after several years of gradual reduction of King Saud's power, Prince Faisal has finally assumed total power.⁶ The more politically sophisticated a country is, the longer it usually takes for a new dictator to replace another one or for a dictatorship to succeed another form of government. In some cases the change takes a period of years, the steps being perhaps imperceptible by the people concerned. Military thought can become so persuasive that military solutions appear to be the only acceptable ones in areas not normally considered of military concern and, in the most important area of economics, military aims can become the vested interests of a majority of the people. Regardless of how militarism arrives, whether gradually or suddenly, and regardless of its type or form it is inimical to democracy and to be avoided, as

⁴Clarence W. Hall, "The Country That Saved Itself," Readers' Digest, December, 1964, pps. 135-158. This article is entirely complimentary of the role played by the military in this coup d'etat.

⁵Lt. Gen. Benjamin Rattenbach, "The Military Sector of Society," Military Review, July 1964, p. 82.

⁶"Where a Friend of the West Runs Things Now," U. S. News and World Report, November 16, 1964, p. 20.

a peril to liberty and freedom.

President Eisenhower in his farewell address and other speeches repeatedly emphasized concern with government centralization at the national level. Without centralization, militarization cannot be effective. A military organization is centrally controlled, with orders emanating from the top and proceeding down through all echelons. Centralization undoubtedly increases the opportunity for militarization. To repeat the most typical of President Eisenhower's frequent statements on the subject:

It has long been my judgment that the real threat to liberty in this republic will not come from any sudden calculated onslaught. Rather the threat to our liberties will be primarily found in a steady erosion of self-reliant citizenship and in excessive power concentration resulting from the lodging of more and more decisions in an ever growing federal bureaucracy.

As was noted, the President did not mention the military-industrial complex by name, but as the Defense Department is the largest bureaucracy in the federal government, it is certainly implied in his statement. Further, from this statement it cannot be proved exactly what Eisenhower means by "sudden calculated onslaught." If perchance any news analyst had thought there was a possibility that Eisenhower was alluding to internal military threat, his comments would have created news of rather a momentous nature. But proof that the President believes that the military presents no threat to our established government can best be shown by his own words before a Senate Committee:

I, for one, want to be on record as expressing my indestructible faith and pride in our armed services--even though their loyalty, patriotism, and breadth of understanding need no defense from me or anyone else. . . In a half century of national service, I have yet to meet the American military officer, who viewed himself as a budding Napoleon or even a Rasputin.

⁷"The Real Threat to Liberty as Ike Sees It," U. S. News and World Report, May 12, 1962, p. 15.

⁸U.S. Cong. Senate Preparedness Subcommittee of the Committee of Armed Services, Hearings Military Cold War and Speech Review Policies, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962) p. 7. Hereafter reference to these hearings or the report will be "Senate Military Cold War Educate Hearings or Report" as the case may be.

S. E. Finer, in The Man On Horseback, says that militarism is least likely in a country in which, first, military professionalism is high, second, civilian control is accepted by the military, and third, the public attachment to civilian institutions is strong.⁹ These three conditions exist in the United States to a greater degree than in any other country with the possible exception of countries such as England and Canada with long democratic traditions. However, Finer's first two points, although this author considers them correct, should not be accepted without additional evidence.

Professionalism and Politics

The professional man is an expert with specialized knowledge and skill in a significant field of human endeavor. . . . The professional man is a practicing expert working in a social context, and performing a service, such as the promotion of health, education, or justice, which is essential to the functioning of society.

The skill of the officer is neither a craft (which is primarily mechanical) nor an art (which requires unique and nontransferable talent). It is instead an extraordinarily complex intellectual skill requiring comprehensive study and training. It must be remembered that the peculiar skill of the officer is the management of violence not the act of violence itself. Firing a rifle, for instance, is basically a mechanical craft; directing the operations of a rifle company requires an entirely different type of ability which may in part be learned from books and in part from practice and experience. The intellectual content of the military profession requires the modern officer to devote about one-third of his professional life to formal schooling, probably a higher ratio of educational time to practice time than in any other profession. In part this reflects the limited opportunities of the officer to acquire practical experience in the most important elements of his vocation. But to a large degree it also reflects the extreme complexity of the military expertise.¹⁰

The outstanding professionalism of the American officer is recognized throughout the world. American professionalism consists both of technical expertise in sophisticated weapons as well as its theoretical application. Entire foreign units, as well as many officers and non-commissioned officers,

⁹S. E. Finer, The Man On Horseback, pps. 21-26.

¹⁰Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State, pps. 8, 9, and 13.

come to the branch schools. This attendance could be attributed to the fact that American military equipment is used throughout the world and the Americans have always had mechanical ability. Eighty foreign officers from fifty nations (including all NATO allies except Iceland) graduated from the Army Command and General Staff College in 1965.¹¹ This is a school of classroom instruction which trains officers for duty at the Division and Army Group level. Wide acceptance by allies at both the theoretical and operational military schools is certainly an indication of an outstanding professional reputation. Also, as the United States is in most Western political alliances, their military leadership also becomes American. The prestige of our government, and the fact that the American military commitment is the largest, gives the American officer preeminence.

Just as the primary responsibility of a physician is to his patient, and that of a lawyer to his client, the primary responsibility of a military officer is to his country. He is an expert in fighting wars, in the management and organization of violence. As Samuel P. Huntington, one of the ablest critics of the military establishment, says, "The motivations of the officer are a technical love for his craft and the sense of social obligation to utilize his craft for the benefit of society."¹² Economic incentives are not a motivating force, but Finer overstates the case in listing poverty among the virtues of the military, as far as the American military man is concerned.¹³ To obtain an officer of the requisite caliber, the country provides reasonable economic security for him and his family.

¹¹Phone call between author and Secretary of the Command and General Staff College, June 16, 1965.

¹²Huntington, op. cit., p. 15. For a more complete discussion of the military as a profession, see pps. 17-18.

¹³Finer, op. cit., p. 10.

The officer remains a professional as long as he stays within his own field of competence. If an officer becomes interested in politics to the extent that his actions are affected by the intrigues and maneuverings common to professional politicians, he has not only done to his country and to the entire military organization a disservice, but he has undoubtedly compromised his professional judgment. An officer's advice, to be accepted, must be based on military considerations without reservation. Mills says that the renunciation of political power is a part of the military point of honor.¹⁴

It is drummed into every military manager in the course of his not inconsiderable education, from the day he enters West Point to the day death makes him eligible for an Arlington burial with honors, that he is to back away from anything resembling a political decision.¹⁵

Further he states,

There is no doubt about it, there are now Republican and Democratic generals. There is also, as we now know well, officers who are for or against individual Senators--such as McCarthy--and who in their military positions lean one way or the other to reveal it or to hide it.¹⁶

To cite McCarthy as the single example of a trend toward partisan politics by the military is certainly inadequate. McCarthy was not a character who inspired neutrality and pro-McCarthyism, if prevalent in the military (for which there is no proof), at least turned to anti-McCarthyism after the Army hearings. Military officers are expected and even urged to vote. The Defense Department yearly carries on an intensive campaign to get out the military vote by absentee ballot. This is considered to be democratic. Many officers vote and many do not. It is well known that Eisenhower inferred he had never voted in his life until after World War II in 1948, and President Truman was enough in doubt as to the General's politics to try to persuade him to

¹⁴C. Wright Mills, The Power Elite, p. 174.

¹⁵Ibid., footnote, p. 200.

¹⁶Ibid., p. 204.

run for President on the Democratic ticket as late as December, 1951.¹⁷ Eisenhower is no different from most officers who admit or even boast they have never voted.¹⁸ Perhaps Mills is concerned about the close friendship existing between senior officers and members of Congress, although he does not pinpoint any such relationships. For senior military officers and senior Congressmen to get to know each other during official business and thereby to gain mutual respect resulting in an even closer friendship, particularly when their beliefs coincide, is only natural. There appears nothing sinister in this type of association. On the other hand, if a Senator or Congressman strongly supports the military or a particular service, there is no doubt that the military officers, or the officers of that particular service, may voice their likes or dislikes. Not to indicate satisfaction under such conditions would be unnatural. And, as Mills himself claims, only the very few military officers at the top are in a position to influence decisions.¹⁹ This latter fact seems to limit the relevance of his argument considerably.

Approximately half our Presidents have had military experience and three, (excepting Washington) Taylor, Grant, and Eisenhower, were career soldiers. The military careers of Jackson, Harrison, and possibly Garfield and the first Roosevelt, assisted their political careers. This would seem to indicate that the Presidency and military experience are closely allied. But the reverse is more near the truth: military officers are poor politicians. Americans seem to trust military heroes, but that politically successful military men sought high governmental elective office is unsubstantiated. Rather, politicians have capitalized on the popularity and reputations of military men for political

¹⁷Dwight D. Eisenhower, Mandate For Change, p. 79.

¹⁸Jack Raymond, Power In The Pentagon, p. 170.

¹⁹Mills, op. cit., p. 231.

purposes. True, there have been military men ambitious politically--Scott in 1852, McClelland in 1864, Hancock in 1880, Dewey in 1904, Wood in 1920, and MacArthur in 1948, but all were defeated and it is most important that not one attempted to organize the military for political purposes.

Since World War II there have been military chiefs who have challenged the President on specific items of policy, particularly Admiral Louis Denfield, Chief of Naval Operations under Truman, and General Matthew Ridgway, Army Chief of Staff under Eisenhower.²⁰ These challenges were on military matters and not politically inspired. Both resigned, wrote books, and are now practically forgotten by most of the public. Neither had a political following. It is also known that General Maxwell Taylor disagreed with President Eisenhower. He also wrote a book that President Kennedy supposedly read and approved. He was brought back into the administration finally to become Chairman of the JCS and is now Ambassador to Vietnam. His very few speeches have been exceptionally circumspect, restricted entirely to military implications and non-controversial policy-making. While he may be a Democrat, this fact could not be definitely proved through any of his actions, speeches, or writings. Senator Fulbright, as critical as he is of military influence in national affairs, says that military involvement has not been a quest for power.²¹ Even Mills says that the military are not out for political power but that they enter the political realm unwillingly, after having been forced to take a political stand because of civilian default.²²

²⁰Samuel P. Huntington, The Common Defense, p. 115.

²¹Cong. Rec., 87th Congress, 1st Sess. (1961), Vol. 107, Part 12, p. 16443.

²²Mills, op. cit., pps. 200-201.

If a political campaign ever seemed to offer the military an opportunity to express their opinion, it was the Presidential campaign of 1964. Senator Goldwater employed a report from the House Republican Policy Committee which promised each service a weapons system that each had urgently recommended as necessary but that had been rejected or postponed by McNamara and he used another report from a task force headed by a former Secretary of Defense and including, among others, two retired members of the JCS--all members of the Eisenhower team.²³ President Johnson answered these charges, but McNamara and other civilian members of the Democratic administration reinforced the President in much more detail. It was reported that this election had involved the military more than any other previous election and that top-ranking military officers were unhappy with the Pentagon becoming involved in partisan politics.²⁴ In none of the sources²⁵ used has there appeared a single case of a top-ranking officer in uniform and on active duty supporting or not supporting a partisan issue. Military officers have reiterated their testimony before Congress when asked, but their speeches supported views which, though partisan as to service, had been previously stated. This problem as already explained, is a question of semantics and it recurs often. The word "military" was used to represent the views of the Pentagon. No distinction was made between the civilian members and the men in uniform. No man in uniform publicly supported the Goldwater thesis.²⁶

²³GOP "Charges a Nuclear Lag," Associated Press Dispatch, The Kansas City Times, October 12, 1964, p. 22. See also notes 4 and 5, and pps. 9 and 10 of Chapter II.

²⁴"Washington Whisper," U. S. News & World Report, September 21, 1964, p. 31.

²⁵See page 7.

²⁶The Nuclear Issue," Newsweek, September 21, 1964, p. 34.

It was true that retired officers did engage in the campaign. General Thomas D. White, retired Chief of Staff of the Air Force says,

Currently a number of retired generals and admirals, genuinely perturbed about America's status in world affairs, are taking active part in the political campaign. It would be possible to have a situation in which the actively serving senior generals and admirals espouse the politics of the 'ins' and a group of retired officers constitute an opposing military view for the 'outs'.²⁷

This did not happen in the 1964 campaign because the "ins" kept quiet or confined their remarks to previously stated positions already on record before Congressional committees. If such a controversy ever materialized, it would have a deleterious effect on the "professionalism" of the military and also injure our country. While it is not too important to differentiate between civilian and military between elections, as their policies theoretically should coincide, it would be well for informed citizens to make this distinction during elections.

General White, expressed the accepted military view on political questions as follows:

When a man enters the military career he knowingly enters a field which with respect to politics is a narrow one. I consider that in this connection the military career represents almost a polar extremity from that of the politician's career.

If the military man is compelled by conscience to speak out, either in contravention of policy or the propriety which must govern the man in uniform, let him leave the service. This often is a hard choice but I see no alternative under our system of government. Such a man can be indeed, a patriot and a fearless leader; public opinion will at a minimum applaud his courage even though it might not be converted to his views.²⁸

²⁷Gen. Thomas D. White, USA, Retired, "The Military and Politics: A Dangerous Mixture," *Newsweek*, October 19, 1964, p. 33.

²⁸Senate Military War Education Hearings, p. 5.

Foreign Policy, National Security Council, and The Bureau of the Budget

John J. McCloy said, "The isolationism of the 1920-1940 period produced a vacuum of political objectives. The State Department did not have, indeed it was not encouraged to have, any political aims in the world."²⁹ During this period the military prepared officers for functions that went beyond the training and directing of combat forces. It is not agreed that the military performed well, but they seemed to be the best planners available.³⁰ Walter Millis says:

The Second World War. . . had inextricably intermingled the civilian and the military components on all the higher levels of policy-making; and the difficult future into which we were gazing as the war ended seemed to offer little hope that they could ever be fully separated. In 1945 the stage was filled with civilians more militaristic than the military, and with military men--like Marshall, Eisenhower, Bradley and a host of others--with a breadth of view on national and world problems which often made them seem more 'civilistic' than the civilians. It was no longer clear that the substitution of a politician or businessman for a professional soldier at any given post of command would necessarily affect the course of policy.³¹

After World War II the military establishment regularly submits its recommendations on economic and political matters and probably has a predominant role in military economic aid. Its administrative roles in places like South Korea and Berlin and in formulating position papers for international conferences considering Japanese terms of surrender, for the Truman Doctrine in 1947, for NATO (North American Treaty Organization) and for many other . . . led Masland and Radway to say,

To limit the purpose and scope of war requires the closest cooperation between military and diplomatic personnel. To attain national security objectives without resort to war requires a national strategy in which the disposition of military forces is integrated with political bargaining,

²⁹ Raymond, op. cit., p. 68.

³⁰ Loc. cit.

³¹ Walter Millis, Arms and the State, p. 140.

policy statements, alliances, foreign economic policy, propaganda, and any and all measures that may foster the growth of friendly factions within foreign governments. In either case the role of the military officer of tomorrow will be even less conventional than the role he has played in the recent past.³²

To carry out this increased participation of the military in foreign affairs the Secretary of Defense has an Assistant Secretary for International Security Offices with Lt. Gen. Robert Wood (1965) as a Deputy. Each service has an organization dealing with international affairs. Some have argued that this military involvement in foreign policy indicates a lack of civilian control but, as Walter Millis observes, it is not a matter of restoring civilian control over the military establishment but of integrating military factors, forces, and plans with civil diplomacy and domestic policy.³³ As General Maxwell Taylor states, "The military are entitled by law and right to a seat at the national table--there to advise, not to dominate or command."³⁴ The military position is to clarify political alternatives and to show the military implications of alternate courses of action. After policy has been determined, the military implements it but does not change it.

Some misunderstanding exists as to the actual military influence in our government. The NSC by law is the organization which recommends national policy to the President. The Secretary of Defense is responsible for the military point of view. Unless specifically requested, the JCS do not advise the President directly; in fact, their advice goes to the Secretary of Defense. By law, either the Chairman or any member of the JCS has the authority to go to the President with a matter he deems of sufficient importance. This would be an

³² John W. Masiand and Lawrence I. Radway, Soldiers and Scholars: Military Education and National Policy, p. 26.

³³ Millis, op. cit., p. 142.

³⁴ Maxwell D. Taylor, "What Really Takes Place in The Pentagon Engine Room," Army-Navy-Air Force Journal and Register, February 29, 1964, p. 13.

extreme measure and, if used very often, would destroy relationships, making removal of either the military or civilian involved necessary. It is granted that on many occasions the Chairman of the JCS does advise the President personally, but this depends upon the wishes of the President. Organizationally the JCS have no direct access to the President or the NSC, where the actual national decisions are made.

The same is true of the budget. It is not a budget made by the man in uniform. It is a military budget made by the civilians in charge of the military. The individual services present their budgets to civilian comptrollers and civilian secretaries. The JCS reviews the budget and makes recommendations to a Defense Comptroller who presents it to the Secretary of Defense, a civilian. Of course, if the Chief of any of the services, or his civilian Secretary, has reservations on the budget, a wise Secretary of Defense gives each service a complete hearing, but the decision nevertheless is civilian. From here the budget goes to the Bureau of the Budget, where it is integrated into the overall national budget, entirely a civilian product, and the Bureau of the Budget presents the overall budget to the President, who submits it to Congress. Both in money matters and policy, the man in uniform is isolated organizationally from the decision-making body unless his personal advice is requested. As a matter of practice, the military chiefs have no trouble in having their recommendations reviewed. The Secretary of Defense undoubtedly presents substantive non-concurrences of the Chiefs of services to the President or the NSC. Congress would be quick to ferret out any such lack of consideration of a military recommendation by either the Secretary of Defense or one of the Service Secretaries, or by any of their civilian subordinates.

One of our national objectives is to prevent the spread of Communism;

another is the maintenance of free world alliances. The press for the most part (but public figures and authors military as well as civilian) popularized various names to indicate the military strategies to accomplish these objectives. First, it was "containment," then "massive retaliation," and now it is "flexible response," which includes "limited warfare," "mutual deterrence," and "balance of terror." Certainly none of these terms produces an image of peace, which is another national objective. The country as a whole is preoccupied with the problem of security. Several of these terms may produce a feeling of security in some people and certainly insecurity in others, but for all, these descriptive terms are warlike terms. In the minds of many Americans these terms are attributed to military leaders. This is not entirely right. The military is not responsible for these terms nor for the national objectives connected with them, although the military undoubtedly participated in formulation of the policies. Rightfully, George Kennan, former U. S. Ambassador to the U.S.S.R. and Yugoslavia, is responsible for the "containment" policy.³⁵ "Massive retaliation" was the policy of Eisenhower and was popularized by the press as the policy of his Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles. However, theoreticians such as Dr. Robert Strausz-Hupe, Colonel (Retired) William R. Kintner, Stefan T. Possony, and many others are responsible for outlining the ramifications of this policy.³⁶ "Flexible response" is the term representing the Kennedy policy. No less authoritative a person than General Maxwell D. Taylor says

that the public first was to receive intimations of the limitations of dependence on a nuclear strategy. . . . (These writings) from unofficial

³⁵Huntington, op. cit., p. 15.

³⁶Robert A. Levine, The Arms Debate, p. 77.

sources represented the first public questioning of the validity of the New Look policy of Massive Retaliation and I welcomed them warmly. Their acuity was all the more remarkable from the fact that the authors did not have access to complete information with regard to atomic weapons effects.³⁷

Henry Kissinger, Robert Osgood, William W. Kaufman, and others, educators employed by civilian educational institutions or scholarly research organizations, deserve the credit for not only originating but explaining these policies to the country. It is true that the Army had been interested in limited warfare for some time but, despite all Army efforts to get its policies considered in official circles, the public remained mostly unaware that a debate which would alter the entire structure of the armed forces was going on behind Pentagon walls.³⁸

In late 1964 there was an argument in NATO over MLF (multinational nuclear force), a proposal supported by the United States and Germany, and opposed firmly by France and, to a lesser degree, by Great Britain. The author of this proposal is Prof. Robert R. Bowie, Director of Harvard's Center for International Affairs.³⁹ Undoubtedly MLF was an administration concept and supported by the military, but to give credit to the military for originating the proposal is giving the military too much credit.⁴⁰ In budgetary matters, determination of national objectives, foreign policies, and even military strategy, it does not appear that the military are as influential as generally believed. At the highest levels the military, for the most part, is represented by the Secretary of Defense. There has been a gradual change since World War II, when

³⁷Huntington, *op. cit.*, p. 348.

³⁸*Loc. cit.*

³⁹"Minuet of the Powers," *Newsweek*, November 9, 1964, pps. 46-50.

⁴⁰Raymond, *op. cit.* pps. 243-248. There are many discussions of who originated what aspect of U. S. policy. This citation is in agreement with the facts as presented. It is not particularly important who originated these concepts but the point being made is that it was not a man in uniform but the State Dept., civilian educators, or research institutions.

the man in uniform was more influential than the civilian Secretaries.

Civil-Military Relations

There are few principles more honored and respected in this country than civilian control of the military. The speeches and writings of the framers of our Constitution showed a keen interest in this subject and all agreed that the military should be subordinate to civil power.

A fear of the military is deeply rooted in American traditions. The framers of the Constitution, recognizing that military domination was incompatible with free government, wove into the Constitution several precautions.⁴¹

Congress controls the purse; the President directs the sword. Congress declares war; the President runs it. Congress appropriates the money and determines the size, structure, and organization of the fighting forces; the President is the commander in chief of these forces.⁴²

Most authorities agree that in this manner the framers provided for civilian control in the Constitution.

Huntington presents the argument that the separation of powers works against objective civilian control; that the framers believed in a citizen Army that would rise up when necessary with the officers coming from the leaders of the nation who, in many cases, would be members of the national legislature. The framers chief concern was that politicians would gain military control. They did not even envisage a separate military class. Jefferson condemned the distinction between military and civilian and George Washington said that the soldier and civilian were the same man. An analogy is found in the rise of the party system. The framers did not envisage political parties nor did they envisage a professional military class so they provided for neither in the

⁴¹ James MacGregor Burns and Jack Walter Peltason, Government by the People, p. 605.

⁴² Ibid., p. 591.

Constitution, although both are now firmly embedded in our political tradition. Hence the theory that civilian control is extra-constitutional has some credence.⁴³

"Liberalism has always been the dominant ideology in the United States.⁴⁴ Throughout the years the American liberal approach to military affairs has been hostile. They believe that

a nation at war or in constant fear of war does not provide a very satisfactory milieu for the toleration and encouragement of difference and discussion. Concern with security matters, fear of disloyal persons, demand for swift action, and an atmosphere of fear are not conducive to free and open debate, protection of individual liberty, and careful deliberation.⁴⁵

These liberals have consistently pointed out that democracies have failed in countries with large standing armies. Isolated incidents⁴⁶ (which will be discussed later) have been used to justify their fears and hostility along with examples from Latin America, Europe, and other places. These liberals fail to realize that the military in the United States are dedicated supporters of civilian control--that this dedication is to the Constitution, and to the President as their Commander-in-Chief. The military have shown little interest, with few exceptions, in the niceties of the evolution of civilian control but support the civilians appointed to the military establishment by the President and confirmed by the Senate as their superiors without qualification.

Former CNO (Chief of Naval Operations) Arleigh A. Burke says

In regard to the military, there is the principle of civilian control. No mature U. S. military officer I know of has ever questioned it. Indeed,

⁴³Samuel P. Huntington, "Civilian Control and the Constitution," American Political Science Review, Sep. 1956, Vol. 50, pps. 679, 698. This article gives an excellent analysis of the origins of civilian control.

⁴⁴Samuel P. Huntington, "The Soldier and the State," p. 143. For a complete analysis of the effect of the liberal society versus military professionalism see pps. 143-162.

⁴⁵Harold D. Lasswell, National Security and Individual Freedom, p. 28.

⁴⁶These include the cases of Generals Ainsworth, MacArthur, Walker and Anderson.

it is a sacred part of our military tradition itself. If a military man cannot reconcile his convictions with his civilian superior's order, he had only the recourse of leaving the service.⁴⁷

Former Chairman of the JCS and now Supreme Commander of NATO Gen. Lyman Lemnitzer says, "The principle of military subordination to civilian control is one of the most important foundations of our form of government."⁴⁸ Former Chief of Intelligence and Research and Development of the Army Lt. Gen. Arthur G. Trudeau says

I know of no military officer who questions the historically accepted principle of civilian control of the military, or the responsibility and authority of the Secretary of Defense and higher officials to review, for policy and propriety, the statements of military spokesmen.⁴⁹

Civilian control of the military is not just merely accepted or endured by the military but it is repeatedly stressed to prospective officers from the time military training is started in ROTC (Reserve Officer Training Corps) units, in the universities, at West Point, or at other military schools. Americans can be proud of and reassured by the devotion to this principle of civilian supremacy displayed at the academies and all higher military schools. It is drilled into every officer.⁵⁰ The military considers civilian control not only a necessity of the democracy which it has sworn to protect, but also a guarantee of its professionalism. There are many recent statements of both civilian scholars and military leaders emphasizing civilian control. I can find no military leader who has ever questioned civilian control; however, General Bradley appears to think that the military would prefer a less public role when

⁴⁷Military Cold War Education Report, p. 201.

⁴⁸Military Cold War Education Hearings, p. 6127.

⁴⁹Ibid., p. 127.

⁵⁰John W. Masland and Laurence I. Radway, op. cit., p. 506.

he said,

Economically, politically and militarily, the control of our government resides with the civilian executive and legislative agencies. . . . When you have civilians like these in charge, no military clique can develop. And when you have trained and skilled businessmen and scientists advising the military as frequently as we have had since 1940, admirals and generals are not likely to influence unduly the policy and plans of our government . . . I also am sure that as soon as civilian agencies are organized to take over such civilian problems, the military will gladly withdraw to its purely professional duties.⁵¹

Except for MacArthur, not since the turn of the century, when General Ainsworth, with Congressional assistance, challenged the authority of Secretary Root, has a military man attempted to override his civilian superior.⁵² It is true that, as a result of the Congressional B-36 hearings, President Truman dismissed Admiral Denfield.⁵³ Also President Eisenhower did not reappoint General Ridgway after his first two years, as would have been customary, but allowed him to retire, supposedly from disagreement over personnel cuts in Army strength and the strategic role for the Army.⁵⁴ Neither Ridgway nor Denfield ever implied that the decisions being made were not wholly civilian decisions. In fact, Ridgway said,

When all my protests against reductions in the combat strength of the Army proved unavailing, there was but one course left open to me-- to support the course of action prescribed by my civilian superiors, no matter how dangerous it seemed to me.⁵⁵

Then General Ridgway visited all his subordinate commands and informed the Generals he had tried his best to forestall cuts in Army strength and that none of them should do or say anything that failed to support the civilian decision.⁵⁶ Both Denfield and Ridgway were supported by their immediate Army

⁵¹ General Omar H. Bradley, "Should We Fear the Military? Civilians Are in Charge," Look, Mar. 11, 1952, p. 35.

⁵² Samuel P. Huntington, The Common Defense, p. 311.

⁵³ Harry S. Truman, op. cit., p. 53.

⁵⁴ Millis, op. cit., p. 404 and Sherman Adams, First Hand Report, p. 27.

⁵⁵ Matthew P. Ridgway, Soldier, p. 303.

⁵⁶ Loc. cit.

and Navy civilian secretaries. After Congressmen had their say for the record, Denfield and Ridgway, as civilians, dropped out of the picture except as examples for future historians who become interested in their careers. The principle of civilian control was enhanced rather than challenged in these two cases.

MacArthur's words,

I find in existence a new and heretofore unknown and dangerous concept that the members of our armed forces owe primary allegiance and loyalty to those who temporarily exercise the authority of the Executive Branch of government rather than to the country and its Constitution which they are sworn to defend. No proposition could be more dangerous.⁵⁷

are often used as evidence of a military challenge to civilian control. Mills gives this speech as his only example of military ascendancy and dangerous military thinking.⁵⁸ Few remember that MacArthur prefaced this remark by stating, "We of the military shall always do what we are told to do."⁵⁹ And several days later at a press conference, he elaborated by saying that "any idea that a military commander in any position would possess authority over the civil functions of this government is a treasonable concept in my mind."⁶⁰ It must be remembered that, when MacArthur talked before Congress, he was a civilian and, at the most, his revolt (if revolt it was) was that of one soldier unsupported by other military men in power or on active duty. General Thomas A. Lane in writing about MacArthur says:

The implication of the Truman supporters has been that this letter was written to embarrass the President. It obviously was not. This country once had a tradition, only recently abrogated, that Congress was entitled to the candid views of the country's military leaders. It was in the Constitutional tradition that General MacArthur had responded to an inquiry by the House minority leader. He had no reason to believe that his

⁵⁷Mills, op. cit., p. 204.

⁵⁸Loc. cit.

⁵⁹Loc. cit.

⁶⁰Mills, op. cit., p. 325.

appraisal, which was available to all inquiring Congressmen would be tossed into a hot political debate. He might have asked that his views be kept confidential; but it would have been a reflection on Congressional prudence for him to suggest what should or should not be made public. As in all his advice to Congress, General MacArthur left the judgment of the public interest to Congress.

You will find in this as in his other actions a meticulous observance by General MacArthur of his duty to his superiors. The significance of the MacArthur removal from command is that the actions of a forthright and loyal commander were so misinterpreted by hostile allies and a coterie of White House toadies that the President lacked a real comprehension of the war being waged in Korea.⁶¹

MacArthur was a very forceful and complicated personality. He had dealt successfully with considerable freedom in policy matters with Japan and felt himself perfectly capable of doing so. He had been Chief of Staff of the Army and in this capacity had many times forcefully represented the Army before Congress. He had many friends in Congress. He was the Commander of United Nations forces but the chain-of-command originated with UN resolution (drafted by the United States), then sent to the United States for execution. The UN resolution would be considered by the NSC, approved by the President, and sent to the JCS who sent it to the Army as the executive agent. General Collins, a man much junior to General MacArthur would transmit the orders to General MacArthur. To the Army, with few exceptions, MacArthur had been disobedient to a superior officer, and obedience is the highest military virtue. General Lane's explanation maybe plausible to some but testimony before Congress is a regularized method with a Committee requesting information and not by personal correspondence. All four members of the JCS testified strongly against him. Some of his immediate subordinates and a few who had been on his staff tried to justify his actions. No one doubted President Truman's authority, but there was considerable emotional opinion among the military, particularly retired officers, that a great commander had been treated

⁶¹Maj. Gen. Thomas A. Lane, "MacArthur Misjudged," Army, June 1965, pps. 6, 8.

shabbily. No doubt President Truman could have relieved the General in a more generous manner. Since then MacArthur's cause has been adopted by "rightist" groups, including a few senior retired military officers. This list includes General Bonner Fellers, General James A. Van Fleet, General Albert C. Wedemeyer, General Mark Clark, General George E. Stratemeyer, Admiral Ben Moreel, Admiral Chester Ward.⁶² A distinguishing characteristic of all these officers, representing all three services, is that they fought in the Pacific, mostly in Korea.

There have been other cases of momentary importance, the most recent of which is that of General Edwin Walker who said that "the oath of an Army officer was a covenant with Almighty God."⁶³ It is true that the oath of office, as both MacArthur and Walker state it, is to support the Constitution but an officer's commission from the President charges an officer to obey his military as well as civilian superiors. But this is quibbling about words.

But Walker before a Senate subcommittee after his retirement, said, "I want to say first that, like all officers of the Armed Services known to me, I have always respected and supported the principle of civilian control over the military. . . . Civilian authority is supreme."⁶⁴ Walker was a minor figure, an embarrassment to the Army, and his case would never have received the publicity it did except that it was exploited by Congress and the "Anti-Communists" and "rightist" groups.

Admiral Burke said he had never heard of an officer advocating preventive war.⁶⁵ The admiral was mistaken and it concerned a case of disobedience involving national policy.

Preventive war, which was strictly against national policy, was advocated

⁶²New York Times, January 14, 1962, p. 1.

⁶³Tristram Coffin, Passion of the Hawks, p. 102.

⁶⁴Senate Military Cold War Education Hearings, p. 1390.

⁶⁵Senate Military Cold War Hearings, p. 174.

by Secretary of the Navy Francis Matthews and also by General Orvil Anderson, Commandant of the Air War College, in August and September (respectively) of 1950. No one should object to a senior military school theoretically considering the possibility of preventive war, particularly at this time, because in 1950 the United States superiority in nuclear warfare was unquestioned and time was considered in favor of the U.S.S.R. But for such a policy to be publicly advocated by people in authority could have had the most serious effects on foreign policy and, more to the point, the military was openly advocating a solution to a political question--and this is not the prerogative of the military. It would seem that the most serious mistake was made by Secretary Matthews who, as a member of the NSC, should have known precisely what the national policy was, while General Anderson, as the head of a school, might be excused on the basis that his job required him to deal with all possible theoretical questions connected with war and peace. General Anderson was dismissed but Secretary Matthews was only privately censured by President Truman, who felt that, due to inexperience, Matthews had not fully realized the impact of his remarks and he had been listening too much to Navy admirals.⁶⁶ As Admiral Burke says the possibility, advantages, and disadvantages, of preventive war, in strategic plans are discussed.⁶⁷ Admiral Robert B. Carney, Chief of Naval Operations, made some very restrained remarks in a 1954 speech, but no evidence has been produced that indicates the military ever reduced such a recommendation to writing even for discussion purposes.⁶⁸

There is no doubt that the military accepts civilian control when it comes from the Commander-in-Chief, but William J. Coughlin, in Missiles and Rockets,

⁶⁶Truman, op. cit., p. 383. and Bernard Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age, p. 229.

⁶⁷Loc. cit.

⁶⁸Brodie, op. cit., p. 229.

expresses doubt about acceptance of the same control from Secretary McNamara who, more than any other Secretary of Defense, has taken command of and done much to unify the services. He says

It should be understood that the high officers in the Pentagon, without exception, acknowledged the need of civilian control of the military establishment. But in most cases it was felt that this civilian authority rested across the Potomac, on Capitol Hill and in the White House, and most certainly was not required to make its presence felt in the halls of the Pentagon itself. The actual running of the military establishment, it was agreed, most properly belonged in the hands of the military.⁶⁹

Recently the top military men have not spoken out, except in Congressional testimony, but there is increasing evidence that junior officers of field grade think there is too much civilian control at the Pentagon level. Colonel Robert H. Ginsburgh advances the theory that civilians have not only taken over control to the point of invading the military man's traditional province and that military professionalism is endangered by civilians taking over military strategy, but that science and industry are preempting weapons requirements and that several layers of civilian appointees are isolating and downgrading military opinion.⁷⁰ Colonel Francis X. Kane, in another article, claims that the present civilian control of the military has "computerized" military decisions, removing human considerations from military problems which have been the military's traditional area of expertise.⁷¹ These two officers are supported by many civilian experts, and recently Admiral William J. McNeil, a World War II Reserve Naval Admiral, who was the civilian comptroller of the Defense Department from 1949 to 1959, said,

The present tendency to increasingly greater civilian control, over both defense planning and execution, must be tempered by an increasingly

⁶⁹William J. Coughlin, "The Revolution, Part II," Missiles and Rockets, April 6, 1964, p. 54.

⁷⁰Colonel Robert H. Ginsburgh, "The Challenge to Military Professionalism," Air Force and Space Digest, March, 1964, pps. 50-56.

⁷¹Colonel Francis X. Kane, "Security is Too Important to be Left to Computers," Fortune, April, 1964, pps. 146-147.

skilled and competent Officer Corps. . .there seems to be a dangerous tendency in our defense to try to anticipate what is wanted from the top (referring to civilian heads) and then supply it.⁷²

Not all junior officers agree. Major John W. Seigle has written an article entitled "The Myth of Decision by Computer." He claims that the civilians have instituted what the military can use to its advantage. He says, "The idea that diabolic computers are making defense decisions is misleading. The proper concern is whether the right people are operating the machines!"⁷³ The fact that General Taylor has said,

On the one side there are those who stress the dangers of excessive military influence in the development of national policy. . .the other side of the debate holds. . .that there is presently over-control of the military which is causing or may cause an erosion of military authority and prestige,⁷⁴ and the submergence of military professionalism to civilian dilettantism.

indicates that the highest ranking officer in the country recognizes a problem. Does the fact that junior officers of today, who will be senior officers of tomorrow, are restless under tight civilian control at the Pentagon level now make it possible that this influence will increase and spread so as to endanger civilian control? Evidence does not corroborate this conclusion, particularly because the officers publicly complaining of excessive civilian control are Air Force officers concerned with the replacement of manned bombers with missiles, while the Army, whose mission of limited warfare has increased in importance under McNamara, is not complaining. The underlying dissatisfaction appears to be service-or mission-oriented, rather than oriented toward civilian control.

⁷²Daniel S. Henkin, "The Speech That Wasn't Cleared," Army-Navy-Air Force Journal and Register, June 20, 1964, pp. 1 and 8.

⁷³Major John W. Seigle, "The Myth of Decision by Computer," Army, May, 1964, p. 67.

⁷⁴Taylor, op. cit., p. 8.

There is a much more subtle military influence which must be considered. Walter Lippmann has said that the talkativeness of American military men is an international scandal which has caused loss of respect and confidence toward the United States.⁷⁵ Finer says that the American system of government and the enhanced role of the military forces military men into a spotlight of constant publicity. Further,

In this (the military) is neither better nor worse off than any other government agency in the United States. The generals and admirals are accused of 'speaking out of turn', and of uttering sentiments which are bigoted, or contrary to official policy, or which deal with matters--like foreign policy--which are no concern of theirs. They certainly do do these things. Often, the publicity given to their view is not intended by them. . . Yet in all these cases it is not only not censured by the American public but is positively defended on the grounds that 'the public have a right to know'. It must never be forgotten that the American panacea for any policy problem is publicity. In this respect the military are no more open-mouthed or undisciplined than the civil administrators.

In this connection Mills points out that the military aims are legitimate and that military men are most competent to pursue them, but he finds because of the new military prestige, what the military says lends weight to controversial matters which are mainly political and raises military matters above the political. He also says that military men are expert in working behind the scenes to accomplish their purposes.⁷⁷ It is well known that Eisenhower was irritated many times by speeches which seemed in conflict with administration policy,⁷⁸ and Secretary McNamara found it necessary to issue the following directive: "After the President has taken a position, has established a policy, I expect no member of the Department, either civilian or military, will discuss that policy other than in a way to support it before the public."⁷⁹ Secretary McNamara refused to give names or incidents regarding civilians or military which had made the directive

⁷⁵John M. Swomley, Jr., The Military Establishment, p. 113.

⁷⁶Finer, op. cit., p. 142.

⁷⁷Mills, op. cit., pps. 185, 199, 202.

⁷⁸Swomley, op. cit., p. 113.

⁷⁹Cong. Rec., op. cit., p. 14439.

necessary and said:

The only case I can recall involving discipline of any kind relating to a public statement by an officer or a civilian employee of the Department of any kind including statements relating to Communism is the discipline applied to General Waiker. The infractions certainly were not major ones.⁸⁰

The military leaders are popular speakers at all types of meetings and they naturally try to say something of importance. Such a normal instinct is hard to control, particularly when the public and press seem to approve. And it is not true to say that this "talkativeness" is usually not without a purpose. There is no more ambitious group of men than the military. They are power hungry, too. But their ambition and longing for power is directed in one of two directions: toward the enhancement of their particular service or toward the increase of their prestige within their own service. No military man ever talks against civilian control, although his talks are exploited by the press and partisan advocates for every possible anti-administration recommendation or for controversial material.

In reviewing the speeches of military leaders, one finds General Power advocating an air alert, General Ridgway more ground troops, General LeMay more airplanes. While patriotism and the need to protect our democracy are woven into the speeches, the emphasis is on the military needs of their own service. This orientation of military men toward power and prestige for their own service is undoubtedly one of the best safeguards against militarism which a democratic government has. The Air Force espouses massive retaliation because the Air Force would have the top defense task; the Army espouses limited warfare for the same reason; the Navy argues for atomic submarines to take over strategic nuclear missions while the Air Force opposes them. A victory for one service is a defeat for the other.

⁸⁰Senate Cold War Education Hearings, p. 1394.

It is the same way with the budget. Strategic goals are converted into military appropriations in which each service is dedicated to getting its share, or more, from the budget. If the military ever agreed on strategic goals, the equipment to attain these goals, or the size and proportionate share of military appropriations, then the danger of militarism would be greatly increased. The present system is expensive, and produces pluralism, but as Senator Henry Jackson (D.-Wash.) says, "The life and death issues of National Security are too important to sacrifice a healthy competition in the name of efficiency."⁸¹

General Bradley when asked to comment on what would happen to the United States if the Communists took over Europe and Asia, said, "We'd have to militarize completely for 100 or 150 years, and that would be as bad as defeat."⁸² In other words, General Bradley thinks that militarism would be as bad for this country as would Communism. It is doubtful if many civilians see the dangers of militarism as clearly as do the military men themselves--they are experts by training and schooling on the effects produced by militarism in other countries and have both intellectually and emotionally rejected it for the United States. That love of country and patriotism are motivating forces in young officers cannot be denied. The letters of Captain J. P. Spruill to his wife, published after his untimely death, are classics in this regard.⁸³ Additional evidence is supplied by another young officer who asserts that the public does not fully understand the military profession and says:

⁸¹"Too Much Unifying Can be Costly Senator Jackson Tells Career Men," Amy-Navy-Air Force Journal and Register, June 20, 1964, p. 8.

⁸²Alfred Vogts, A History of Militarism, p. 486.

⁸³Army Information Digest, July, 1964, pps. 46-47.

Today the armed services are rapidly assuming a role in American society which leaves them virtually the sole repository of those virtues upon which the American Republic was founded: devotion to public service, high moral standards, selfless obedience and sacrifice to the ideal of service to the nation, and other virtues fast fading from the world scene.⁸⁴

Military teaching and a military career are still producing young men who recognize values of liberty and justice and are willing and anxious to pattern their military careers in this tradition. Undoubtedly the two examples shown above are rather extreme symptoms of selfless, patriotic idealism and there is a danger connected with such absolutism. For military men to believe that they are the sole repositories of American virtues shows a lack of understanding of our other great democratic institutions--educational, political, and spiritual. Such extremism in youth can be accepted as immature judgment but, if extended to senior military officers, would be dangerous and would be an evidence of extreme militarism.

S. L. A. Marshall, in a recent article entitled "Why Do They Slander Our Military Men?" said,

The American military, like all the rest of us, want a better deal for themselves if it can be got. But I maintain that they are beyond the rest of us in their active, thinking support of the time-tested ideals that have kept this a government of, by and for the people. Here I speak of the principle of civilian control in its broadest, most meaningful implication. The principle has stayed firm through almost two centuries, because the American military have given it wholehearted support. Had they not been so dedicated, constitutionality might have run as devious course in the U. S. as in a banana republic. In our union, the military alone have had the power to challenge government decisively--and they have served but to uphold Government.⁸⁵

⁸⁴Major Carl M. Guelzo, "In Defense of an Elusive Ideal," Army, July, 1964, p. 64.
⁸⁵S. L. A. Marshall, "Why Do They Slander Our Military Men?", Post, September 5, 1964.

Former Secretary of Defense Robert A. Lovett said:

Alarmist cries about the lack of civilian control over the military, in our Nation, deal with a strawman issue. They are concerned with a problem that does not really exist, and they are divisive and damaging by falsely implying that the military does not accept our historic tradition of civilian supremacy. Nothing could be more wrong.⁸⁶

Former Secretary of Defense Thomas S. Gates expressed the same idea in this manner:

Civilian control, in a historic sense, is not debatable. I have never heard it questioned. Military men respect it and believe it. . . . No military man nor military group wants political control. I have no fear whatsoever in this regard. 'The man on the white horse' is no more real than Don Quixote tilting at windmills and is a very foolish worry of some extremists. This will not and cannot happen under our system and it would never be accepted by responsible officers.⁸⁷

Dr. James D. Atkinson, associate professor of government at Georgetown University, was asked by the Subcommittee for a statement. He made a statement and it is interesting to note that he pointed out that Andrew Jackson, Winfield Scott, George B. McClelland, and Leonard Wood, although soldiers, brought political issues before the public and that this was accepted as natural by the people of the United States.⁸⁸ In fact, it wasn't until the 1920's that the military were supposed to be excluded from politics. The important point is that not one of these generals who discussed political issues before the public and even ran for office attempted to enhance their political position by military support. Atkinson's conclusion is that the military should be nonpartisan, and it closely follows that of other reputable scholars of the military tradition.

No myth has been more persistent--especially since the 1920's--than that there existed a military mind which was alien to American soil and which had to be watched carefully lest it undermine our national institutions. The myth that somehow an officer caste might arise and create a dictatorship has never had any foundation in fact in the United States,

⁸⁶ Senate Cold War Education Hearings, p. 12.

⁸⁷ Ibid., p. 3118.

⁸⁸ Senate Military Cold War Education Hearings, pps. 3147-3160.

yet it has somehow managed to persist. The myth has been nourished on the idea that there has been a conflict between the military and the civil authorities over the question of 'civilian supremacy' over the military. Actually, this is a false dichotomy. Even a cursory survey of American military history reveals the fact civilian supremacy--even during the darkest days of the Civil War--had never been questioned by military people.⁸⁹

With evidence from two Secretaries of Defense (one Republican and one Democrat) and with opinions of prominent scholars⁹⁰ to corroborate such views, there seems little room for argument with Senator Thurmond's conclusion before the Senate Subcommittee: "The information developed by the subcommittee shows conclusively that there is no threat from the military to civilian supremacy."⁹¹

⁸⁹Ibid., p. 3147.

⁹⁰Gene M. Lyons, "The New Civil Military Relations," American Political Science Review, March 1961, pps. 53-55 says that the military accept civilian supremacy and that they have been thrown into a political role in formation of policy. Lewis J. Edinger, "Military Leaders and Foreign Policy Making," American Political Science Review, June 1963, p. 405 says "In the study of 'civil-military relations' the effect of military influence have been difficult to assess. After reading all the factors required to determine military influence--it can be practically said that no one has produced studies that would confirm military influence." Paul Y. Hammond, Organization for Defense: The American Military Establishment in the 20th Century comes to the conclusion that any risk of losing civilian control is considerably less than is commonly believed. William T. R. Fox, "Civilian Soldiers and American Military Policy," World Politics, April 1955, pps. 403-418 presents a stronger argument for military inclusion and actions in civil-military relations.

⁹¹Senate Military Cold War Education Report, p. 203.

Military Mind

H. G. Wells once said, "The professional military mind is by necessity an inferior and unimaginative mind; no man of high intellectual quality would willingly imprison his gifts in such a calling."⁹² The concept of a military mind that lacks balance of judgment, uses dictatorial methods instead of persuasion, looks at problems narrowly and illiberally, and by education, training and experience is not equipped to perform a role in society outside of a constricted military sphere, stems from the liberal tradition in the United States from 1920 to 1940.⁹³

Several political scientists have observed that our present pluralistic society has become so mixed that there is no longer a clearly defined military group in contradistinction to a civilian group. Gene M. Lyons is not the first or only one to express the idea that civilians are becoming militarized and the military civilianized.⁹⁴ Just exactly what is meant by this statement is not amplified but the impression given from the entire article is that senior officers today show a broader interpretation and knowledge of political, economic, psychological, and sociological factors while the civilian knowledge and use of the same factors is becoming narrower.

John W. Masland and Laurence I. Radway portray the military today as follows:

The traditional distinction between military and civilian affairs in American life has become less significant. Under present conditions at home and abroad, it is obviously not enough for the armed forces to provide good soldiers, sailors, airmen, and the leaders necessary to command them in battle. Today many of these leaders are called upon to work closely with

⁹²Lt. Col. Gordon K. Fleishman, "The Myth of the Military Mind," Military Review, November 1964, p. 4.

⁹³See Chapter 1, page 4, footnote 7 and speech of Senator Fulbright, Cong. Rec., 1st Sess. (1961) Vol. 107, Part 1, p. 14433.

⁹⁴Gene M. Lyons, "The New Civil-Military Relations," American Political Science Review, March 1961, pp. 53-55; see also "Washington Play It Cool," Newsweek, January 8, 1964, p. 34, and footnote 31 on page 79.

foreign affairs experts, industrial managers, scientists, labor leaders and educators. They participate in the drafting and promotion of legislation, in the preparation of a national budget, and in the determination of the American position on a wide variety of foreign policy issues. They are required to understand, to communicate with, and to evaluate the judgment of political leaders, officials of other executive agencies, and countless specialists; they must make sound judgments themselves on matters which affect a wide variety of civilian concerns. They are called upon to evaluate the motivations and capabilities of foreign nations and to estimate the effects of American action or inaction upon these nations. And above all, the new role of military leaders requires of them a heightened awareness of the principles of our democratic society.⁹⁵

C. P. Snow has divided the intellectuals into two classes, scientific and humanistic. He claims that each has its separate dialogue and one of the dangers of the present era is that they do not understand each other.⁹⁶ It could be said that each discipline has its own methods and individualistic mental views. Similarly business, law, medicine, professional athletics, have general characteristics which could be classified as separate mentalities. General George H. Decker said, "The real test of the military decision maker is to weed out the trivia, to go to the heart of the matter, to decide, and having decided to execute."⁹⁷ General Taylor, giving more detail, agrees that there is a military mind and described it in a speech before the American Bar Association as follows:

Personally, I've never been overly exercised by the charge of possessing a military mind. How would you lawyers feel if you were said not to possess a legal mind? By the same token we soldiers, sailors, and airmen regard a military mind as something to be sought and developed--an indispensable professional asset which can only be acquired after years of training in reflecting and acting on military and related problems. We hope that such a mind, when properly matured, will prove itself analytical, accurate and decisive in time of crisis because history has shown that neither the battlefield nor the national council table is the place for conjecture, vagueness, or obscurity of thought.⁹⁸

⁹⁵Masland and Radway, op. cit., p. vii.

⁹⁶C. P. Snow, The Two Cultures and A Second Look, pp. 11-12.

⁹⁷Fleishman, op. cit., p. 7.

⁹⁸Taylor, op. cit., p. 8.

The influx of retired officers into positions of responsibility in industry and government has already been noted. Obviously their performance is creditable or industry would not accept them neither would the President appoint them nor would Congress approve. It is also important that 200 generals or admirals (17 percent), 1400 colonels or Naval captains (11 percent), and 6,000 officers of lower grades are on assignment to interservice or international agencies or to other departments of the government.⁹⁹

To meet these increased challenges the military establishment is increasingly placing emphasis on education both in service schools and civilian institutions. Take the 1964 Army figures as an example (the same approximate percentages are true for the Navy and Air Force). More than 73% hold college degrees, a gain of 24% since 1954, and 8% hold master's degrees excluding medicine, law and theology. When the last of the World War II officers, who became officers after serving in enlisted status, are retired, these percentages will rise considerably. Post graduates degrees originally were allowed only for disciplines which could show an immediate military use or need but now officers are allowed to take advanced degrees in almost any field but the biggest gains are in biological and physical science, management, economics, psychology, and political science with emphasis on international relations. At present there are 800 Army officers enrolled at government expense in full-time graduate study and an additional 7,000 in off-duty study of their own, many of them for graduate degrees. During the past 10 years, 4,500 have received Master's and Doctor's degrees.¹⁰⁰

Masland and Radway, who have produced a recent and comprehensive study on military education, point out that the following subjects are among those taught at the various branch schools: public and international affairs, community

⁹⁹Masland and Radway, *op. cit.*, p. 517.

¹⁰⁰"Officers Achieve Impressive Gains in Degrees Held," ANF Army News Features, November 16, 1964, p. 1.

relations, military government, civil disturbances, Congressional relations, general management, foreign military aid program, public speaking, conference and committee techniques, and a course dealing with Communism, fascism, and democracy (each school teaches these subjects in different proportion and no school teaches all of the above subjects).¹⁰¹

At the National War College three quarters of the time is spent on non-military subjects dealing with international relations.¹⁰² The authors felt too much time was spent on the foundations of Communism (Marxism and Leninism) and thought more time should be spent on the emerging nations of Asia and Africa.¹⁰³ This college's entire curriculum is directed toward preparing officers for assignments to positions involving the formulation of security policy at the NSC level.¹⁰⁴ At the Army, Navy, and Air Force War College the authors were impressed by the breadth of the curriculum. "At no other place can an individual secure instruction on the full range of circumstances that bear upon the security of the United States today and during the foreseeable future."¹⁰⁵

The conclusion of the authors on professional military education is as follows:

It is a record of which the armed forces justly may be proud; it is far better than many civilian educators and laymen realize. The services recognize the need to prepare officers for the newer demands that have been placed upon them. The awareness has led to both specialized training programs and broader educational opportunities. . . .

We conclude that military education does make a very substantial contribution to the preparation of officers for policy roles. . . . The range of subjects presented in military schools helps him to see the relevance of his task to the larger context in which he operates. It helps him to see broader technical, organizational and social relationships, and to appreciate the dynamic quality of decision making in an era of revolutionary change. In many cases the educational experience helps him to diminish a narrow

¹⁰¹ Masland and Radway, op. cit., pps. 278, 279, 291.

¹⁰² Ibid., p. 358.

¹⁰³ Ibid., p. 359.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid., p. 368.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid., p. 367.

parochialism and to increase versatility. They facilitate creative military service under civilian leadership in a democratic society.¹⁰⁶

The most important factor concerning West Point, Annapolis, and the Air Academy was that the amount of instruction provided was much closer to the amount provided by civilian colleges than was expected. This was accomplished because the total education program is unusually long. No academy offers less work in the humanities, composition, and speech than is required at a civilian college. Social sciences have increased in importance with a diplomatic history course devoted to a systematic analysis of international relations. The cadets spend more time in arts and sciences than on either engineering or military subjects.¹⁰⁷

Over 65% of regular Army officers come from ROTC, the Navy has a lesser percentage and the Air Force approximately the same. In 1965 there were 13,000 Second Lieutenants commissioned in the Army alone (goal is 17,000) with only 500 from West Point, a ratio of 26 to 1.¹⁰⁸ By weight of numbers alone, the military graduates of civilian institutions are becoming more influential in the policies and actions of our military establishment every day. Gene M. Lyons' and John W. Masland's Education and Military Leadership is the most recent and authoritative study of the ROTC. Among their conclusions are that:

The programs were originally designed for the preparation of reserve officers available to lead a citizen army and navy mobilized in an emergency. . . . Present trends suggest a diminishing role for reserve officers. . . and a rising demand in the career service for officers trained in colleges and universities.¹⁰⁹

¹⁰⁶Ibid., pps. 502, 503.

¹⁰⁷Ibid., pps. 214-217.

¹⁰⁸Newsletter Issue No. 2, U. S. Army Troop Support Unit, August 20, 1963

P. 2. ¹⁰⁹Gene M. Lyons and John W. Masland, Education and Military Leadership: A Study of ROTC, p. 3.

These men (ROTC graduates) must understand the role of the military establishment in a democratic society and be sensitive to political, economic, and social developments at home and abroad. They must have analytical skill and good judgment of high order. Perhaps of greatest importance is the need for wisdom and a broad perspective, not only among officers who advance to higher levels of responsibility but among officers at all levels, in peacetime and war.¹¹⁰

Quantitatively ROTC output looks all right. . . .Qualitatively the situation is different. The ROTC programs are not contributing adequately to the strong professional officer base required for the forces-in-being. Almost all of the testimony that we have obtained has confirmed that the ROTC product makes excellent officer material. But too few of these men elect to remain in the military. The services are not securing their share of talent for long-term and career duty, particularly in certain specialized categories.¹¹¹

Responsibility for achieving a proper relationship of higher education to the needs of society rests with individuals and agencies of the federal government and with leaders in higher education.¹¹²

Civilian institutions and the services must realize that this group of young Americans has an important job to do and that how well it performs and how well the future military officer is imbued with democratic principles may be determined at our educational institutions. One conclusion is evident: that the type of officer desired will not evolve if civilian institutions and the services fail to recognize that this is an area for which they have a responsibility to provide the necessary background and instruction and that not just any curriculum is satisfactory.

If an American military mind was at one time narrow and parochial, the evidence available now is that by education, training, and experience it has grown with its expanded responsibilities in science, technology, and political and economic affairs. In fact, "the far-flung operations of military officers at mid-century may be viewed by the future historian as the start of a fundamental

¹¹⁰*Ibid.*, p. 13.

¹¹¹*Ibid.*, p. 212.

¹¹²*Ibid.*, p. 237.

change in the American social order and the future American system."¹¹³

Although there are no statistics available, retired military personnel as well as the more than 50% of American men who have some kind of military service, do not seem to be having difficulty in being assimilated into civilian communities. Officers now are Republicans as well as Democrat; Methodists, Catholics, and every other religious denomination; members of Rotary, Lions, Kiwanis; and active in PTA and other public-minded groups. "Much of the isolation and austerity that characterized the military forces was pressed upon them by an indifferent or suspicious people"¹¹⁴ but now they represent a cross-section of America as broad as any other group. Martin Blumenson says:

World War II was a watershed in the relations between the American public and the military services. Since that time, the American people have come to understand the precarious equilibrium of our world and the necessity for maintaining a large Military Establishment. Officers are no longer outside the mainstream of American life, but perform a vital function of protecting and conserving it. They are now recognized as professionals in the full sense of the term, not only as the opposite of amateurs, but achieving a knowledge acquired by study and experience.¹¹⁵

Public Education by the Military

As has been indicated earlier, Senator Fulbright in a Senate speech took exception to the military engaging in public education on the dangers of Communism. He said that the military does not have this ability nor should it have this responsibility. And, of course, this public instruction was just another evidence of the spreading influence of the military into every phase of American life. If the military could move into one sphere of political education of the public, it could certainly extend its influence into other areas of education. It was further evidence of Eisenhower's contention that the military portion of the complex was, by its very size, taking over vital areas in American culture that

¹¹³Masland and Radway, *Ibid.*, p. 25.

¹¹⁴*Ibid.*, p. 4.

¹¹⁵Martin Blumenson "Some Thoughts On Professionalism," *Military Review*, September 1964, p. 13.

had never before been subjected to military direction. Fulbright's speech resulted in a Senate Subcommittee being appointed which the press called the investigation into the 'muzzling of the military.' The subcommittee report was almost a complete repudiation of Fulbright's thesis and, as this report, which has been quoted several times already, is the most exhaustive study by a Senate Subcommittee of the proliferation or penetration of the military into extra-military fields, in this case education of the public, it will be considered in some detail, even though its consideration may repeat other parts of this study. It recommended that the military participation in anti-Communist seminars be continued because the experience and specialized knowledge of the military gave it a legitimate function, due to the dangers and menace of Communism.¹¹⁶ Two Senators dissented to this conclusion. Senator Strom Thurmond went considerably further and recommended that "the Military Establishment should continue to utilize its personnel and facilities to the maximum extent to inform the public on the issues of the cold war."¹¹⁷ Senator E. L. Bartlett said, "I continue to be, and likely always will be opposed to public education by the military on the subject of communism." His reason was that the officers did not have time, with all their other duties.¹¹⁸ The concurring members of the Committee consisted of Democrats, John Stennis, Mississippi, Stuart Symington, Missouri, Henry Jackson, Washington and Republicans Leverett Sultonstall, Massachusetts, Francis Case, South Dakota, and Margaret Chase Smith, Maine. George W. Brown, in his study of the findings of the Committee, considered them "reasonably representative of feelings of the attitudes in the Senate as a whole."¹¹⁹ This assessment seems accurate.

¹¹⁶Military Cold War Education Report, pps. 7, 8.

¹¹⁷Loc. cit., p. 191.

¹¹⁸Loc. cit., pps. 43, 44.

¹¹⁹George W. Brown, Generals and the Public: Recent Policymaking in Civil-Military Relations, p. 4.

Judging from the parade of witnesses supporting military participation in cold war seminars to educate the public on the menace of Communism, there could be little doubt as to the conclusion the Subcommittee would reach. Witnesses were politically bipartisan. They included the military and civilian heads under both Democratic and Republican Administrations, a professor of government from Georgetown University, other government officials, and many of the officers who had participated in or conducted cold war seminars. However, there was some evidence submitted in dissent particularly by Norman Thomas and the Socialist Party-Social Democratic Federation and the Jewish War Veterans.¹²⁰ There was also Senator Fulbright's speech in the Senate, containing his memorandum to the Secretary of Defense and other evidence he had placed in the Congressional Record which was made a part of the hearings.¹²¹ The preponderance of witnesses came from the military, many of whom were retired, or were civilians who had held top positions in the Defense Department or, in some cases, the State Department. The absence of educators as witnesses, in a matter in which they should have priority interest, was very apparent. These hearings were well reported. It is admitted that the impact of the hearings could not be evaluated at the time but, as students study them their impact will probably become greater. Any educator desiring to make a written statement or to present testimony could have done so, as Norman Thomas did but none took the opportunity. Senator Fulbright's speech and memorandum initiated the investigation; yet he didn't appear at the investigation or comment about it while it was in session. Was he satisfied that the subject was being covered from all angles? Or did he feel, for political reasons, that he should not intervene? Or was he just too busy? No one knows, but his opinion would have been valuable in assessing the objectivity of the investigation.

¹²⁰Senate Cold War Education Hearings, p. 3016 and 3142-43.

¹²¹Loc. cit., p. 3053.

The subcommittee presented much valuable material and undoubtedly brought several subjects, generally misunderstood by the public, into focus. It was universally recognized that military men have a responsibility to indoctrinate the members of the armed forces on the military aspects of Communism and a subversion by Communists within the military establishment. There was no argument by anyone that the U.S.S.R. represents the only threat to the security of the United States. There was no doubt that Communist subversive activities within the United States are antithetical to the government of the United States and that knowledge of these subversive activities should be available to every American. It was recognized that the subject of Communism, in any of its various aspects, is a political question and it was also recognized that the military should not appear in the same seminar with controversial speakers such as those of the various "rightist" groups, or retired officers who have become politically aligned.

President Eisenhower's statement at the hearings is typical of those who testified:

I am sure that all of us would deplore any move which would restrict public access to reliable information on the deadliness, implacability, totality, and cunning of the Communist assault on freedom. We should not trouble ourselves over the possibility of overinforming the public.¹²²

And later on he qualified this statement with regard to the military: "Military involvement in the providing of information concerning Communist potential aggression--indeed its involvement in all matters--must be clearly nonpartisan, directed to subjects related to the defense of America, and in harmony with approved national policies."¹²³

The subcommittee report stated that military participation must be factual and non-partisan. As far as Communism is concerned, it is my opinion that these

¹²²Loc. cit., p. 5.

¹²³Loc. cit., p. 178.

two conditions are impossible. An illustration will suffice to demonstrate this. President Eisenhower says that it is not the function of the military services to ferret out the details of attempted Communist subversion in our nation. This is the job of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, but the long professional experience with Communist tactics and with Communism's highly developed educational system makes the military singularly well trained to provide the public and members of the Armed Forces with the implications of the extreme threat of Communist imperialism. In other words President Eisenhower would allow the military to choose the facts to be presented and to put them into proper context for presentation. The military is capable of performing this job, and the job needs to be done. But in the case of Communism, either as an external or an internal threat, identical facts will bring disagreement in interpretation. To quote from Newsweek:

The FBI is charged with having developed 'a vested interest in security' --to the point where it has been exaggerating the internal threat posed by a steadily weakening Communist Party. Says one congressman: 'They are, in effect, shoring up the Communist Party, making it appear much more of a menace than it can possibly be considering its decline. This is a gimmick that helps the agency score with Congress. Hoover scares hell out of a lot of Congressmen. How can they refuse to go along on his appropriation when he is in the forefront in the fight to oust Commies and spies?'¹²⁴

Stewart Alsop says:

Finally, the change proves that American policy has worked remarkably well. . . . Only a few years ago the 'iron curtain' was indeed impenetrable and the 'satellites' were satellites indeed. Now those long-familiar words are outmoded--the iron curtain is full of great, gaping holes, and the satellites are very visibly beginning to shake loose. In short, the containment policy has succeeded.

¹²⁴Newsweek, December 7, 1964, p. 23.

If the West can only hang together, if there is no disaster in Asia, if the conditions which made the policy work are not foolishly or complacently altered, the policy will continue to succeed, as the memory of Stalin's terror fades, and the Soviet system changes at an accelerated pace.¹²⁵

Whether Newsweek or Alsop are right, wrong, or partially right is not the question and is not the subject of this work. The question is, would David Lawrence, Walter Lippmann, Walter Judd, Barry Goldwater, Strom Thurmond, or William Fulbright derive the same interpretation from the same set of facts on Communism? They are all intelligent and respected Americans but they would produce different answers. For the military to be, in any way, drawn into such an argument brings it not only into the political arena, which is recognized, but places it in a position of using facts which, regardless of how they are used, would result in a partisan position. Practically everyone who testified before the subcommittee said the military must be factual and non-partisan. Communism is an area in which non-partisanship, under present political conditions, is impossible to achieve. McCarthy brought on his downfall when he attacked the integrity of an Army general. This is the military's most valuable attribute and the surest way to lose it would be for the military to be recognized by either side as partisan in any type of Communist indoctrination.

There is much confusion concerning the scope and attendance of cold war seminars. The seminars can be divided into four different classifications: (1) instruction by military personnel for their own personnel, (2) seminars for military and State Department personnel at the highest level of military education, (3) seminars for military personnel in the Reserve and for the public given by military instructors, (4) lectures for Reserve personnel and for the public by

¹²⁵Stewart Alsop, "Communism: The Meaning of Change," Saturday Evening Post, December 5, 1964, p. 12.

military and civilians.

As to the first classification, there is little if any question that the military should instruct its own personnel concerning Communism with particular emphasis on the possibility of subversion within military organizations. Major General Edwin A. Walker was called as a subcommittee witness, as it was generally accepted even by the New York Times¹²⁶ that he had been censured by the Army for his troop indoctrination program, or "pro-Blue" program. This is not so. His "pro-Blue" program was considered basically sound and continued implementation in the 24th Infantry Division was recommended. General Walker's offense was in recommending use of voting materials not obtained through military sources.¹²⁷ Specifically he recommended in talks, as well as in the "Taro Leaf", the official publication of the 24th Division in a column carrying his signature, that the ACA (Americans for Constitutional Action) index was available for use by anyone who wished to consult it before voting. A high rating on the ACA index indicated that the Senator or Representative had voted for Americanism and a low rating indicated the individual voted for bills that aided Communism. General Walker rightly claims that he did not specifically tell anyone how to vote and that other indexes were available for anyone who wished to use them. However, no mention of this other material was made in the "Taro Leaf". Naively he claimed that these actions were not partisan. General Walker's entire performance before the Subcommittee was ineffectual, incoherent, biased almost to a pathological degree, and humiliating to the Army. The subcommittee tried to get straightforward answers out of General Walker, but it was almost impossible.¹²⁸ The only recommendation of the hearings in regard to presence of the military in the field of Communism was that it should be intensified.¹²⁹

¹²⁶Senate Military Cold War Education Hearings, p. 3064.

¹²⁷Senate Military Cold War Education Report, p. 31.

¹²⁸Senate Military Cold War Education Hearings, pps. 1387-1534.

¹²⁹Senate Military Cold War Education Report, p. 27.

The second classification is that of the seminars of the Industrial College and National War College. These, in my opinion, cannot logically be criticized. Senior officers of the Defense Department and State Department attend these colleges who have already been picked as prospects for top echelon positions in the military and foreign policy establishments of our government. The speakers at these year-long courses represent the top thinkers in government, and industry, past and present, as well as university scholars with accepted reputations and other leaders throughout the country. Certainly these students are able to evaluate the material presented. A sampling of the lecturers included at the War and Industrial Colleges are Senator Fulbright, ex-Secretary of State Dean Acheson, Walter Reuther of United Auto Workers and scholars such as W. W. Rostow, Roger Hilsman, Bernard Fall, Paul Hammond, Richard E. Neustadt, Hans Morgenthau, Max F. Millikan, Charles O. Lerche, Jr., William C. Johnstone, and William T. R. Fox, and William C. Foster, head of ACDA (United States Arms Control Disarmament Agency).

The only criticism of the War College was special seminars conducted by Dr. Frank R. Barnett, Director of Research for the Institute of American Strategy and one of the top men in the Richardson Foundation, who was responsible for presenting material as well as lectures, and it is true that this Foundation's position is anti-Communist and its view of world conditions is one of protracted conflict as espoused by Dr. Robert Strausz-Hupe, Director of the Foreign Policy Research Institute, which is also supported by the Richardson Foundation. In looking over the names of those connected with these two institutes sponsored by the Richardson Foundation, one finds that they are all scholars of repute who have held top positions either in government or in universities throughout the country, most of them have published works recognized as scholarly and, above all they have popularized and, in some degree been responsible for the

Eisenhower-Dulles "massive retaliation" policy. The important point is that they represent one sector of the political spectrum in their reasoning toward Communism. Every thinking American should understand the point of view of these scholars. The Richardson Foundation is reportedly supported by several industrial firms engaged in defense industry. There is no evidence that these firms influence the thinking of the Foundation but these two organizations present only one point of view consistently and the assumption is, though unproved, that this position is satisfactory to the sponsor. Frank Barnett has been for some time a speaker at the annual conventions of the AMA (American Medical Association) and NAM (National Association of Manufacturers). These organizations are thoroughly American and their views respected by many, but they, too, represent only one portion of the political spectrum.

The professional military man is considered generally conservative and his position of "peace through military strength" is strongly supported by this group of thinkers. In order for the military to remain independent and for its judgment to be considered entirely professional, connection with such groups must be avoided. For the Richardson Foundation to present lectures, with which, according to its own thinking military men are more apt to agree, places the military in a political and partisan group and therefore makes it more susceptible to attacks from opposing political groups and to misinterpretation of its motives and actions by the uninformed.

A third group of seminars is presented throughout the country by the Industrial College. These have already been discussed.¹³⁰ They are given to a broad group of the American public. Although these lectures cover the entire field of world political, geographical, and economic thinking, there have been

¹³⁰See pps. 59-62 of Chapter III.

comparatively few objections to them and none traceable to persons attending the seminars. From all indications, these seminars are factual, well presented, and as non-partisan as a seminar on Communism can be. While these seminars are always supported by a civilian organization, such as the Chamber of Commerce, military men are the only lecturers.

The fourth type of seminars are the most controversial, reaching by far the largest number of people, including all types of Americans from all sectors of society, and the instructors are both military and civilian. The most active example was Captain Kenneth J. Sanger of the Naval Air Station in Seattle. He gave over 200 lectures on Communism personally, and officers under him gave about 400 in little more than a year. These lectures were given for organizations such as Rotary, Lions, Kiwanis, Parent Teachers Associations, Mothers Clubs, Church Groups, high schools and even colleges. These lecturing officers roamed the entire Pacific Northwest. Captain Sanger officially was responsible for training given to reserve officers who normally attend training once a week. Seminars on Communism were certainly within the scope of his training directive. Reserve officers were urged to give similar lectures to the public. It can easily be seen, with such a diffusion of effort and regardless of how factual or non-partisan the basic data may be, interpretation inevitably creeps in and the source of the material is credited to the military. Captain Sanger testified that his program in Seattle was given wholehearted support by the Seattle-Times, Post-Intelligence and the Pacific Northwest Progress, the three leading newspapers in Seattle. The subcommittee brought out the complaints of the Daily Worker, New York Times and Time Magazine about Captain Sanger's program but congratulated Captain Sanger profusely on his efforts.¹³¹

¹³¹Senate Military Cold War Education Hearings, pps. 2417-2459.

As has been stated, the subcommittee recommended continuance of military participation in these seminars, saying that the complaints were for the most part picayune or unjustified, but in a few cases valid.¹³² While no organizations were pin-pointed, the valid cases, without doubt, consisted of a very few times in which Dr. George S. Benson, John Green, and Dr. Clifton L. Ganus of Harding College, Admiral Chester Ward (Retired), or Dr. Fred C. Schwartz, William P. Strube, Herbert Philbrick, and Richard Arens of the Christian Anti-Communism Crusade appeared.¹³³ That the military should not participate with any of these gentlemen or organizations appears unquestioned. The fact that the military did appear with, or sponsor, these organizations on less than six occasions out of the hundreds of meetings, that these occasions received the publicity which they should have, and that all meetings became tarred with the same brush, should have alerted the military to take action to protect its professionalism. There is no record that this was done. In fact, the articles in Time¹³⁴ and the New York Times¹³⁵ which accused the military of having officers presenting "right-wing" doctrine, were found to be unreliable. Senator Strom Thurmond labelled these criticisms as misleading, distorted, and factually inaccurate.¹³⁶ If the testimony of the officers concerned,¹³⁷ which was under oath before a Senate subcommittee, is to be believed, Senator Thurmond's assessment is correct. However, the label of "right-wing" trends did not change because of the Senate hearings. No retraction by Time or the New York Times

¹³²Senate Military Cold War Education Report, p. 29.

¹³³Senate Military Cold War Education Hearings, pps. 3D57-3D60.

¹³⁴Senate Military Cold War Education Report, p. 179.

¹³⁵Senate Military Cold War Education Hearings, p. 3066.

¹³⁶Senate Military Cold War Education Report, p. 180.

¹³⁷Senate Military Cold War Education Hearings, testimony under Goldthwaite, Kiefing, Sanger, Wagasky, Warden, passim.

has been found. The damage to military professionalism was already accomplished.

Accepting the thesis of President Eisenhower and the subcommittee that the military are best prepared to educate the public on Communism, which is a debatable conclusion, and accepting the fact that accusations against the military have been exaggerated, it is still true that respected and thoughtful commentators have made the accusation that the military are assisting in spreading "right-wing" doctrine. Only one Navy Captain expressed any concern about "guilt by association," and this after a specific question as to this possibility by Senator Sternis.¹³⁸ Witness after witness, including President Eisenhower, Admiral Radford, General Hamlett, Admiral Burke, and Ex-Secretary of Defense Gates thought that military participation in these seminars was fulfilling a national need.¹³⁹ That senior officers do not see any danger to military professionalism indicates the degree to which the function of the military in a democratic society is now accepted. Supposedly no one would object if, at one of these seminars, Senator Thurmond was to participate or no one would object if Senator Fulbright participated. It is doubtful if Senator Fulbright would be invited, but there is no doubt that these two respected and intelligent Americans would present different points of view, even using the same factual data. The cold war and Communism, which is internally subversive as well as externally dangerous to national survival, are partisan political questions. The military should educate its own members but public education, except on strictly military subjects that have already had administration approval, is not a proper field for the military, if the professionalism which requires politically unbiased advice is to remain inviolate. Public education

¹³⁸Ibid., p. 1790.

¹³⁹Ibid., passim.

should be left to our democratic institutions--educators, politicians, press and pulpit. If the public is not being properly educated on these matters, then the political leaders should take action.

The subcommittee recommendation is

that adequate guidelines, policies and procedures be established to insure that proposed seminars will be given advance screening, assessment and evaluation to preclude military involvement in a seminar (a) not based on a broad base of community support; (b) at which a controversial or partisan speaker is to appear on the program; (c) at which partisan or political subjects are to be discussed; or (d) which otherwise involves partisan, political, or controversial issues.¹⁴⁰

It is a misconception, despite esteemed opinion to the contrary, that Communism, in any of its aspects, can be the subject of a seminar without becoming partisan, political, or controversial, as required by the subcommittee recommendation. If this fact were recognized, then the recommendation of the subcommittee is acceptable; otherwise the military cannot publicly enter this field without damage to its professional reputation, as well as to the country.

Ethos and Peace

Knowledge of the distinguishing characteristics, habits, attitudes, beliefs, and standard of conduct of a group creates confidence or lack of confidence in the group as a whole.

Dr. John A. Hannah, President of Michigan State University and former Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Personnel, in testifying before the Armed Services Committee, said:

Before I came to this post I weighed West Point and Annapolis solely on the basis of educational grounds. . . While there are some things they may not do as well as our good civilian institutions. . . they do one thing much better and that is they do instill in their students. . . a loyalty to the service, a loyalty to the government, an appreciation for ethics and integrity to a degree beyond what we do at our civilian institutions.¹⁴¹

¹⁴⁰Senate Military Cold War Education Report, p. 8.
¹⁴¹Masland and Radway, op. cit., p. 125.

Masland and Radway say that the service academies spend more time on character building than on anything else and that they are the repositories of the service ethos and are acquiring young men at a relatively impressionable age, so they are able to

define the ideals to which they expect their officers, from whatever source derived, to aspire. Here they (service academies) formulate the standards of excellence suggested by their corporate experience. Here, they confront the prospective martial leader with the great models of the past. Hopefully and prayerfully the desired characteristics of heart and mind are laid before young men, and every incentive that can be imagined is employed to encourage them to follow.¹⁴²

Among the ideals of the American officer already discussed are pride in his professionalism, dedication to civilian supremacy, and obedience as the highest virtue. Huntington has provided the most complete discussion of the military ethic. One of the traits he assigns to the military is that of pacifism.¹⁴³ A dictionary definition of pacifism is: "opposition to all war and armed hostility."¹⁴⁴ Under this definition Huntington is incorrect and the military cannot logically be considered pacifist. However, the love of war which is militaristic is the counterpart of the love of peace which is pacifist. If this latter connotation is used for pacifism then Huntington's argument has some merit. The Military are for peace but it is a peace guaranteed by superior military strength.

"Power for Peace" has been the slogan of the U. S. Armed Forces since 1961. The military do not believe that strong forces bring wars; rather they believe that the strongest nation will never be attacked if the weaker nation knows the true relative strength and knows the stronger nation will use its force if attacked. The military further believe, as has been previously stated, that the

¹⁴²Ibid., p. 169. See also chapter on "character building," pps. 197-231.

¹⁴³Huntington, *op. cit.*, p. 79. Chapter 3 is recommended for anyone who desires a more complete discussion, pps. 59-79.

¹⁴⁴Webster's New World Dictionary of the American Language, College Edition, 1962.

United States has never been prepared for a war and that in this thermonuclear age there must be no doubt in the mind of a potential enemy that this country will be protected. They also believe that the decision for peace or war is a political one and the military must be ready at anytime to win a war that is not of their choice. This is not the pacifism which means opposition to any war but it does not eliminate a dedication for peace. To quote General MacArthur: "No one desires peace as much as the soldier, for he must pay the greatest penalty in war."¹⁴⁵ General Barksdale Hamlett, Deputy Chief of Staff of the Army, recently said,

Today, the common defense requires a military establishment capable of supporting American foreign policy whose ultimate goal is to secure an enduring peace. A necessary, intermediate step in accomplishing this goal is to deter or defeat Communist attempts at inroads of the Free World.¹⁴⁶

General Thomas O. White, former Chief of Staff of the Air Force says, quoting President Kennedy,

The primary purpose of our arms is peace, not war--to make certain that they will never have to be used--to deter all wars, general or limited, nuclear or conventional, large or small--to convince all aggressors that any attack would be futile--to provide backing for diplomatic settlement of disputes--to insure the adequacy of our bargaining power for an end to the arms race. . . . Our military posture must be sufficiently flexible and under control to be consistent with our efforts to explore all possibilities and to take every step to lessen tensions, to obtain peaceful solutions and to secure arms limitations.¹⁴⁷

Then General White continues his argument to the effect that we need flexibility in all strategies, meaning more manned bombers, and should not forswear the "first strike" capability.¹⁴⁸ This type of argument is not inconsistent with a love for peace; however it does recognize the likelihood of war, and that peace can be maintained only through military strength. Similarly this concern for peace is shown by General J. Lawton Collins, former

¹⁴⁵Selected Quotations: U. S. Military Leaders," Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, May 10, 1955, p. 42.

¹⁴⁶General Barksdale Hamlett, Army Information Digest, May 11, 1964, p. 11.

¹⁴⁷Gen. Thomas D. White, "The Pendulum Is Swinging Too Far," Newsweek, February 24, 1964, p. 22.

¹⁴⁸Loc. cit.

Army Chief of Staff, who said that it was time to think more about preventing a war than about preparing for war.¹⁴⁹

Other Programs

Another of the main allegations of the anti-war group is that concentration on the military aspects of fighting Communism prevents serious consideration of other programs of more importance. Senator Fulbright expressed the idea that the military lacked the experience and judgment to put into proper perspective the President's total "strategy for a nuclear age."¹⁵⁰ Proposals to decrease tension¹⁵¹ are among the goals of the present administration, as they were under Eisenhower. Before he had been in office a month, President Johnson told disarmament officials that in his opinion the Kennedy administration would be remembered longest for the nuclear test ban treaty and that the greatest goal of his own administration would be world peace and he urged these officials to search for new ways to reach this goal; however, he reiterated that the United States would continue to lead from strength in its search for peace.¹⁵² In April of 1964 President Johnson announced a reduction in the production of enriched uranium Khrushchev followed with a similar announcement.¹⁵³

With disarmament there would be no further need of the industrial base to support a huge military establishment. This would require a reconversion of industry to other pursuits and would release funds and other resources for such programs as the "war on poverty," aid to education, improvement to highways, and assistance to underdeveloped countries, to name a few. It should be expected that the military would oppose disarmament as contrary to the "peace through

¹⁴⁹Samuel P. Huntington, The Common Defense, p. 46.

¹⁵⁰See Note 88 on p. 65.

¹⁵¹These include all phases of disarmament, "test ban" under Kennedy, "open skies" under Eisenhower and while they can be considered under one group as means to lessen tension, they should not be confused as they are distinct proposals.

¹⁵²"Johnson Pledges Drive For Peace," New York Times, December 15, 1963, p. 21.

¹⁵³Kansas City Star, Associated Press Dispatch, April 20, 1964, p. 1.

military strength" concept which it supports. But the reverse seems to have more substance. Disarmament has been accepted by the military as a political question to be decided by civilians. While, most assuredly the military has never advocated disarmament, and it has loyally presented alternatives connected with problems of inspection which would provide adequate assurance that treaties could not be violated without the guaranteed knowledge of the United States. Julius Duscha who, as we have seen, is very critical of the military-industrial complex, says,

The major force working against disarmament and reconversion planning in the United States today is not the military; nor is it the 18,000 corporations holding defense contracts, the thousands of sub-contractors, and the thousands of communities that depend on defense plants and military bases for their prosperity. The main obstacle is massive popular and governmental distrust (includes the military and perhaps to a greater degree than most government agencies) of the Soviet Union--based on the Soviet record of aggression and broken agreements.¹⁵⁴

Similarly Jack Raymond of the New York Times claims that the JCS has worked hard at disarmament and arms control. They endorsed the test ban treaty with "admonitions of caution and apparent disappointment that they would not get a chance to test warheads for some of their weapons."¹⁵⁵ Congress, on the other hand, has many members interested in disarmament but they have never been able to get a majority to agree on one positive program. And there are many who are much more bellicose than the military. An example is Congressman Craig Hosmer of California who last November, warned the country against the "nutballs" and "domestic idiots" working for the U. S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.¹⁵⁶ This latter organization has a high-level committee of military generals and admirals working for it continuously at the Pentagon, and also has an Army unit on a full-time basis at Fort Hood testing inspection and verification techniques.¹⁵⁷

¹⁵⁴ Julius Duscha, "The Disarmament Blues," Harper's Magazine, May 1964, p. 57.

¹⁵⁵ Raymond, op. cit., p. 273.

¹⁵⁶ Duscha, loc. cit.

¹⁵⁷ Lloyd Norman, "Gap in the Clouds of War," Army, March, 1964, pps. 23-28.

As far as reconversion is concerned, Secretary McNamara has several times urged industry to consider non-defense markets and has warned that defense budgets have reached their peak and will decrease in the future.¹⁵⁸ There appears to be no basis to the charge that the military has not supported the administration on disarmament or reconversion as concepts, nor has it unduly objected to the theory of a decline in overall defense appropriations. As can be expected, each service has objected strenuously to cuts within its own service while, at the same time, supporting the proposition of a reduction in the overall defense budget. It is interesting to note that General Bradley said, after his retirement, that he never should have testified on what the country could afford in budget hearings on military appropriations but should have confined his remarks to military requirements needed for security of the country.¹⁵⁹ He later realized that, by supporting the administration by testimony outside his field of expertise, he had to a degree compromised his military professionalism.

The United States People-to-People Program was launched by President Eisenhower in May 1956. One of the committees formed to launch this effort was the Armed Services Committee, responsible for directing the program's activities for the Army, Navy, and Air Force. The Army Veterinary Corps has advisory groups in areas ranging from Ethiopia and Iran to Bolivia, Panama, San Salvador, Thailand, Vietnam, Okinawa to help raise sanitary standards. There is a Medical Civil Action Program sponsored by the military in Vietnam, Thailand, Colombia, Turkey, Korea, and other places. It is well known that the Army advisors in Vietnam are assisting the villagers to raise crops, build schools, improve drainage. The Army Engineers are busy in many countries performing the same

¹⁵⁸ Russell Hawkes, "DOD Official Urges Industry to Consider Non-Defense Markets," Missiles and Rockets, December 23, 1963, p. 16.

¹⁵⁹ William T. R. Fox, World Politics, April, 1955, p. 414.

type of civil works that they do in the United States.¹⁶⁰ Perhaps these jobs should be done by civilian groups like the Peace Corps but they are forwarding the President's program for democracy in underdeveloped countries.

Richard Van Wagenen studied the views of American officers on the United Nations. He says that none of them saw the UN as a potential world government in the near future. All realized the UN's limitations but none even hinted that the United States should desert it or give it fewer functions. Several wanted the UN to reach decisions that could be enforced, even against the United States.¹⁶¹

There is no evidence, as would be expected, that the military supports or doesn't support the President's programs on cultural exchanges or domestic programs such as the poverty program. But Senator Fulbright's contention that the military lacks the experience and judgment to put into proper perspective the President's "total strategy for a nuclear age" is also unsubstantiated. Support of the United Nations, reconversion of industry, disarmament and other methods to lessen tension--all parts of the President's overall program have not met opposition from the military.

Two Kinds of Capitalism

"Corporate executives seem increasingly possessed by the idea that they must define and formulate their responsibilities to their publics, both inside and outside the firm."¹⁶² According to Paul A. Samuelson there are two categories of capitalism:

Old fashioned profit maximizing markets that are perfectly or imperfectly

¹⁶⁰Lt. Gen. Leonard D. Heaton, "Ambassadors in White," Army Information Digest, May 1965, pps. 32-37.

¹⁶¹Richard W. Van Wagenen, "American Defense Officials Views on the U. N.," Western Political Quarterly, Vol. 14, 1961, p. 116.

¹⁶²Earl F. Cheit, ed., The Business Establishment, p. 159.

competitive; and the new notion of 'managerial capitalist'--that the corporation (and its officials) are responsive to the interests of all parties--employees, customers, shareowners, the public, the federal government.¹⁶³

The old fashioned kind of capitalism was supposedly an American product which made this country great. It consisted of minimum government control, competition, a market mechanism that protected the public welfare automatically, relieved industry of any social responsibility except for a good product at a competitive price, the profit motive, and self-interest as a guiding principle.

Robert L. Heilbroner quotes William Feather, a publishing executive and regular contributor to Nation's Business, as saying in 1926:

The one-hundred per cent American believes in the doctrine of selfishness, although he is often ashamed to admit it. . . . The American idea is that every man is out to promote his own interest, and he has discovered that the best way to do this is to make himself useful to others. . . . It is inconceivable to a one-hundred per cent American that anyone except a nut should give something for nothing.¹⁶⁴

The new fashioned kind of capitalism is the Gospel of Social Responsibility and is typified by Thomas J. Watson, Jr., President of IBM (International Business Machines), who says,

Only with the past few years have large number of business leaders publicly acknowledged and actively preached the doctrine that they are servants of society and that management merely in the interest (narrowly defined) of stockholders is not the sole end of their duties. Indeed, discussion of the 'social responsibilities of business' has become, not only acceptable in leading business circles, but even fashionable.¹⁶⁵

¹⁶³Ibid., pp. 203-204.

¹⁶⁴Ibid., p. 13.

¹⁶⁵Howard Bowen, Social Responsibilities of the Businessman, p. 44.

The Constitution was adopted according to the preamble in order to form a more perfect union, establish justice, insure domestic tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity. To this list of objectives could be added one proposed by Gunnar Myrdal who says, "The primary role of government in the economy I conceive to be the one of creating conditions for business that result in rapid and steady economic growth."¹⁶⁶ Some may consider that Myrdal's statement is included in promoting the general welfare, because the role of government in economic problems has been radically altered since the Constitution was adopted. The founders believed in freedom for man in all his rights (political, religious, ethical or economic). No firmer belief was prevalent: free enterprise and the protection of individual property was meant to be protected at all costs. By free enterprise, the founding fathers meant leaving business to control its own affairs to the maximum extent. This concept changed through experience. Free enterprise, left alone, was found to be self-destructive, by the growth of huge industries and monopolies. Arnold A. Rogow and Harold D. Lasswell say that even Adam Smith, the apostle of free enterprise, was aware that competition left to itself becomes monopoly through conspiracy, and that monopolies conspire to maintain themselves.¹⁶⁷ This statement, almost buried in Smith's philosophy, should not be given undue weight but it does indicate that the apostle of American capitalism was aware of the dangers of monopoly which could prevent a free market. In the initial period (approximately 100 years) in United States history, of absence of government restrictions, the large enterprises gobbled up

¹⁶⁶Gunnar Myrdal, Challenges to Democracy, edited by Edward Reed, p. 11.

¹⁶⁷Arnold A. Rogow & Harold D. Lasswell, Power Corruption and Rectitude, p. 93.

the small and merged with each other so that the public had only one supply channel and the monopolies prevented competitors from entering the market by price laws, or any other method they could devise.

Cyclical booms and depressions and the fact that businessmen considered that wages to be paid laborers must be determined by the market, placed a good portion of citizens in economic peril. Depressions occurred 22 times from 1762 to 1938, with 6 of these listed as major depressions or panics, and the one from 1837 to 1843 lasting 72 months.¹⁶⁸ To eliminate these evils and to further protect the majority of the citizenry, the United States decided upon government control of industry. This control began moderately with the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887 which was enacted to regulate railroads, in which industry some of the largest fortunes were made and unscrupulous practices were common, and was followed by the Sherman Anti-Trust Act in 1890, Hepburn Act in 1906 and Clayton Anti-trust Act in 1914, increasing gradually until now there are over 100 government agencies dealing with the regulation of business.

Government planning for business is anathema to businessmen. Businessmen praise Adam Smith's classical economic theory, but behave contrary to its rules. They point to agriculture as definite proof that government spending prevents a solution and that government interference has made it so the market system could not work. They firmly believe that too much planning inhibits innovation. Nevertheless, John E. Bunting, in his book, The Hidden Face of Free Enterprise, brings out some relevant facts. His thesis runs as follows: Americans now want security. Scarcity for most has been overcome. World War II proved beyond doubt that government spending can produce a boom. Businessmen do everything they can to thwart natural economic law--not because they

¹⁶⁸ Richard A. Morris, Encyclopedia of American History, p. 508.

don't believe in the market system--but because they believe in their own self-interest. Businessmen do not want the market system to work in their own firm. They want the market system for everyone but themselves. A businessman wants to control the price of his own product and has continually sought to control the market and not have the market control his business. Businessmen want to be free to make profits and, to do this, they must not expect to be insured against loss, believing that profits are something they deserve rather than being a reward for superior performance. During the depression beginning in 1929, businessmen were the first to come to the government for assistance.¹⁶⁹

As Frederick Allen says:

Most businessmen believe in competition--theoretically but constantly search for ways to prevent it, so that rival companies in an industry might all jack up their profits and enlarge their profits. Again and again the heads of various steel companies, let us say, would form a 'pool'--make an agreement not to sell below a certain price. But these often lasted only long enough for someone to get on the phone.¹⁷⁰

As classical an economist as William Ropke says that

to restrict competition, then, is to jeopardize the principle of economic reciprocity. If this much is clear, then the conclusion can no longer be avoided that the growth of monopoly represents an extremely serious disfigurement of our economic system.¹⁷¹

Any businessman holds that competition has made America a great country and is the essence of capitalism. This is the theory which businessmen adhere to and will fight for politically, but actually they believe and at times honestly say, "The only way to insure profits is to stick together, keep prices high, and maybe push them higher."¹⁷²

¹⁶⁹ John E. Bunting, The Hidden Face of Free Enterprise, pps. 2, 21, 36, 63, 74, 120, 324.

¹⁷⁰ Frederick Lewis Allen, The Big Change, p. 74.

¹⁷¹ William Ropke, translated by Patrick M. Boarman, Economics of a Free Society, p. 236.

¹⁷² Bunting, op. cit., p. 17.

Joseph Rosenfarb, in his book Freedom and the Administrative State, gives as his thesis

that an economy in which continuous planning is essential is inherent in our economic system, and that a managed economy founded on private enterprise, and democratically controlled and oriented, should be America's contribution to modern statecraft and social systems.¹⁷³

It appears that recommendations for increased national economic planning by the federal government might be necessary if individual liberty for the greatest number of citizens is to be attained. No one can deny that, as long as there is a poverty level in the United States, the individuals on this level are being denied freedom.

Full consumption has been denied a vast segment, if not the majority, of the nation's population. So long as the present income exists, a full consumption and full production economy will be a pious but unrealizable goal for those insisting on the preservation of the fundamental economic inequalities which have flourished under Republicans and Democrats alike.¹⁷⁴

Government control is no longer the question in the United States; the question is whether regulation will bring both service and more enjoyment to more Americans and will prohibit private monopoly. Leslie B. Worthington, President of U. S. Steel Corporation, says that there are now four branches of the U. S. Government: the executive, legislative, judicial, and regulatory; this latter branch is composed of the 60 federal agencies that not only regulate but also

investigate and sometimes castigate almost every action and activity taken or planned by businesses big and small, successful and unsuccessful. .
 . No businessman in America objects to regulatory procedures which are

¹⁷³Joseph Rosenfarb, Freedom and the Administrative State, p. X.

¹⁷⁴Gabriel Kolko, "The American Income Revolution" as quoted in America As a Mass Society, Philip Olson, editor, p. 114.

designed to stimulate and insure fair competitive practices. If this is their true and only purpose, then such regulations will never bother him at all.¹⁷⁵

It is important that even business now accepts regulation to insure fair competition, which was not the case at the turn of the century, but it is also true that business and industry believe uncompromisingly that there is too much regulation and they bitterly contest additional regulations.

There appears to be a dichotomy in the beliefs of industry. Thomas J. Watson, Jr., President of IBM (International Business Machines), says:

For centuries the businessman has been a favorite whipping boy and the reasons are plain to see. Business acquired wealth. With wealth, they gained power. And until this century, much of that power was employed almost solely in their own interests.¹⁷⁶

Dr. Clare Elmer Griffin says:

There is evident among many more thoughtful business leaders a growing sense of ethical obligations to workers and an appreciation of the intangible values of morale which have led these leaders to seek practical ways of meeting this problem (individual economic security).¹⁷⁷

Conservatives Donald Kemmerer and C. Clyde Jones conclude:

The new way of giving people the maximum of liberty is by protecting them from the selfish acts of others. Letting everyone do pretty much as he pleased was the old way, but that will no longer work in a country as crowded and an economy as complex as ours.¹⁷⁸

Modern businessmen have social responsibilities. Business pays social security taxes, provides recreational facilities, builds trust funds, manages insurance policies, pays minimum wages decided by law or collective bargaining. United Fruit, after many years of exploiting to the hilt its holdings in Central America, has adopted a system of sharing by emphasizing private initiative. A change became necessary for them to remain in business in Central America.¹⁷⁹

¹⁷⁵Leslie B. Worthington, "Business Worry: Too Much Regulation," U. S. News and World Report, March 9, 1964, p. 16.

¹⁷⁶Thomas J. Watson, Jr., A Business Man and His Beliefs, pps. 8-9.

¹⁷⁷Clare Elmer Griffin, Enterprise in a Free Society, p. 566.

¹⁷⁸Donald Kemmerer and C. Clyde Jones, American Economic History, p. 611.

¹⁷⁹Paul Deutschman, "United Fruit's Experiment in International Partnership," Readers' Digest, October 1964, pps. 146-150.

These and many more examples of social awareness and progress could be cited by American industry. Still, the more typical opinion of the majority of businessmen is the attitude of Roger Blough, U. S. Steel executive: "For a corporation to attempt to exert any kind of economic compulsion to achieve a particular end in the social area seems to be quite beyond what a corporation should do."¹⁸⁰ Social improvement for workers simply cannot replace the profit motive entirely if corporations are to exist. Professor Milton Friedman contends that the doctrine of management's social responsibility is

fundamentally subversive. . . . Few trends could so thoroughly undermine the very foundations of our free society as the acceptance by corporate officials of a social responsibility other than to make as much money for their stockholders as possible.¹⁸¹

Earl F. Cheit claims that

top management, in fact, is committed more strongly than ever to the corporation's profit position as a result of the growth of stock option plans, because without profits the options are largely worthless.¹⁸²

The gains of society in general appear to have come from public and governmental pressure rather than from a fundamental change in business motives. U. S. Steel conceded that its decision to open higher-paying jobs to Negroes in its Fairfield, Alabama, plant was because of federal government pressure and the leverage of government contracts.¹⁸³ It is true that many American businessmen take their responsibility to society seriously. The new managerial power system predicted by James Burnham has not come to pass but there is no proof that managers reject the values of ownership or the goal of maximizing profit.¹⁸⁴ Of course managers act for other reasons, such as power, prestige, and job security. Businessmen also support the Community Chest, employment of the

¹⁸⁰ Andrew Hacker, "Do Corporations Have A Social Duty?", New York Times Magazine, November 17, 1963, p. 21.

¹⁸¹ Cheit, op. cit., p. 163.

¹⁸² Ibid., p. 170.

¹⁸³ Ibid., p. 183.

¹⁸⁴ Ibid., p. 180 and James Burnham, The Managerial Revolution.

handicapped, research in the social sciences, symphony orchestras, religious tolerance, the United Nations, economic education of the American people, liberal foreign trade policy, intellectual refuges from China, freedom of the press, conservation of forests, and maintenance of private colleges.¹⁸⁵ This new "Gospel of Social Responsibility" stresses responsibility to shareholders, to customers, to the industry, to the nation, to everyone.

Undoubtedly there are men like Watson who say, "Bigness is a relative new phenomenon in our society. Even if nothing else had changed the vast concentrations of power in our society would demand that businessmen reconsider their responsibilities for the broader public welfare."¹⁸⁶ There seems little argument with the fact that industry is searching for a new ideology and taking a more tolerant view both of labor and of government.

Heifronner says,

There is no reason to doubt that the corporation manager today has an increased concern for human welfare and a more sophisticated appreciation of human wants than was the case a few decades ago; times and ideas have changed. At the same time--and this is half explicit in the ideological statements we have examined--there are evident mixed motives in the wooing of the man on the plant floor. Greater productive efficiency, the discouragement of unionism, the inculcation of pro-company sentiment, the procurement of labor peace--these are clearly among the motives underlying management's concern for human values in addition to its announced solicitude for the individual.¹⁸⁷

Further Heifronner says there "is the explicit admission that corporate management can act in interests other than those of classical theory, that is, in at least partial disregard of the traditional dictates of profit making."¹⁸⁸ He also believes that the new liberal business ideology will come to dominate the older ideology and may prove to be the means by which many necessary

¹⁸⁵Chait, *op. cit.*, p. 160.

¹⁸⁶*Ibid.*, p. 159.

¹⁸⁷*Ibid.*, p. 26.

¹⁸⁸*Ibid.*, p. 33.

adaptions are made in our social system.¹⁸⁹ On the other hand there are others who remark, when the new human relations policies are put to any specific business actions of decision, that the important question still is: Is it done only where it pays?¹⁹⁰ Even sympathetic critics have failed to answer the question: "To whom is the corporation responsible?"¹⁹¹

Ethos Compared

The optimistic view that the new ethic of business is that of social responsibility has many supporters. There is considerable evidence that it is having effect but the opposite view is present: that the profit motive is the only logical one and that social improvement must come as a by-product to strict adherence to the classical economic views of competition, supremacy of the market, and minimum government control. Business ideology apparently is in a transitional state. The important point is that there are divergent viewpoints. There is no accepted standard and the preponderance of evidence is that it is a selfish ethic. Whether this is best for America is not the point, but that self-interest is still the controlling ethic for industry. The military ethic, on the other hand, provides a constant standard by which the military can be judged, and it is essentially an unselfish ethic. The military believe in their ethic as a protection for their professionalism and for democratic institutions.

It cannot be realistically expected that the military man and businessman would have the same code of ethics. In the first place the professional military man belongs to a closely coordinated, compact group and, while on active duty, is under rigid organizational control. Violation of the military ethic brings

¹⁸⁹ Loc. cit.

¹⁹⁰ Ibid., p. 161.

¹⁹¹ Ibid., p. 25.

almost automatic censure from within the group, which may include dismissal from the service. Businessmen belong to a loosely connected group, with practically no group control as far as ethics is concerned. They come from every walk of life, enter, leave, and reenter the business group at will, some are educated and some not, and they form a cross-section of Americans in almost all particulars. They are no more idealistic or responsible than the average American. Obedience is the highest virtue to the military, while freedom or liberty receive the most praise from industry and business.

The motives of the two groups are entirely different. The military man is dedicated to preserving American democratic traditions and his responsibility is the security of the country. The success of a businessman is primarily measured monetarily. Without profit, there is no industry, and if business does not prosper, neither do the people of the United States. American businessmen may have made America great by their strict adherence to the profit and loss system. It is no condemnation of industry and business to state that the primary dedication of the average businessman is to making money and not to preserving American institutions. This is not to say that American businessmen and industrialists are not patriots, because they are. In times of peril to the country they can be depended upon, but in day-to-day operations profit is their motivating force. For the most part industrialists believe that what is good for industry is good for America. This also maybe a true statement. "Manufacturers," Judge Elbert Gary, (U. S. Steel President) once stated, "must have reasonable profits to do their duty."¹⁹² It is too strong to say, but it is implied that no profits result in no duty. But it can be said that, with profits,

¹⁹² Edward Pendleton Herring, The Impact of War, p. 198.

the businessman finds his duty to his country a stronger motivating force and the danger can also be implied that, with greater profits, the duty to country may become a greater motivating force.

The recent anti-trust suits against steel company officials, jail sentences for electrical industry executives, Security Exchange Commission (SEC) investigation of the American Stock Exchange during which its president quickly resigned, and conflict of interest controversies in the Chrysler Corporation and Prudential Life Insurance Company, involving the presidents of both firms maybe isolated incidents and it is not to say that business in general accepts these practices; it is only intended to say that there is no overall moral code which sets the standard, as the military ethic does for the military. The lack of similar incidents among the military, retired as well as active, is a credit to its ideals as well as to the control within the establishment.

It is true that business has accepted an ethic as represented by "Better Business Bureaus" and it can be briefly but inadequately summarized¹⁹³ as, "Honesty is the best policy." These organizations provide protection for the consumer as well as for the good names of reputable firms. Their growth, in many cases, was instigated and promoted by those businessmen who feared additional government controls might be forthcoming, particularly in questionable advertising practices, if business did not willingly police its own actions. Their influence is mostly local in nature, not national in scope, and it does not constitute a creed applicable automatically under all conditions and uniform in its standard, in any way comparable to the military ethic.

Mills has said that the hierarchies of corporation, state, and military are interchangeable.¹⁹⁴ It has already been shown that military men are going to

¹⁹³ "Says Business Morality Reflects Basic Mores," Kansas City Star, January 7, 1965, p. 12.

¹⁹⁴ Mills, op. cit., p. 10.

industry for a second career, upon retirement, in increasing numbers. Is there a conflict of interest in this development? It could not be expected that industry would take thousands of military men and give them important jobs for altruistic reasons. Undoubtedly industry gets full reward for these services and has found retired officers to be valuable employees. Business Week says, "The marriage of business and military is a happy one. Beyond all else, the military man is loyal and his integrity is puncture-proof."¹⁹⁵ Furthermore, the leaders of the military had to join hands to shape industry in 1941 and the need of industry for experienced managers has not abated. Former Secretary of Defense Gates says,

retired officers who are now employed in private enterprise are making a significant and perhaps irreplaceable contribution to national defense and the industrial capacity of this country.¹⁹⁶

Aviation Week reports that "retired officers have not only technical knowledge but also a major amount of executive, administrative, and pure business ability."¹⁹⁷

Military men, with their ethic of absolute obedience and loyalty, their dedication to their own service, their knowledge of Pentagon methods, and, above all, their conviction that national security rests upon military strength, can be strong advocates for defense industry by means of entering industry upon a second career. And when industrialists talk of the absolute loyalty and integrity of military employees, they are speaking of loyalty to business executives or to the corporation which has hired them. Congressman Hebert says, "The question of defense industry hiring of former military men is a delicate one. The cases are not all black and they are not all white. That's why we have to be careful."¹⁹⁸

¹⁹⁵"Generals Make Good in Business," Business Week, October 27, 1956, pps. 74-86.

¹⁹⁶Katherine Johnsen, "Gates Defends Officers in Industry Against Congressional Attacks," Aviation Week, July 13, 1959, p. 35.

¹⁹⁷Katherine Johnsen, "Congressmen--Retired Officers Termed Sources of Pressure," Aviation Week, Aug. 17, 1959, p. 32.

¹⁹⁸Raymond, op. cit., p. 210.

The logical conclusion is that the military ethic is a strong safeguard for the country while the military man is in uniform, but it may work against national interests when he is a civilian member of the industrial portion of the complex.

Congress

As stated previously, Congress is so actively engaged in all aspects of the military-industrial complex, from budgetary appropriations to procurement contracts, that the complex is more accurately named the Congressional-industrial-military complex. No attempt will be made to define an ethic for Congressmen, the third component of the complex, as has been done for the other two units. This is a job Congress should do for itself but has refused so far to do. Re-election comes most generally to those who can prove they have done most for their constituents. This naturally leads some Congressmen to an overriding interest in defense contracts for their districts, but apparently to no more or less interest than that in other federal money spent in their districts. The size of the defense budget is the only reason for its preeminent importance.

If, as President Eisenhower says, "We must never let the weight of this combination endanger our liberties or democratic processes," then it appears that Congress, with its legislative and investigative powers, has the major responsibility for determining the rules and exposing the dangers, if they are present, connected with the growth of the complex. In fact, it also appears that there should be no insurmountable difficulty in controlling such a complex. Congress has passed innumerable laws to control industry. Senator Clifford P. Case, Republican of New Jersey, made a very sensible proposal. He recommended that a joint Senate-House Committee be constituted to review space and defense

contracts and that all records and communications leading to the award of a defense contract be made public. He also suggested that this committee be headed by a member of the opposition party--in this case by a Republican. The difficulty with this latter suggestion, although it is admittedly feasible, is immediately apparent. No Democratic Congress would allow a Republican to get the publicity and credit for such a potentially explosive national issue, or vice versa. However, if the opposition could find no instance of unwarranted influence, then the public could be fairly well assured that there was none. Further Case said,

One immediate benefit would be that members of Congress and the Executive Branch would be in a better position to resist pressures from contractors who seek political help in obtaining contract awards. . . . The knowledge that any outside intercession would become publicly known would serve as a warning and, I believe, the strongest possible deterrent to those who would seek improper intervention."¹⁹⁹

Secretary McNamara said he was in complete agreement with the objectives of maintaining public confidence in the defense procurement process.²⁰⁰ Although this proposal is over a year old, neither the Defense Department, the White House, nor Congress has made any effort to put any portion of it into effect.

Furthermore, Congress has required appointees to the executive branch to get rid of their holdings which might cause conflict of interest. Charles E. Wilson was required to sell all his General Motors holdings before the Senate would confirm him as Secretary of Defense in 1953. McNamara relinquished options on Ford Motor Company stock and thereby lost \$400,000 in profits.²⁰¹ No such rules apply to Congressmen. This dual standard prompted the late Senator Richard L. Neuberger of Oregon to say,

¹⁹⁹Julius Dusha, "The Disarmament Blues," Harper's Magazine, May 1964, p. 61.

²⁰⁰Loc. cit.

²⁰¹Irwin Ross, "Congressmen and Their Conflicting Interests," The Reader's Digest, July 1964, p. 121.

I fear that it has a corroding effect on government generally when a member of the President's Cabinet can be ordered to jettison his corporate portfolio by Senators who themselves may be dabbling in oil, cotton futures, television, hotel chains or uranium.²⁰²

President Kennedy in his message to Congress concerning the prevention of conflicts of interest on the part of Special Government Employees gives a definition of ethical standards of conduct. One of the most important facets of this definition is the prohibition of use of inside information for private gain.²⁰³ If this is wrong for special employees who work for the government only intermittently, how much more wrong is it for Senators or Congressmen who have access to this type of information on a day-to-day basis and whose influence can affect the decisions of government on a permanent basis?

The Defense Department has said that the surest way for a company to lose a contract is for a retired officer to start lobbying for it.²⁰⁴ Defense officials resent such pressures but also resent pressures from Congressmen. In the halls of Congress, by comparison with the Pentagon, vested interest lobbies run riot and conflict of interest rides unchecked.²⁰⁵ The recent Baker investigation has pointed up this problem dramatically. The Senate Committee has turned in its report, but even its innocuous recommendations have not been accepted.²⁰⁶ Many Congressmen have made public their financial holdings and have recommended that this practice be made mandatory or, at least, that a yearly statement be sent to the General Accounting Office for its records. While Senator Mansfield and Senator Humphrey both favored some such disclosure, Senator Dirksen said it would

²⁰²Raymond, *op. cit.*, p. 218.

²⁰³Special Message on Conflicts of Interests to the Congress of the United States, supplied to author by Senator Henry Jackson, Democrat of Washington.

²⁰⁴Katherine Johnsen, "Gates Defends Officers in Industry Against Congressional Attacks," *Aviation Week*, July 13, 1959, p. 35.

²⁰⁵"JFK Speech in New Hampshire," *New York Times*, November 23, 1958, p. 4.

²⁰⁶"Congress: Fighting To Finish," *Newsweek*, August 10, 1964, p. 29.

make "Class B citizens out of Senators."²⁰⁷ Does this imply that Cabinet Officers and other high officials in the Executive Branch are "Class B citizens?"

This is not a new matter. David Lawrence, in a reprint of an article he wrote during the New Deal, says,

We favor legislation which will make it a penal offense for any member of Congress to approach any person in the executive establishment with respect to the disbursement of any public money, or to appear before any executive department or commission on behalf of any constituents or anybody else to obtain contracts or agreements for said constituents, or to influence the award of any projects involving the expenditure of public funds.²⁰⁸

Robert Moses, New York City Park Commissioner, says that what is needed is mental honesty, and his creed is:

I shall accept no favors which will influence my official actions. I shall steadfastly avoid confusion and conflict of public and private business. I shall look to no reward that will reflect upon my conduct in office.

He further states that conspiracy among supposed competitors is more serious than conflict of interest between government and business.²⁰⁹ Of course, Mr. Moses is supposedly speaking from his home state of New York but it appears that the same would be true on a national level--that competing businesses probably conspire more than government and business. If this is true, is it not the responsibility of Congress to adopt proper rules, laws, or regulations to prohibit such conduct within the military-industrial complex, if President Eisenhower's thesis is accepted that its very weight is endangering the individual liberties and democratic processes of the country? That Congress has done nothing to curb the growing influence of either the military or industry in government affairs should be proof that the majority does not agree that the problem exists. As far as Congress itself is concerned, it should be

²⁰⁷"ethics in Congress," editorial, New York Times, May 24, 1964, p. 2E.

²⁰⁸David Lawrence, "Do Fundamental Principles Really Change?", U. S. News and World Report, January 6, 1964, p. 79.

²⁰⁹"Mr. Moses Examines Conflict of Interest," New York Times Magazine, July 23, 1961, p. 12.

stressed that just because a conflict of interest exists does not mean that it is exploited. Temptation and suspicion remain as long as Congressmen refuse to apply to themselves that which they apply to the members of the executive branch, a power which they jealously guard and implement.

Laws and rules are not made for the ethically sensitive person, but for those less perceptive individuals to whom unethical conduct is pursued until restrained by legal or other standards. Could it possibly be that obvious measures for control of the Congressional-military-industrial complex, which will be enumerated in a later chapter, are proposed because they might hamper the operations or influence of a majority of Congressmen?

The final report of the Twenty-Sixth American Assembly states:

The vigor of the Congress as a legislative body and the effectiveness of our constitutional arrangements require that the Congress warrant and command the confidence and respect of the electorate. A Congress able and equipped to discharge its central functions rationally, expeditiously, and with integrity is essential to the survival of representative government in this country.²¹⁰

One way for Congress to warrant and command the confidence and respect of the electorate would be to adopt a code of ethics for its own actions as uncompromising and exacting as it expects of the top appointive echelon in the executive branch. Being elected to Congress does not automatically and perpetually clothe a person with the distinction of probity. Democratic government, it is often forgotten, is founded upon the doctrine of responsibility through popular elections. The elected official should be held responsive to the voters if democratic theory is to have practical application. Among other things it would be well if Congress exercised a beneficial influence on the moral tone of the country. If the military-industrial complex is endangering the democratic

²¹⁰Report of the Twenty-Sixth American Assembly, Congress and America's Future, p. 5.

processes of our country, Congress shares the blame. No one doubts that controls are needed in the industrial-military complex, and that Congress has the ability to provide such controls. The main concern at present is that the impartiality and objectivity of Congressional legislation and investigation may become clouded by self-interest. Adopting internal rules that would make this possible or unlikely would certainly create confidence in its subsequent actions.

A Safeguard in Separation of Powers

Edward S. Corwin, a great authority on the Constitution, says that one of the two great structural principles of the American Constitutional system is the doctrine of "Separation of Powers."²¹¹ This principle is held in great esteem among scholars of government and among our Congressional law makers. Separation vis-a-vis concentration is the theory behind the Sherman Anti-Trust Act--keeping one industry from getting too large or too powerful or opposing monopolies in industry and preferring several smaller companies. Separation of powers is applicable to other areas of government as well, but its effect in the Congressional-military-industrial complex is of paramount importance. In fact, the separation that exists within Congress, within the three military services, and within industry is the most effective present safeguard against militarism. This may seem a contradiction because the reader should now be convinced that the potential danger of the Congressional-military-industrial complex lies in the inextricability of its components, as Walter Lippmann and Senator

²¹¹Edward S. Corwin, The President: Office and Powers, p. 9.

Fulbright claims, or, as Senator Thurmond says:

In these times military considerations and economic, political, and ideological considerations are interrelated to such a degree as to make an arbitrary dividing line between the military and nonmilitary increasingly unrealistic.²¹²

It also lies in the fact that Congress, rather than controlling the military in the traditional Congressional role of chief antagonist to military budget requests, now is the chief protagonist for increased military budgets and actively seeks the cooperation and approval of the military in advocating these increases. However, despite these changed conditions resulting in closer associations dictated by both national and political self-interests, a few examples should prove that the election of Congressmen by states or districts separates their interests, that industry is also widely diversified and separated throughout the country, and the separation of the military into three services rather than unification into a single service is an indispensable safeguard in preventing the rise of the misplaced power that President Eisenhower warned the nation about.

The fact that the military is service-oriented rather than unified as to strategy and military hardware is not hard to show. Under Truman, the Air Force was in ascendancy as air power was considered our most valuable military asset. In fact the Air Force's position was that Navy carriers were obsolete and that procurement money should go into the Air Force's B-36. This resulted in the "Revolt of the Admirals."²¹³ The military argument was purely a service fight between the Air Force and Navy, but the result was that both the carriers and the B-36 were kept in the military arsenal and Admiral Louis Denfield was asked to resign by President Truman. "Massive retaliation" was the national

²¹²Senate Military Cold War Education Report, p. 51.

²¹³Raymond, op. cit., p. 199.

strategy under President Eisenhower. This resulted in the downgrading of the Army mission and the upgrading of the Strategic Air Command (SAC) mission under the Air Force. Two Army Chiefs of Staff, Ridgway and Taylor, were not reappointed for a second normal two-year term, but were allowed to retire. Again, this was strictly a service argument. Under President Kennedy, "flexible response" became the national strategy, with the result that the Air Force's strategic mission has had to give way to the Army's answer to peripheral wars. General LeMay has been disturbed with this result and, at the present time, Air Force general officers are the most outspoken against administration policy, but it is a service argument on a military question. Air Force generals are ably abetted by Senator Goldwater, a World War II bomber pilot who holds a Reserve Major General's commission in SAC. With the Polaris missile and nuclear submarines, the Navy has won back much of its influence in the strategic field that was lost to the Air Force immediately after World War II. So we find the budget arguments concerned with the number of nuclear submarines, as compared to Air Force ICBM's and IRBM's and manned bombers, and the Army requirements for limited war.

After national strategy is decided, supposedly by NSC, it is implemented by the services. At this time the interests of industry and Congress become apparent. The recent TFX controversy, which the McClellan Committee has been investigating, is the largest defense contract ever let. A bevy of Congressmen became vitally concerned because of the huge amount of subcontracting to be done. Finally all companies were eliminated for the prime contract except Boeing and General Dynamics. The JCS recommended Boeing but McNamara, representing the administration, changed the decision to General Dynamics. His given reason was that the General Dynamics plane had more "commonality" as he called it. The plane was to be used by both the Navy and the Air Force. The contract award to

General Dynamics was not only a victory for them and a defeat for Boeing, but a victory also for the Congressmen of the states of New York and Texas, where the largest portion of the work was to be done and a defeat for the Congressmen of the states of Washington and Kansas, where Boeing's principal plants are located.²¹⁴ The importance of military approval to Congressmen was also highlighted in this case. As soon as the JCS stated before the McClellan Committee that either plane was acceptable and that the decision was a difficult one to make, the McClellan investigation disappeared from the front page. There seemed to be no more argument.

The air defense mission of the United States is divided between all three services. Each service recommended its own weapons system for priority development and procurement--the Navy's Talos, the Army's Nike Hercules, and the Air Force's Bomarc. Finally the race narrowed to Bomarc against Nike Hercules.²¹⁵ A decision for Nike Hercules would have been a victory for the Army and Western Electric and a decision for Bomarc would have been a victory for the Air Force and Douglas. In this case no decision was made for several years, with both systems becoming operational, which shows the costliness of pluralism.

There are many more examples that could be given but in all of them the services contended for a mission or a weapons system for their service, the Congressmen for work to be done in their district, and, of course, industry for the contracts. Contractors are scattered all over the United States, but the largest are in California, New York, Michigan, Texas, and Washington; however, subcontractors are even more widely dispersed. Congressmen represent every state in the union and the military is service-oriented. The Congressional-military-industrial complex, viewed as a whole, may appear to be a monolithic

²¹⁴Julius Duschka, "Arms and the Big Money Men," Harper's Magazine, March 1964, p. 41.

²¹⁵Raymond, op. cit., p. 386.

giant, but viewed from inside, it is widely diffused and separated. However, there are dangers. Congressmen can combine to get contracts and industry can allocate sub-contracts to the districts of influential Congressmen. The size of defense contracts allows for unlimited possibilities. Again this diversification promotes pluralism, which is costly. Judge Brandeis, talking about the Constitutional separation of powers, made a statement which is equally applicable to the separation of defense industry among our Congressmen and within the services. "The separation of powers was not devised to promote efficiency in government. In fact, it was devised to prevent one form of deficiency--absolutism or dictatorship."²¹⁶

²¹⁶ Joan Coyne McLean, President and Congress, p. 46.

CHAPTER V

EISENHOWER'S UNSOLVED PROBLEM

The most influential political position in the world is that of the President of the United States. The position alone, regardless of the man holding this office, brings immense respect and prestige. When a sincere and dedicated man who has given his life to the service of his country uses this forum for a farewell address, it is certain that his words have been chosen with utmost care in order to bring to the people he has served the distilled wisdom of his experience as well as guidance and hope for the future. In Eisenhower's farewell address the President had compelling reasons for what he said. Admittedly the speech is general, lacks specifics, and is vague. These qualities can be considered normal for a speech severely limited in time. However, the President's past actions and policies should provide clues and guides for the underlying meaning of his words, and clarification and amplification of his thoughts and ideas can reasonably be expected to result from the questioning of an alert press in interviews.

Eisenhower Explains--Commentators Evaluate

The only direct reference Eisenhower has made of the military-industrial complex since his farewell address was in writing to the Stennis Subcommittee in 1962. He said:

Moreover, as mentioned in my final address as President, we must watchfully mind the military-industrial complex, for it tends to generate powerful economic and political pressures beyond the anticipations even of the participants themselves. But these are matters of proportion and sensible national leadership, requiring the same kind of continuing oversight and perspective that other major power groupings in our society,

including business, labor, and government itself require in the interest of keeping our system flexible, balanced, and free.¹

The significance of the speech seems to have changed considerably. From an influence that is felt economically, politically, and even spiritually in every city, State house, and every office of the Federal Government, he now refers to it as a matter of proportion requiring the same oversight as all "major power groupings in our society." Perhaps he felt he had spoken too strongly initially. Or perhaps he thought that mention of the dangers in his speech would start a dialogue which would be a sufficient response to the problem. If this were his motive then he was successful. But it is doubtful if Eisenhower expected his theory of a military-industrial complex to be exploited by Fulbright, Douglas, and writers like Swemley, Coffin, and Cook, who use his speech as evidence of a warfare state,² and are generally conceded to be in opposition to his political beliefs. His reticence to enlighten the public further could be considered political. This is only speculation, but as his remarks are still being used by those who would be expected to quote him in negation rather than affirmation, this may have some validity.

Commentators, analysts, and others have interpreted the speech mostly according to their own particular bias. Those who believe the military establishment is too large and creates an atmosphere conducive to war have used the speech as evidence of militarism, or at least of a preoccupation with military solutions when others are available. Of course the President didn't indicate this. He said the military-industrial complex was an imperative need and represented only a potential danger, not an (actually) present danger. Business and industry have generally regarded the speech as unfortunate, and even as an

¹Senate Cold War Education Hearings, p. 7.

²The publications and articles of these writers are all entered in the bibliography.

"undeserving and evil legacy,"³ pointing out that these partners are doing a conscientious job of keeping United States military strength at a level second to none, which is what America wants and expects. Typical of the reasoning of usually knowledgeable political experts in the field is the report of the Congressional Quarterly:

Revered by the nation as its chief military hero, and respected as its Commander-in-Chief, the President was confident of his ability to 'put need above pressure-group inducement, before local argument, before every kind of any pressure except that that America needs,' as he put it on February 11, 1960. The star studded brass of the Pentagon awed him not a bit; 'there are too many generals who have all sorts of ideas,' he said on February 3, 1960. Knowing how they 'operated,' however, he feared that his successor--whether Nixon or Kennedy--would be unable to understand their pressures.⁴

Undoubtedly the President was concerned about pressure from the military-industrial complex. Certainly he realized that by the time these pressures reached the Presidency they had been applied in the echelons of government subservient to him and in Congress, as well. He must also have realized that, if the pressures were applied to the Presidency which had been unsuccessfully resisted in the Defense Department, civilian control was not as effective as it should be. But the lack of civilian control is not what concerned Eisenhower. In 1962 before the Stennis Committee on Military Cold War Education, he reiterated strongly that there is no danger of the military usurping unwarranted control.⁵

It is rather odd for Eisenhower to give a warning regarding a military-industrial complex. Whatever success or fame he has achieved is directly the result of his military career. He has always professed a deep respect and trust in the military and its leaders. Likewise, he has demonstrated a predilection,

³William J. Coughlin, "Hogwash in Harper's," Missiles and Rockets, March 16, 1964, p. 46.

⁴"The Military Lobby--Its Impact on Congress, Nation," Congressional Quarterly, March 24, 1961, p. 463.

⁵Senate Cold War Education Hearings, p. 7.

almost an awe, for the advice and association of business leaders. In the selection of his cabinet he showed this preference for business men. With Wilson in Defense, Humphreys in Treasury, and Weeks in Commerce, the cabinet became known as the "millionaire's club." He appointed innumerable industrial leaders to assistant and under-Secretary positions and even complained that he could not entice enough businessmen to enter government.⁶ Businessmen definitely had priority in the Eisenhower administration and he seemed to have complete faith in them.⁷ As an example of their early influence, Eisenhower met 30 times with different business groups during his first eighty days, while Kennedy met with them only twice during a similar period.⁸ Richard Neustadt says, "Moreover both (Eisenhower and Truman) have tended to put special credence in successful products of an idealized career other than their own: military men in Truman's case; businessmen in Eisenhower's."⁹ So for fifteen years, one or the other partner in the military-industrial complex had preferential treatment from the Chief Executive. Could it be possible that Eisenhower's lifetime association with the military and his eight years of close association with business leaders gave him an insight into their respective operations that forced him, as a matter of conscience perhaps, to warn this country against such a combination?

During 1959 President Eisenhower had already encouraged national suspicion of the military-industrial complex. When asked if he had expressed concern over the influence of the "munitions lobby" in the debate over the Army's Nike Hercules anti-aircraft missile and the Air Force's Bomarc, Eisenhower appeared annoyed that someone had made "those remarks public property" and said he did not recall using the term "munitions makers," but that "obviously political and financial

⁶New York Times, December 9, 1952, p. 36.

⁷Richard Neustadt, Presidential Power, p. 176.

⁸U. S. News and World Report, May 1, 1961, p. 68.

⁹Richard Neustadt, "The Presidency at Mid-Century," Law and Contemporary Problems, Autumn 1956, p. 634.

considerations" rather than "strictly military needs" were influencing the debate over military weapons.¹⁰ At another time he said, "if such forces were allowed to prevail, everybody with any sense knows that we are finally going to a garrison state."¹¹

Huntington says:

The economic interests of the industrial concerns--potentially the most powerful of the outside groups--usually did not extend to major strategic issues. The companies tended to accept the decisions on basic strategy and then, within that framework, compete for contracts for their products and services. It is doubtful, for instance, that the aircraft industry--more involved with military policy than any other industrial complex--influenced the decision on massive retaliation or even that it played an important role in determining the size of the Air Force.¹²

The truth of this statement is not doubted, but the fact that a reputable political scientist could even consider the possibility of industrial influence upon strategic political decisions is a serious indication of incalculable danger to the country. The next sentence by Huntington is the most important one.

"In the future, the influence of some outside interests in the formulation of strategy probably will increase. Between 1945 and 1960, however, their role was distinctly peripheral."¹³

President Eisenhower was deeply committed to peace and disarmament. These were his chief goals as President, as they were President Kennedy's and are President Johnson's. Eisenhower was disappointed that he was not more successful during his two terms in office. He was sensitive to what he felt at times were counter pressures by the military-industrial complex.¹⁴ Sherman Adams relates the following story.

Eisenhower asked Humphreys if it were not possible for American businessmen to make some sacrifices in the interests of world peace. 'No,' Humphreys said candidly, 'The American businessman believes in getting as

¹⁰ Jack Raymond, Power at the Pentagon, p. 192.

¹¹ Congressional Quarterly, op. cit., p. 463.

¹² Samuel P. Huntington, The Common Defense, p. 176.

¹³ Loc. cit.

¹⁴ Sherman Adams, First Hand Report, p. 458.

much as he can while the getting is good.' 'Maybe that's the trouble with businessmen, George,' Eisenhower said seriously.¹⁵

"Newness" and "Bigness"

Incidents such as these probably altered Eisenhower's complete enchantment with business leaders. But these incidents are not quoted as factors by Eisenhower. He gives no hint that the military-industrial complex was affecting disarmament proposals or strategic decisions, except in offhand remarks which cannot be treated as his considered judgment. Instead his reasons are that the complex is "new" and "big." Granted that the military-industrial complex is both "new" and "big," but "newness," and "bigness" of themselves are not qualities inimicable to the democratic processes and liberties of the United States. "Newness" and changes are present in every sector of American life--even revolutionary changes. In communications, space, and medicine, science is daily changing our lives. The "mass society" is changing traditional social and political concepts. "One man-one vote" and civil rights legislation are having or going to have profound political, social, and economic effects nationally and locally. Emerging and underdeveloped nations are changing international relationships and affecting foreign policy. One of the characteristics most highly prized of our Constitution and democratic government is the flexibility with which it enables our government to meet the crises of a changing world. It is the constituent parts of the "newness" and "bigness" that must be examined.

President Eisenhower is correct in stating that the military-industrial complex is new and has brought changes politically, socially, and economically in the United States. Again, these changes may or may not be detrimental to

¹⁵ Loc. cit.

democratic processes and liberties. Each one must be examined on its own merits. No general statement can be made. The "cold war" itself is new and responsible for some of these changes. The different ideologies of Russia and the United States would produce changes even if war were not an ever-present danger, because of the resulting political incompatibility of the United States and the U.S.S.R. Many think that co-existence has eliminated war as an instrument of national policy. At least the possibility of war is still the accepted national policy and peace through military strength is the dominant theory in our international relations. This has brought the most profound changes in the military, but immediately after World War II, it was apparent that the military would never again be asked to relinquish the responsibility that Franklin D. Roosevelt had given them and drop into apparent oblivion. Reorganization of the government, resulting in creation of the NSC, provided that the military would always be represented at the highest level of government policy-making. During wars America has turned to the military for leadership but after they were finished, as Mills points out, the military has returned to the background in a position that was the target of general distrust and ingrained suspicion.¹⁶ This concept has radically changed. To return to pre-World War II conditions, in which military influence was practically disregarded, is as hopeless and undesirable as stopping the new trends of science, industry, and education. The military now appears to be in the mainstream of American life. At least the officers' corps is no longer drawn mainly from the service schools but predominantly from civilian institutions and about 50 percent of regular military officers return to civilian universities for advanced degrees, many in the social sciences. The

¹⁶c. Wright Mills, The Power Elite, p. 7.

prestige of the military has grown tremendously, until now when it speaks, even on subjects considered political, it has the ability to raise the subjects above the political level. The military would dispute the fact that it was being partisan; and they clothe their thoughts in an aura of patriotism and impartiality difficult to counteract by those who disagree. Also, they have abundant opportunities to speak, not only as witnesses at Congressional hearings where what they say is fully reported and often makes headlines, but also, if they desire, news reporters will attend military press conferences. Retired military officers are commentators for national magazines and daily newspapers.¹⁷ Here they, for the most part, loyally support their own service. Military speakers are also featured for nationally known professional organizations, at fund drives of a patriotic or public spirited nature, as well as at educational institutions and many other types of meetings. Their presence is sought after. No longer are their public appearances before audiences limited to Independence or Memorial Day. Many would consider this cultural militarism but the consensus is that the military represent a broad approach to accepted American ideals.

Unmentioned by President Eisenhower, the biggest change in the military-industrial complex is political. Security of the United States was undoubtedly the major issue of the 1964 campaign. Senator Goldwater employed a task force whose membership included two former Chairmen of the JCS, Admiral Arthur Radford and General Nathan Twining, and a former Secretary of Defense, Neil McElroy, to support, among other issues, his main contention that the President should delegate the use of nuclear weapons, in certain emergencies, to NATO commanders.

¹⁷A few of the better known retired military commentators are: General Thomas D. White, former Chief of Staff, USAF, Newsweek, Major General Max Johnson, U. S. News and World Report, Major George Fielding, New York Times, Brig. Gen. Thomas Phillips, St. Louis Post Dispatch. There are many other lesser lights.

President Johnson did not use the military commanders, but he and Vice-President Humphrey exploited to the maximum the weaknesses of Goldwater's position and they did freely use Secretary McNamara. Employment of even the civilian chiefs in American politics never had occurred before to such an extent. President Eisenhower, commenting on such employment said, "I think that to take the details of how you're going to defend the United States and make it a campaign issue is quite reprehensible."¹⁸ His remarks could be applied equally to Senator Goldwater, Secretary McNamara, or President Johnson. But the important point is that no evidence was produced during the campaign that the military chiefs had even given behind-the-scenes support for Goldwater,¹⁹ in this or in any other of his contentions, except as they had already gone on record before Congress.

But the change in the American political campaign practices is not the principal change, as far as the military is concerned. The primary alteration is in its relationship with Congress. Congress, the former "watchdog" of the Treasury as far as military expenditures was concerned, has turned its job, in the main, over to the executive branch. The President is supposed to control the economy and one of the most important ways he controls the economy is through his annual budget message. Any limitation of military spending must come through this document and cannot be left to Congress to reduce it as once was possible. Congress, once parsimonious and even antagonistic toward military spending, now seeks military assistance to increase such spending. Congressmen have always had a close relationship with industry, at least that industry in their own states or districts. Likewise, industry has always worked harmoniously

¹⁸ Newsweek, October 19, 1954, pps. 32 and 33.

¹⁹ "The Nuclear Issue," Newsweek, September 21, 1964, p. 34.

with the military. In these areas it is not change or "newness" which is important but the second factor mentioned in Eisenhower's criticism--that of "bigness."

It is true that the military-industrial complex would not present a problem if it were not for its size. The interest of Congress can probably be measured by the size of military contracts, although Congressmen are interested in anything that effects their constituents monetarily. It appears safe to say that the bigger a contract is--the more Congressional interest there will be. If it means a job to a constituent which produces 100% of his income, or if a town is totally dependent upon a defense contract--then size means little; it is the percentage of the income for the constituent or locality that is the determining factor. Nevertheless, size or "bigness" is probably the most important ingredient of the military-industrial complex. President Eisenhower has remarked on this size several times since leaving the government. He places emphasis on the deleterious effects of big government, but not similarly on those of big business.²⁰ The Defense Department is by far the largest agency in the federal bureaucracy, so his statements must apply to it. Still, to criticize "bigness" of itself is not a conclusive argument. Burns and Peltason contend that, "bigness" is now a way of life in the United States. "Ours is a civilization of big cities, big machines, big labor, big bombs, big government."²¹ A huge Defense Department is necessary because the Communist threat to our security is a huge one; it is necessary because U. S. military forces are scattered over the entire globe and because the U. S. is a member of defensive alliances encircling the iron curtain countries. The job of defense in the United

²⁰Dwight D. Eisenhower, "Let's Be Honest With Ourselves," Saturday Evening Post, October 19, 1963, pps. 23-25, October 26, 1963, pps. 26 and 27.

²¹James MacGregor Burns and Jack Walter Peltason, Government by the People, p. 8.

States cannot be done by a small organization.

Walter Lippmann challenges Eisenhower's theory of big government by asserting that federal civilian employment has not grown as fast as the population; that state and local employment has doubled since 1947, while nondefense employment in federal government is the same percentage; that the share of state and local government in the GNP has doubled since 1948--from 5 to 10%--federal revenue as a percentage of GNP has increased only slightly--from 12 to 14%; that using debt as the measure, local and state debt has increased 382 percent while the federal debt has increased only 26%--all this despite the continuation of the cold war.²² These statistics show that there is not the steady drift toward centralization so feared and, if these facts are sufficient, they augment the claim that the United States is not in danger of becoming a militaristic state, for one of the tendencies of militarism is centralization.

Convincing as these figures are, a more important aspect of the problem of centralization is the decision-making process and the promulgation of regulations. Numbers of personnel may decrease, but if the required decisions must go to the top for an answer or if all actions are governed by time-consuming regulations, then centralization of authority has taken place regardless of the mere number of personnel, with a resulting loss of initiative, time, sympathetic consideration, as well as awareness of actual details. The more decisions a top-level person has to make, the less he will know about each one. This law, of course, is part of Mills' theory--that a few people are making all the important decisions.²³ But this contention has never been proved because Mills fails to name names and, if he could, he probably would have done so. It is impossible in our present government to determine who is making the decision. There is no doubt that

²²Walter Lippmann, "Ike's Picture of Nation Challenged," Kansas City Times, April 15, 1964, p. 22.

²³Mills, op. cit., pps. 8, 11.

government should be kept as small as possible to do the job. "Bigness," regardless of whether it is in government, which includes the military establishment, in industry, in unions, or in other institutions, is prone to rigidity and complacency, and once a government agency is created, it becomes self-perpetuating. On the other hand, the United States has long accepted the theory that business must be controlled. As industry grows and becomes more diversified, the more government it will take to control it. Government, in all its functions, must increase if its power is to provide the services the people are demanding as the United States grows economically and its international interests increase.

The concentration of power in business monopolies, trade associations, farm blocs, or trade unions, to such an extent that any of them can challenge the authority of the state is hostile not only to a democracy but also to any form of organized society.

Freedom Lost

The military-industrial complex does not work as a uniform conscious entity; such as unions, farm blocs, AMA (American Medical Association). Nevertheless, it has unquestioned national influence. There is no doubt that its immense power can be used in an unwarranted as well as a warranted manner. It is also evident that the power of the complex is enhanced greatly by the inclusion of political power. Relegation of the complex to the same category as other power blocs is debatable, for it seems to have at least one characteristic not common to other power blocs. The bases for farm blocs are farmers and politicians from rural areas. The same is true for unions and the same can be said for any other bloc, but the Congressional-military-industrial complex cuts across all power blocs. Its power is felt in the unions, in small cities as well as large,

in educational institutions, in the economy of the entire nation, and it reaches into practically every home in the country.

Eisenhower says that this all-pervasive power of the military-industrial complex has the potential to endanger our liberties and democratic processes and, at other times, he speaks of the erosion of liberties. He has failed to mention what liberties are being reduced. Individual liberty and freedom, in theory at least, are the characteristics of the government of the United States most prized by its citizens. Politicians and other orators speak of these liberties and freedoms in a general way, but very rarely become specific. But the fact is that certain of our freedoms have disappeared; although they are not mentioned in the first ten amendments, or the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth amendments of the Constitution, which are usually considered its most important portions guaranteeing individual liberties and freedoms. Nor can these lost freedoms be attributable to the industrial-military-complex per se but they have been lost, totally in some cases and partially in others, because of the same factors which perpetuate and enlarge the military-industrial complex.

The draft (officially called by several other names) has been in effect since 1940, with the exception of 17 months in 1947 and 1948. Carried on the rolls in 1964 were 9½ million young men. Of the 1.1 million men reaching age 26 annually, only 58% have fulfilled or are in the process of fulfilling their military obligation. If a young man doesn't enlist after high school, he is usually not drafted until age 22 or 23 and by then he has usually started a civilian career. The services claim inability to fill their officer and enlisted requirements of 2½ million men without the draft. At present there are at least 50 possible variations a young man must consider as he becomes age 18. The system, as it operates, is not universal nor is it fair. The six-year

commitment in the ready and standby reserve is not producing the type of units best suited for the thermuclear age.²⁴ Extensions of the draft at first were thoroughly debated in Congress and contested, but in 1963 it was extended until 1967 by a vote 387 to 3 in the House. No one can contest that young men have lost considerable personal freedom and liberty through the draft. President Johnson announced in April 1964, that he had approved Department of Defense plans for conducting a "very comprehensive study of the draft system and related manpower problems."²⁵ Senator Goldwater made the draft a campaign issue in 1964 as Adlai Stevenson did in 1956.²⁶

No authentic information has been released on the DDD (Department of Defense) study, but the rumors to date are that there will be no extensive changes.²⁷ Affecting the draft is McNamara's recent announcement about incorporating the Army Reserve units into the National Guard. This action reduces the combined Army reserves by 150,000, which should reduce somewhat the Army's need for the draft. The big saving, however, will be in equipment. The Army has long contended that it was uneconomical to have two reserve forces--the National Guard and the Army Reserve. As they had direct control over the Reserves, the Army has several times tried to reduce the National Guard, but the politically powerful National Guard has always prevented this action. Secretary McNamara's plan has taken the other alternative and combined the Reserves with the National Guard.²⁸ The Army, the National Guard, and the Defense Department have hailed

²⁴Charles J. Hitch, Economics of Defense in the Nuclear Age, p. 316.

²⁵"Rundown on Draft Versus All-Volunteer Military Force," Army, September 1964, pps. 18-21. All facts for this paragraph, except as otherwise noted, are taken from this article.

²⁶New York Times, September 17, 1964, p. 28, and September 24, 1964, p. 30.

²⁷Kansas City Star, February 10, 1965, p. 14A.

²⁸New York Times, January 17, 1965, p. 12F

this as a constructive step forward; while the ROA (Reserve Officers' Association) has been rather quiet, evidently not being able to find substantive arguments to combat the move, but it is expected that this organization will find means to alleviate some of the more drastic measures in the directive.²⁹ The only dissenting views have been from Congress:

Congressmen throughout the Nation are seething, mainly, it appears, because the Defense Secretary also directed that men in important Government posts such as Congressmen (who were not consulted) should not be kept in the Ready Reserve.³⁰

The position of the Defense Department is that Secretary McNamara has the authority, without going to Congress, to make the reorganization but it can almost be guaranteed, whether McNamara is right or wrong on this latter assumption, that Congress will find a way to influence this decision before the reorganization is complete, particularly as funds to enlarge the National Guard must be appropriated, even though the decrease in Reserve forces and their equipment will provide an overall saving. Similar reorganizations can be expected in the Navy and Air Force reserve structures if the Army reorganization proves satisfactory.

It is a truism that a democratic society, by its very nature, requires an informed electorate. Government by the people presupposes that the electorate has the freedom, if it so desires to use it, to obtain the knowledge to know how its government and society operates. All agencies of government are responsible to see that the public is kept informed but all three members of the Congressional-military-industrial are instrumental in restricting this freedom. However, Congressmen have particular responsibility for this freedom as elected

²⁹ ROA has requested former Ohio Governor M. V. DiSalle to release correspondence between him and President Kennedy in which the latter opposes any National Guard-Reserve merger. Journal Memo, The Journal of the Armed Forces, February 6, 1965, p. 4.

³⁰ The Common Defense; A Monthly Newsletter on our National Security and Peace, January 1965.

officials with broad investigative powers. The press, with its freedom guaranteed under the first amendment, is considered by Americans as the agency most responsible for keeping the public informed. An 18th century historian William Lecky, said:

Next to the existence of open constituencies, and a fair mode of election, the best security a nation can possess for the fidelity of its representatives is to be found in the system of parliamentary reporting.³¹

Thomas Jefferson said,

The way to prevent these irregular interpositions of the people is to give them full information of their affairs through the channel of the public papers, and to contrive that those papers should penetrate the whole mass of the people. The basis of our government being the opinion of the people, the very first object should be to keep that right; and were it left to me to decide whether we should have a government without newspapers, or newspapers without government, I should not hesitate a moment to prefer the latter.³²

The press cannot perform its function of adequately informing the public if its members cannot get access to information. James Wiggins, in his book Freedom or Security,³³ has listed many of the difficulties the press is having in maintaining this freedom. In this discussion it is assumed that the press would perform its function if it could. The problems of a responsible press are outside the purview of this thesis. Classification of material for security reasons prohibits the press from presenting many facts to the people. Responsible civilian and military officials feel it important to inform the public in broad outline and this they do. And often the administration finds it politically wise to release material which would otherwise be considered classified. The debates in the 1964 Presidential campaign between Secretary McNamara and Senator Goldwater are a fine example. However, Secretary McNamara would never have released much of this material unless he had considered it politically prudent

³¹William Hartpole Lecky, A History of England in the Eighteenth Century, Vol. 1, p. 442.

³²Julian Boyd, editor, The Papers of Thomas Jefferson, Vol. XI, p. 49.

³³James Russell Wiggins, Freedom or Security, *passim*. Unless otherwise noted, this book provides the material used in discussion of the press.

to counteract Senator Goldwater's charges. There is also a feeling among many people that the results of decisions are offered and not the reasons or the data behind them. Even in the Goldwater-McNamara debate the decisions had already been made and had to be accepted. It would take years for Goldwater to reverse the trend toward fewer bombers even if he had been elected President in 1964 and had still decided it was necessary.

Undoubtedly many military secrets must be classified. But it is also true that material once shielded remains so longer than any need for it to be held confidential. Any officer or civil servant, except minor clerks, is allowed to classify material. No individual is reprimanded for too high a classification or for classifying material which should be unclassified, but he can get into serious difficulty for failure to classify. The entire system works toward more classification instead of freer information. Upon retirement, General Ridgway submitted his final report as a matter of courtesy to Secretary Wilson. Secretary Wilson returned it with the request that it be classified. General Ridgway refused to do so, stating that it was all taken from unclassified sources. When the New York Times questioned Wilson on the report, his comment was that the report wasn't important anyway.³⁴ Without doubt, the only reason for Wilson's request was that the report was critical of the administration and would be embarrassing. No one knows how much more of the same type of information is being withheld. It is certain that the press would never have ferreted out this information if General Ridgway had remained in office and had not been interested in presenting his views for consideration to the public. The material in Ridgway's report should have and could have been debated in the press among the informed public for months. Classification of material is a loss of freedom, which although necessary at times, is easily and continually abused.

³⁴Matthew Ridgway, Soldier: The Memoirs of Matthew B. Ridgway, pps. 317-321.

Industry has the same problems. Its work on classified projects must be protected. Before personnel can work on these projects, a thorough investigation, similar to a government security check, is made. Anything in an employee's past that indicates disloyalty or instability is grounds for loss of or failure to get the proper security clearance. This type of security check for millions of government employees is accepted, as to work for the government is a privilege and not a right. For industrial employees it may mean loss of a job and certainly restricts the freedom of many individuals who may have been unwise once. Also this security restricts the free flow of scientific information, which may have overall serious repercussions. Limiting scientific information to a restricted circle puts fewer minds to work on various problems and can easily have the effect of slowing the entire scientific output of the nation. An even more limiting effect of this system has been realized. Industry has found a serious problem in restricting classified information to people who have the required security clearance. To make matters easier, they have found it necessary to classify at least 25,000 entire plants or enclaves and to have security clearance for all individuals working in these plants, including the lowliest janitor.³⁵ Whether necessary or unnecessary, freedom of many Americans has been reduced.

Secrecy breeds secrecy. It has long been a growing problem for the press to get proper access to Congressional operations. Congressional Quarterly ran a survey in 1954 of committee sessions, excluding meetings held during recess, meetings held outside Washington, meetings of conference committees, meetings of the House Rules Committee called to grant rules for consideration of bills, and meetings of the House Appropriations Committee and subcommittees of which no record is kept. Of the 1,413 Senate committee meetings, 546 or 39% were

³⁵Raymond, op. cit., p. 154.

secret and 867 were open. Of the 121 joint committee meetings, 70, or 58 percent were closed and 51 were open. Of 1,468 House committee meetings, 627, or 43% were closed and 841 were open. It is interesting that the House Armed Services Committee, which might be expected to meet most often behind closed doors for security reasons, was 38% secret compared to House Education and Labor, which was 92% secret. Many committees held a greater percentage of secret meetings than the Armed Services Committee. This raises the question as to whether security or convenience of members is more important as far as secret committee meetings is concerned. Regardless, secret committee meetings restrict the right of the public to know how the government operates. In many states this penchant for legislative secret meetings is on a par with that found in the national government and has even been adapted by city and county commissioners in some cases.³⁶

For a country that wishes to protect itself, the knowledge of potential or actual enemies is as indispensable as the presence of armed forces. In fact, current and reliable intelligence is a vital ingredient to adequate military planning. One of the objectives of the United States is world peace and, to further this objective, governments among the emergent and backward nations must not be inimicable to our ideas. Intelligence about the operation of these governments can be gathered only by a secret intelligence force. While not an immediate part of the military-industrial complex, the CIA (Central Intelligence Agency) is also partially a result of world conditions and is closely knit to the military as far as intelligence estimates are concerned. In the book, The Invisible Government, by David Wise and Thomas B. Ross, the activities of the CIA are outlined. Whether this book is factual in all details is not known, nor is it important to this discussion. What is important is that CIA controls

³⁶Wiggins, op. cit., pps. 12-15.

a whole area of government policy that is never discussed until long after that policy has taken effect. This secrecy has been accepted as necessary in the world today, but it is also an area in which unwarranted influence and misplaced power can surely arise. The book begins:

There are two governments in the United States today. One is visible. The other is invisible. The first is the government that citizens read about in their civics books. The second is the interlocking, hidden machinery that carries out the policies of the United States in the Cold War.

This second invisible government gathers intelligence, conducts espionage, and plans and executes secret operations all over the globe.

The Invisible Government is not a formal body. It is a loose, amorphous grouping of individuals and agencies drawn from many parts of the visible government. It is not limited to the Central Intelligence Agency, although the CIA is at its heart. Nor is it confined to the nine other agencies which comprise what is known as the intelligence community: The National Security Council, the Defense Intelligence Agency, The National Security Agency, Army Intelligence, Navy Intelligence, Air Force Intelligence, The State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research, The Atomic Energy Commission and The Federal Bureau of Investigation.

The Invisible Government includes, also, many other units and agencies, as well as individuals, that appear outwardly to be a normal part of the conventional government. It even encompasses business firms and institutions seemingly private.

To an extent that is only beginning to be perceived, this shadow government is shaping the lives of 190,000,000 Americans. Major decisions involving peace or war are taking place out of public view. An informed citizen might come to suspect that the foreign policy of the United States often works publicly in one direction and secretly through the Invisible Government in just the opposite direction.³⁷

The most important areas in which individual freedom has been lost has been discussed by Walter Millis, in his book Individual Freedom and the Common Defense, in which he says there are "three areas of concern": (1) obligatory military service and other features of the present system of military manpower utilization; (2) the many recent measures directed toward the control or extirpation of

³⁷David Wise and Thomas B. Ross, The Invisible Government, pps. 3 and 4.

sedition and subversive belief; (3) the increasingly stringent measures directed toward the control of espionage, the protection of government secrets, the gathering of intelligence, and the development of counter-intelligence operations.³⁸

Spending

The obvious way to reduce the influence of the military-industrial complex would seem to be to reduce the military budget. President Johnson has made it clear that he believes it possible to hold down these expenditures and thereby make more money available for the socio-economic benefits of a "Great Society." He said:

As I have stated--and as our enemies well know--this country now possesses a range of credible, usable military power enabling us to deal with every form of military challenge from guerrilla terrorism to thermonuclear war.

Barring a significant shift in the international situation, we are not likely to require further increments on so large a scale during the next several years.

Expenditures for defense will thus constitute a declining portion of our expanding annual Gross National Product, which is now growing at the rate of five per cent each year.

If, over the next several years, we continue to spend approximately the same amount of dollars annually for our national defense that we are spending today, an ever-larger share of our expanding national wealth will be free to meet other vital needs, both public and private.³⁹

There is no doubt that any cut in the defense budget must come from Secretary McNamara through the leadership of President Johnson. Congress will investigate for waste and poor management, particularly from evidence supplied by GAO (General Accounting Office) but real economies must derive from the executive branch. During Eisenhower's 8 years in office, the defense budget was

³⁸ Walter Millis, *Individual Freedom and the Common Defense*, p. 12.

³⁹ David Lawrence, "Can We Take Chances On Survival?", U. S. News and World Report, February 1, 1965, p. 104.

always over half the national budget and around 10% of the GNP. During the Kennedy administration it remained about the same as far as percentage of the national budget and GNP are concerned. As the GNP increased, so did the national budget and the defense budget, resulting in about \$6 billion more for defense under Kennedy. The defense budget has had its ups and downs since World War II, but generally the trend has been upward. Even under a rising defense budget, industrialists have criticized cancellation of any defense project. McNamara has cancelled several, but the most recent was Pluto (low-altitude supersonic vehicle). Typical of industry's view is:

The cancellation, with its undertones of unilateral non-armament, is of a broader significance than the program itself. If we continue to appease the Soviet Union by failing to carry out research and development in promising areas, then it must be asked whether there is, in fact, a bright future for defense firms. . . .⁴⁰

Industries have concentrated on military research and development which, they claim, is strangled by the concept which demands fulfillment of requirements and missions as grounds for substantial expenditures.⁴¹ Hanson Baldwin points out that invention has never followed this path and the machine gun and tank would still remain blueprint dreams had their development awaited the specifications of a clear-cut military requirement.⁴² It is known that the JCS voted unanimously to include production money in the FY (fiscal year) 66 budget for Nike X, the anti-missile missile.⁴³ The country that makes a breakthrough in this field will have a clear-cut superiority for a while, but Secretary McNamara has insisted that systems tests be performed before any production decision is made.

Most of the criticism of the defense budget has come from the civilian sector. But General Thomas S. Power, USAF, former Chief of SAC, who recently

⁴⁰William J. Coughlin, "Two Minds," Missiles and Rockets, July 20, 1964, p. 46.

⁴¹William J. Coughlin, "The Price of the Future," Missiles and Rockets, November 16, 1964, p. 46.

⁴²Hanson W. Baldwin, "Slow Down In The Pentagon," Foreign Affairs, January 1965, p. 264.

⁴³"The Countdown," Missiles and Rockets, January 25, 1965, p. 7.

retired and wrote a book which was suppressed by the Pentagon, while he was on active duty gave an interview in which he discussed the dangers of disarmament.⁴⁴ U. S. News and World Report said that military men, (it did not name them), were worried about cutbacks and listed the following actions as leading toward disarmament when other countries were not disarming: (1) scrapping the last 225 B-47 nuclear bombers, (2) deactivating 3 squadrons of B-52 long-range bombers, (3) curtailing or closing 95 military bases, (4) reducing Army and Air Force by 58,000 men, (5) considering ending the military draft, (6) cancelling plans for 200 more Minuteman missiles, (7) vetoing Army plans for Nike X missile, and (8) refusing to authorize any new major surface warships.⁴⁵ Of course, defense and space industry is fearful of improvement in relations with Russia, as it removes the urgency from their program.⁴⁶ Industrialists cite arguments as "even more dangerous" that match the position taken by Stewart Alsop, who stated that the revolution in weaponry is now almost complete.⁴⁷ They also misuse the arguments of economists like J. R. Livingston, who firmly believes that military programs should not be kept in operation just for the sake of the economy and who says:

All of these things (closing of military bases, cutbacks in military programs) will create pockets of unemployment. If the administration doesn't modulate this program it could result in a flattening out of the rate of growth, and if handled badly it could even cause a recession--but I don't think this is going to happen.⁴⁸

This is a reasonable statement but industrialists and politicians point to California, which has 23% of the defense business and 50% of the space business but also has San Diego, which is hard hit by unemployment due to a falling level

⁴⁴"A 'Sure Way' To Prevent Nuclear War" - Interview with Gen. Thomas S. Power, USAF (Ret.) - U. S. News and World Report, January 25, 1965, p. 72.

⁴⁵"Why Military Men Worry About Cutbacks," U. S. News and World Report, January 25, 1965, p. 73.

⁴⁶William J. Coughlin, "The Bear Trap," Missiles and Rockets, May 18, 1964, p. 46.

⁴⁷William J. Coughlin, "Withdrawal From Reality," Missiles and Rockets, June 15, 1964, p. 46.

⁴⁸"Sees Peril In Military Cuts," Kansas City Times, December 7, 1964, p. 3.

of new government business.⁴⁹ They expect the government to correct this but not by reconversion or by moving business from a locality that does not have unemployment to one that has unemployment. As far as industry is concerned, the Economic Conversion Commission proposed by Senator McGovern is totally unnecessary.

This would result in further government interference in private industry. The widespread talk about the necessity of converting this industry to commercial business is just so much pap. There will, of course, be shifts in the space and defense markets. But federal spending with this industry will remain high, regardless of the outcome of the November election. Those firms competent enough to keep up with changes in the market will have no trouble surviving.⁵⁰

The FY 1966 budget, with \$49 billion for defense and \$24 billion for new contracts seemed to allay the fears of industrialists. Nevertheless, they gave warning that this budget was "seen as a floor from which defense spending inevitably must rise to some degree--not as a ceiling from which it will decline."⁵¹ And William C. Ellet, Director of Market Analysis for Northrop Corporations, said: "I concur the defense budgets of the future may decline, but there is a finite point below which they will not fall."⁵² The conclusion to be drawn from these illustrations is that defense industry will apply every pressure possible to maintain the present level of defense spending. A decrease in defense spending will not decrease the influence of the Congressional-military-industrial complex. It will increase it because more Congressmen and industrialists will be struggling for what they think is their rightful slice of a smaller pie. The military will

⁴⁹William J. Coughlin, "Survival Of The Fittest," Missiles and Rockets, June 29, 1964, p. 46.

⁵⁰Loc. cit.

⁵¹William J. Coughlin, "Onward and Upward," Missiles and Rockets, February 8, 1965, p. 65.

⁵²Loc. cit.

probably not outwardly support the industrialists except in official Congressional testimony, but it will, from dedicated interest in its concept of national security, provide the facts and basis for industry and Congress in their attempts to influence and perhaps change decisions. A declining defense budget will be more serious from the viewpoint of misplaced power and unwarranted influence than will an increasing defense budget unless defense industry has already been absorbed into other pursuits. Increased defense spending is reinforced by thoughtful scholars such as Herman Kahn who thinks the present defense budget is far too small. He claims that World War III is well on the way and we should be expending money for civilian defense structures, anti-missile defense, more ballistic missiles, and a larger strategic air command. Further he thinks that the defense budget of the past few years has been below the minimum required for security and has only been kept alive by the Korean War, Hungarian insurrection, Suez and Berlin crises. Without these stimulants the United States would in all probability already have become a secondary power.⁵³ Specifically Kahn is of the school that rejects a single, simple strategy which is the most economical. He says:

No satisfactory solution to all the problems can be found by relying on a single simple strategy; the richness and variety of the possible challenges create a requirement for multiple and flexible capabilities. One hopes the acquisition of adequate limited war capabilities and pre-attack mobilization bases will mitigate the conflicting demands to a point where whatever problems remain can be handled by some combination of general war capabilities, unilateral and multilateral arms control measures, and various regional and international arrangements.⁵⁴

The two solutions of limited war and preattack mobilization bases that he envisions would greatly increase the defense budget, which increase he claims

⁵³Herman Kahn, On Thermonuclear War, p. 536.

⁵⁴Ibid., p. 531.

America can and must accept if it wishes to survive.

Another point of view is being presented by columnists and trade magazines on the civilian portion of the defense establishment. This takes multiple forms but mainly exploits the differences existing between the military and civilian sectors of the Defense Department and between the civilians in the Defense Department and in Congress. Both these groups are naturally antagonistic. Congress is always looking for means to increase its prestige and authority vis-a-vis the executive branch. Relations between the legislative and executive branches vary from active to reluctant cooperation to outright and direct opposition. The diverse interests of Congress make it impossible for a Defense Secretary to please the entire Congress. The best he can hope for is a consensus to support him. McNamara initially enjoyed approval of a high percentage of Congressmen, but this approval has decreased with the length of time he has been in office and this is normal. As far as the military and civilian sectors of the defense establishment are concerned, the degree to which both see "eye to eye" on all key issues can be used as a measurement of how well the civilians are performing their job. If all three services, with their separate interests, support the civilian hierarchy without question, then the civilian organization is undoubtedly not fulfilling its mission. Conversely if all three services are at odds with the civilian heads, then there is something wrong also. Controversy is essential to successful control. In no other way can Army, Navy, and Air Force demands be arbitrated.

Morris Janowicz in his revealing and persuasive book, The Professional Soldier⁵⁵ says that, continuously since the end of World War II, both the legislative and executive branches have sought to strengthen the political control of the armed

⁵⁵All factual material for this paragraph, except as otherwise noted, is taken from Morris Janowicz, The Professional Soldier, pps. 347-349.

forces. This has been accomplished in the executive branch by the NSC and by enlargement of the President's personal staff and in Congress by increasing the number of committees and, particularly, by increasing the number of committees dealing with defense. Janowicz also points out that civilian control has been oriented toward administration rather than toward policy. But this is a field in which the military are recognized experts. Also the military itself has been more interested in management than in politics and, as a pressure group, it "is not a voluntary organization, acting on the organs of government; on the contrary, it is an organ of government, seeking to develop new techniques for intervening in domestic politics."⁵⁶ The military approaches Congress as an object of public relations, except for a few key individual Congressmen. This description of the military is apt. The reorganization of the Department of Defense in 1958-59 had the cumulative effect of producing greater organizational balance between military and civilian administrators.⁵⁷ However, commentators looking for areas of disagreement between Congress and the military and between the civilian defense officials and the men in uniform highlight any frictions that appear which are apparent and give (as to the individuals concerned) the press considerable room for personal interpretation.

Secretary McNamara was hailed by industry as a fine choice when he was selected by President Kennedy but greeted with less enthusiasm by the military, who were less sure of his management techniques, cost effectiveness programs, unified procurement in selected areas, and other financial reforms.⁵⁸ McNamara's success within these areas, his forceful presentation of ideas to Congress and his support by President Kennedy increased military concern and, when he moved

⁵⁶Janowicz, *op. cit.*, p. 369.

⁵⁷Lawrence Radway, "Uniforms and Muffin: What Place In Policy?", Public Administration Review, 1958, p. 182.

⁵⁸William J. Coughlin, "The Revolution: Part II," Missiles and Rockets, April 6, 1964, p. 54.

into technical areas, even cancelling some "pet" military projects, the industrialists started to exploit what they called "military dissatisfaction" to attack McNamara, without quoting or naming military men but using the indefinite term of "some military men" (or a similar expression). One of the less subtle, but typical, comments is:

Defense Secretary McNamara was a good man in his time and place. He has now outlived his usefulness. He can't project himself and the Department of Defense into the future. He has no vision. Unless there is a change, the country will be in trouble in a few years.⁵⁹

John J. McCloy says that usurpation of authority by civilians is much more dangerous than usurpation by the military.⁶⁰ John C. Ries has written an entire book the thesis of which is that the Secretary of Defense has built up an all-powerful apex⁶¹ of civilians who have duplicated and supplanted the men in uniform which has all the defects of the Army system discarded by Secretary Root 60 years ago. Hanson W. Baldwin, who is often critical of the man in uniform, criticizes McNamara for consolidation at the Defense level in creating new agencies such as the Defense Supply Agency, Defense Communications Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency and Defense Atomic Support Agency. He points out that the 15 Presidential appointees in rank of Assistant Secretary of Defense in 1961 have been increased to 16 and the Deputy Assistant Secretaries of Defense have been increased from 11 to 30.⁶² Another article states that Secretary McNamara has asked Congress to increase the Joint Staff which he controls from 400 to 800 and, now that he has military chiefs whom he has appointed and who are his type of men, that he is trying to increase their tour from 2 to 4 years.⁶³ Janowicz quotes

⁵⁹William J. Coughlin, "Alice in McNamara Land," Missiles and Rockets, August 3, 1964, p. 46.

⁶⁰Burns and Peltason, op. cit., p. 606.

⁶¹John C. Ries, The Management of Defense, Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins Press, 1964.

⁶²Hanson W. Baldwin, "Slow Down in the Pentagon," Foreign Affairs, January, 1965, p. 271.

⁶³"Four Year Tour For Service Chiefs?", The Journal of the Armed Forces, January 23, 1965, pps. 1 and 5.

General Taylor saying that as Army Chief of Staff, he had 19 layers between him and the President.⁶⁴ In another field McNamara is accused of classifying reports that he does not want publicized, such as "The Howze Report on Army Mobility," "Disoway Report on the Air Force," and "Project Forecast," which looks to changes in the 1970's, as security material, and he is charged with the "muzzling" of other subjects such as the Naval problem of nuclear propulsion and future ship construction.⁶⁵ Time summarizes both sides of the question as follows:

To some outsiders, particularly on Capitol Hill, McNamara's dominance over the JCS seems a cause for concern. Where once they worried that the JCS might become so powerful to be a sort of 'Prussian General Staff,' they now fret lest the Chiefs become too subservient to the civilians. But the fact remains that under McNamara the nation's military power has grown as never before--with less waste of money and with less energy expended in futile interservice and military-civilian fights. McNamara's new team of military managers seem likely to flourish in that fashion.⁶⁶

Summary

Eisenhower's recommendations for control of the military-industrial complex were principally: (1) that "in the councils of government, we (supposedly includes the citizenry of the nation) must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence" and (2) "only an alert and knowledgeable citizenry can compel the proper meshing of the huge industrial and military machinery of defense. Certainly it can be agreed that the President presented a timely warning. But he did not give a hint as to how the citizenry must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence nor did he tell how the citizenry could become knowledgeable so that they could compel the proper meshing of industry and the military. A few of the subjects that would have to be understood to make one

⁶⁴Janowicz, op. cit., p. 347.

⁶⁵"Congress Can Remove The Muzzle," The Journal of the Armed Forces, January 2, 1965, pps. 1 and 8.

⁶⁶Time, February 5, 1965, p. 23A.

knowledgeable on the military portion of the complex are the training, armament, status of alert forces, gaps in the warning networks, range of bombers, reliability of missiles, atomic stockpiles, hardening of sites, dispersal and concealment of military facilities of United States forces, as well as those of our allies.

Experts of all countries are continually evaluating and reevaluating their own strengths as well as those of their allies, and for that matter, those of all other countries. These complex interpretations require highly skilled personnel, computers and, after the estimates are made, there is rarely real agreement. In the United States the Army, Navy, and Air Force, Defense Intelligence Agency and CIA all make separate evaluations and never accept each other's estimates. The estimates remain controversial and disparate. These separate estimates not only support the viewpoint of the service, but are among the most carefully guarded secrets of this country as well as our allies.

Decisions on weapons systems made today, taking into consideration lead time for equipment such as submarines, planes and missiles, will affect the military establishment for at least a decade. A scientific breakthrough, such as the atomic bomb, gives a country which has the production capacity, wealth, and determination to react to such a breakthrough, a decided advantage. The country that first possesses an anti-ballistic missile capable of defending its cities will have a military superiority that could be decisive for years. The fate of our nation rests on these decisions, but the decisions can be made only by the President and his appointed officials. Even Congressmen, with their undoubted knowledge, skill, and experts to advise them, can only insist that America remain superior in all fields. Despite Eisenhower's admonition, these decisions are taken for granted by the citizenry of the United States.

Ernest A. Englebert says:

For political scientists it raises the broad question of the possible alternatives to open and uninhibited public decision-making when the issues are so complex and clothed in security that intelligent and public debate is not possible.⁶⁷

The principal alternative presented is for political scientists to gain a sufficient knowledge of science to be able to understand the positions taken by scientists in national politics. If it is necessary for political scientists to become scientists in order to intelligently debate questions of national importance, it is also important to recognize that the general public must have the same ability if they are to understand the issues at stake.

The fact that the American public demands the security of absolute superiority in all weapons systems and in any type of war (land, sea, or air) in this thermonuclear age, and the fact that politicians know their statements cannot be disputed without the release of classified material, makes defense a subject that can be exploited. The Republicans tried to do this in 1964, and Eisenhower did it in 1952. Kennedy did it in 1960 and a recent article called this a military myth which sparked a costly arms race.⁶⁸ All these statements were partisan and overdrawn and while there is no statistical proof, the American citizens seem to accept the statements of our defense posture according to their individual political beliefs. A Republican naturally has faith in what the Republican national leaders are saying and, likewise, a Democrat believes his party's national leaders. If this were not so, there seems no logical explanation for the fact that the Democrats in 1960 were saying that the Eisenhower administration had produced the 'missile gap'⁶⁹ and had not prepared the United States for limited wars, and four years later Senator Goldwater claimed that

⁶⁷Robert Gilpen, *American Scientists and Nuclear Weapons Policy*, as reviewed by Ernest A. Englebert, *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 57, June 1963, p. 450.

⁶⁸The 'Missile Gap' - 1 - Military Myth Sparked Costly Arms Race," *Kansas City Star*, Associated Press Dispatch, January 26, 1965, pps. 1 and 6.

⁶⁹Senator Stuart Symington, (D-Mo.) popularized the term 'missile gap' during Eisenhower's second administration but it was used by Democrats, including President Kennedy, during the 1960 Presidential Campaign.

the Kennedy administration had allowed American defense to deteriorate from its strong position under Eisenhower. Defense decisions, as far as they affect complex, are aired politically and not factually. This does not mean that the actions in Vietnam or the Congo may not get factual interpretation in the press, but the portion of the military involved in the complex is more often shrouded in secrecy as far as the public is concerned.

Still there is a wide area in the classified, definitive decisions on the details of the defense posture and in the material released occasionally by the administration to reassure the American public, from which the American citizen can become better informed. The Army has proposed a new Air Assault Division in which helicopters replace a great many vehicles; some of these helicopters cost as much as a B-47, or \$3 million each. Should the Army procure, maintain, and operate the increased airplanes and helicopters or should this mission be given to the Air Force? General LeMay claims that the Army proposed a duplication of the research and development and the supply installations necessary to maintain and operate these aircraft and that this task could be accomplished more cheaply by existing Air Force installations.⁷⁰ But does a democratic government want this unification of responsibilities or does it need existing pluralism in order to foster competition and separation? Or will the Air Force give the priority to this job that the Army desires--there is proof, according to the Army, that the Air Force has always given development and procurement of planes for Army use last priority. Examples such as this could be duplicated many times. Also there are problems of maintenance costs, modernization, as well as operations, and many others which Charles J. Hitch discusses

⁷⁰ Air Force Information Policy Letter for Commanders, Number 130, United States Air Force, April 1964, p. 24.

in his book, Economics of Defense in the Nuclear Age. The subject is exceptionally complicated, but there is no doubt the public could become more knowledgeable about the defense budget. Probably the area which shows the most promise for public enlightenment would be a law which would open all negotiations on defense contracts to the public.

Although the President has failed to propose a remedy for a changing condition (cold war and resulting military-industrial complex) in American society, he has also failed to show areas of personal freedom already eroded by this changing condition, as indicated by Walter Millis. The most important omission by the President is that any increased involvement in defense matters by the citizenry is contingent upon more information from a reliable source which will tend to remove defense questions from partisan politics. This not only increases the part to be played by a responsible press and educational institutions but changes must be made in Congressional operations. In both his farewell address and his letter to Senator Stennis Eisenhower stressed another idea. In the former he warned against unwarranted influence, sought or unsought, and in the latter he said the complex generated political and economic pressures beyond the anticipations of the participants. The problem remains: how to guard against an unsought, unwarranted influence that is self-generating.

CHAPTER VI

A PROPOSAL

A synopsis of the problem follows: (1) the prolonged existence of the cold war, which shows no signs of abatement (coexistence with Russia intensifies conflict with Red China), presents the United States and her allies with the continued threat of instant, thermonuclear war from the U.S.S.R.; (2) unsettled conditions throughout the world require the U. S. to be prepared for any type of war practically any place on the globe; (3) to maintain a certain degree of readiness to oppose these multiple threats, the United States retains a huge military establishment including armed forces, conscription to provide personnel, a sizable arsenal, stockpiling of critical materials, and expanding research and development in all types of military equipment and in all areas of military endeavor; (4) the American people believe that world security is the overriding single problem in the world today and accept and support the theory of "peace through strength" in all areas of research and development and in all types of possible warfare on land, sea, or in the air; (5) this huge military establishment requires an industrial base to support it and creates the danger of misplaced power and unwarranted influence particularly because Congress has a vested interest in the continuance of the military-industrial complex; (6) misplaced power and unwarranted influence increase due to the motivation of industry for profits and Congressmen for re-election; (7) the military's dedication to civilian control and democratic institutions protect the national interests while military men are in uniform; however, there is no proof that this dedication will operate when the military man enters industry for a second career; (8) geographical dispersal of

Congressional districts, as well as the diversification and distribution of industry, provides safeguards against misplaced power and unwarranted influence by offsetting concentration to a degree; (9) there has been erosion of liberties and freedoms due to the cold war; (10) unwarranted influence and misplaced power may increase or the national economy may be adversely affected under a declining military budget (unless adequate prior plans for reconversion of defense industry or other public spending are introduced; (11) the major difficulty to be solved is that the Congressional-military-industrial generates unanticipated pressures inimical to the best interests of the country; (12) the ultimate solution to this problem must be a more informed electorate, but the press is handicapped in providing continuity and completeness of information because of security classification, other inherent complexities in bureaucratic government, and a natural tendency for both Congress and the executive establishment to avoid personally embarrassing or politically detrimental facts from reaching the public; (13) only Congress and the executive branch can provide the solution to the problem.

Individual Liberty

There are many reasons why the national government does not keep the electorate completely informed. These reasons intertwine but can be generally grouped under two headings. First, all three of the coordinate branches of the national government feel that they have a paramount interest in protecting individual liberties and freedom; each branch is jealous of its own prerogatives, particularly Congress and the executive branch; the result, at best, is a lack of cohesion. Each branch can point to the other as the negligent agency with its own actions being accepted as best for the country. Second, there is no general consensus as to exactly what freedom and liberty mean. Above all

freedom or liberty is a personal matter; loss of liberty for one person or agency may be a gain for another individual or group of individuals. Freedom must be constantly reevaluated in its overall effects and, as the United States is changing politically, socially and economically, the concepts of freedom and liberty need redefining. At best it is a nebulous subject not to be controlled by a single Act of Congress; instead its loss is by creeping erosion, and it must be considered in every Act of Congress, as well as in executive directives and the daily actions within the executive branch.

Without giving reasons, Americans speak of freedom and liberty as sacred concepts and political virtues peculiarly American. The Revolutionary War was fought for freedom. The debate which started on these subjects before 1776 is still going on. Thomas Jefferson accused the Federalists of despotic behavior and a desire to destroy the newly-won liberties. It was the theme of William Jennings Bryan at the turn of the century and of Barry Goldwater in the 1964 Presidential campaign. To document politicians, use of this theme would be almost endless. But always the party out of power accuses the party in power of destroying individual freedom and liberty. The Constitution, the guardian of these liberties, also is sacred. Although it has been interpreted and reinterpreted, any politician can bring cheers from his cohorts by saying it is being misinterpreted. Actual amendments are remarkably few but, nonetheless, the Constitution has undergone a radical change in meaning. Madison, the first great interpreter of the Constitution, did not believe in an interpersonal relationship; his theory was based on achieving group equilibriums. The modern theory of liberty, evolving gradually over many years, differs greatly. It is concerned with the status of the individual, an individual who is part of a great society which is being changed by bureaucracy, urbanization, industrialization, technology, and the cold war.

John P. Roche, in his essays "The Sources of American Liberty," in which his thesis is that more Americans have more liberty and freedom today than ever before, says:

The great power for good of the national government has as an inevitable concomitant a great power for evil. From my point of view there are no inexorable forces at work moving the United States towards authoritarianism, but the liberal community must realize that the instruments of national power it so casually bestowed upon the national government in the period 1935-1952 are capable of employment against its interests. 'The sword cares not who wields it, nor whose blood it sheds.' It is perhaps at this point that an impartial sociological observer might regret the domestication of American nonconformists, alluded to above: so large a proportion of the American reform elite was taken into the firm in the 1930's and 1940's that few voices but those of the crackpot Right are disposed to criticize and attack.¹

And in further elaboration, he says:

No sane man will deny that the potential threats to American freedom from possible state action are far greater in 1963 than they were in 1833 or 1913. The great apparatus of federal power could be employed for evil ends as well as for good ones, and the real possibility of resistance to centralized power has vanished. I would submit that any sober evaluation of the contribution of the national government to the improvement or the decline of civil liberty must conclude on the basis of the evidence to date with a decision in favor of federal intervention.

Anyone who cherishes the ideals of individual freedom and justice can never relax his efforts to push forward the frontiers of liberty. . . . despite the existence of a huge centralized state, he is today free to enjoy a range of personal liberty unknown to his ancestors.²

The main political problem in the United States is to use the immense power of the national government to foster freedom and liberty. Great strides have been made, as indicated by Roche, particularly in civil rights, competitive bargaining, development projects similar to the Tennessee Valley Authority, and Supreme Court rulings to equalize voting, but nothing is more true than Roche's other point which stresses that every great power for good entails a

¹John P. Roche, Shadow and Substance, p. 56.

²Ibid., pps. 76-77.

concomitant power of perversion. A complex, as potentially powerful as the military-industrial one is, becomes more capable of perversion when it includes Congress.

Control by Congress

Admiral Rickover told Congress that it had the ability to control the industrial-political complex. By implication he assumed that, if Congress through its investigative powers would control the industrial portion of the complex, then the military portion would also be controlled.³ Undoubtedly this idea has considerable merit. State and local governments are engaged actively in securing defense industry, but the focal point still remains in Congress. Here is where money is appropriated and undoubtedly a Congressman's influence in Washington is not only desirable, but could be indispensable, since this is where final decisions are made. Congressmen have the authority and ability to control Congress as they make their own rules. But the incontrovertible fact is that Congress, throughout the history of the country, has shown little inclination to control "pork barrel" legislation and, while individual Congressmen occasionally recommend controls, there has been no concerted drive toward achieving any meaningful results in this field, and to expect Congress to do so in the future seems futile. Congress has a vested interest in fostering the growth of the military-industrial complex, because it means business for Congressional constituents and reelection for Congressmen.

Congress, by itself, will not provide the means to control the military-industrial complex and the paradox remains that, without the assistance of Congress, no action will probably be taken.

³Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964), pps. 467, 469, 512-516.

The Presidency

As Richard E. Neustadt says, in his valuable book on Presidential Power, "Everybody now expects the man inside the White House to do something about everything."⁴ The President has enormous power and can galvanize action for a specific goal in many ways but his greatest power, according to President Truman, is persuasion.⁵ For the President to persuade Congressmen to act, according to Neustadt, "is to induce them to believe that what he wants them to do is what their own appraisal of their own responsibilities requires them to do in their interest, not his."⁶

Under the stress of a national emergency, the President could doubtlessly persuade Congress, as he often has, to act according to his wishes. But the military-industrial complex presents no sudden or urgent national emergency; its effect has exerted a growing influence in an area in which Congress, as a whole, has vital interests of its own. The President speaks for "all the people" while Congressmen speak for their individual constituencies and, as Burns and Peltason say, "are elected by different alignments of voters and hence have differing loyalties and respond to different pressures."⁷ Outside of President Jefferson, and to a lesser degree President Washington, never has a President been able to speak with positive assurance (except during "honeymoon" periods or national emergency) that Congress would follow his lead. Even a strong President like Theodore Roosevelt complained that his strongest opposition was among his own party.⁸ On a subject so general as the protection of the liberty and freedom of the individual and the safety of democratic processes, Congress would never

⁴Richard E. Neustadt, Presidential Power, p. 6.

⁵Ibid., p. 32.

⁶Ibid., p. 46.

⁷James MacGregor Burns and Jack Walter Peltason, Government By The People, p. 446.

⁸Joan Coyne MacLean, President and Congress, p. 61.

speaking with unanimity. It is a group of autonomous, conflicting, irreconcilable committees. Neustadt is correct in saying,

Until there is a marriage between presidential and congressional electorates, particularly at the stage of nomination, there will be no marriage between President and Congress.⁹

But there is another more basic reason why the President is unable to act with the needed continuity under the present organization of our executive branch and cannot provide the needed organization for discussion and action regarding the military-industrial complex. If Congress is fragmented, so is the executive branch. Neustadt's study shows that the Cabinet represents its own Department more than overall national interest and the oft quoted remark of President Truman is considered representative. "I sit here all day trying to persuade people to do the things they ought to have sense to do without my persuading them. . . . That's all the powers of the President amount to."¹⁰ The Presidency is a many-faceted position. The President is Chief of State, Chief Executive, Chief Diplomat, Commander-in-Chief, Chief Legislator, Chief of Party and Chief of the Economy. If the assertion of this thesis is accepted, it will be necessary to add to all these positions another one--Chief Protector of Individual Liberties and Freedoms. As may have been reiterated innumerable times, the President must consider all of his positions in making a decision.

The present problem is to make certain that he considers the latter job when making decisions. In all his different positions he has assistance throughout the executive branch and, in many of these duties, Congress and the Judiciary have responsibilities also. While the Cabinet doesn't

⁹Neustadt, *op. cit.*, p. 191.

¹⁰*Ibid.*, pps. 9-10.

represent all, or at present even the most important assistance the President receives, it is usually considered the body that provides his principal advisors. Eisenhower spoke for himself, in his farewell address, in warning the nation about the industrial-military complex. It is unknown whether the Eisenhower cabinet of businessmen would have wholeheartedly supported his thesis on the military-industrial complex. It might have accepted the lofty and general terms of the address but it appears reasonable that when it came to positive action as to limitation or control of the military-industrial complex, a consensus would have been very difficult to obtain. Eisenhower tried hard to make his cabinet a unified voice, but as Richard J. Fenno points out, the cabinet at best is only a sounding board for the President.¹¹ The normal cabinet follows the description of Rexford G. Tugwell:

A new President sits down at the table facing a Cabinet, not of friends or even of prospective loyal associates, but of representatives he has felt compelled to accept by political arrangement. They have in common only membership in a party recently victorious in an election. Individuals among them may not agree with the plans made by the President, and they may regard themselves as political rivals--an impulse likely to grow stronger as they are encouraged by the interests that gather behind them.¹²

Cabinet officers all have their own administrations with built-in pressures and loyalties to their respective departments. These duties are extensive and time-consuming. Even if the President could count on the entire executive branch supporting him, there appears to be no department of the present Cabinet capable of logically assuming the mission for drafting legislation, and making recommendations pertaining to the erosion of personal liberties. The departments of Commerce and Defense both have vested interests and would be suspect from the

¹¹ Richard J. Fenno, "Now Is The Time For Cabinet Makers," New York Times Magazine, November 20, 1960, p. 12.

¹² Rexford G. Tugwell, The Enlargement of the Presidency, pps. 173-174.

start. While there are aspects of the military-industrial complex as evidenced by GAO reports to Congress that should be handled by the Department of Justice and there maybe other legal infractions but the primary purpose, as will be seen later, is to advise the President and Congress and to provide a forum that may produce a consensus requiring legislative action first. And if there is a problem existing at present, there is also sufficient reason to accept Eisenhower's contention that it will persist. It seems apparent that the fragmentation within Congress by party, committee, and district, the failure of the problem to fit into any single department within the executive branch, and the continuing historic conflict between Congress and the executive branch would all combine to prevent any meaningful results on such a general subject as the loss of individual freedom and liberty caused by the military-industrial complex. If the national government is to become effective in this area, a new commission is needed.

A New Commission

In 1950, Dr. H. D. Lasswell, Professor of Law at Yale, in his book *National Security and Individual Freedom*, was one of the first to draw attention to the fact that freedom was diminishing because the separation of the military and civilian spheres was breaking down, defense expenditures were rising, and the government was not only expanding but becoming more centralized. Other changes, he noted, with attendant loss of freedom were the weakening of political parties; decline in the influence of Congress, civilian administrators, and the courts; withholding of information; increased police investigation; and a decline in the relevancy and influence of the press and public opinion.¹³

¹³Harold Dwight Lasswell, *National Security and Individual Freedom*, New York, McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1950.

Not all these subjects are considered pertinent to this thesis nor is it agreed that Lasswell proves his position in all of them but it is important to note that even a recognized scholar such as Dr. Lasswell believes that one cannot isolate the military-industrial complex without considering the Congress, courts, press, and public opinion. This fact becomes self-evident to any student studying the subject. Dr. Lasswell also held that national security demands all the sacrifices necessary to preserve American independence but, as he says,

If the crisis continues for years, as seems probable, and rises to even higher levels of intensity, as seems likely, effective freedom of choice will be restricted by the necessities of defense. One urgent problem is how to keep these sacrifices of freedom at the lowest point consistent with national security, since an unnecessary loss of freedom is an unnecessary blow to security.¹⁴

Dr. Lasswell's solution was to expand the NSC (National Security Council) to three additional permanent members who would have no other government responsibilities except to review all security policies and advise the President as to their effect on individual liberties. He would assign to the NSRB (National Security Resources Board), now replaced by OEP (Office of Emergency Planning), the responsibility to assess the impact of security upon the free economy.¹⁵ In Congress he would establish comprehensive national security committees representing all committees with jurisdiction in the field in order to give Congress an overall view of security which he claims is lacking at present.¹⁶

¹⁵Ibid., p. 49.

¹⁶Ibid., p. 80, 81. Actually an eight-point program is recommended: (1) three full-time civilian members to be added to the NSC with no other government duty than to formulate and review security policies, (2) one full-time member to review effect of security measures on individual liberties, (3) one full-time member responsible for effecting flow of information to the public on national security, (4) clarify and develop the function of NSRB (now replaced by OPM), (5) establish within the Department of Defense a strong civilian staff independent of control by military services to aid in developing and evaluating security policy, (6) eliminate extraneous functions from the control of the armed forces, (7) develop a program of advanced training within the government under civilian auspices to provide a comprehensive grasp of security policies within the framework of our objectives as a nation, (8) President to devote a portion of his

Also recommended is that the President devote a part of his annual State of the Union message to a discussion of the problems involved in the relationship of the national security problem to the problems of civilian supremacy, freedom of information, civil liberty, and a free economy.¹⁷

Lasswell's solution is the only concrete proposal dealing with the entire subject I have found, and it was recommended fifteen years ago; the problem has not diminished since then. Lasswell's plan has advantages in that it recognizes the military-industrial complex is not an isolated problem and also recognizes the first requirement in protecting individual freedom and liberty in a democracy is an informed public. This plan also recognizes that individual freedom and liberty is the most priceless ingredient in American democracy and the plan has placed the responsibility for maintaining it in the NSC, the principal advisory body to the President. It would also outline specific duties for the President. It would require him to review decisions concerning freedom and liberty in his annual message to Congress and the people.

Lasswell's plan has certain drawbacks that would reduce its effectiveness. Chiefly, it fails to recognize that the complex is Congressional-military-industrial and that any improvement over present conditions must consider the role of Congress. While he has furnished the President with an expert adviser on liberty and freedom, any recommendations for legislative correction must go

annual message to discussing national security program in relation to civilian supremacy, freedom of information, civil liberty, and a free economy.

¹⁷Ibid., p. 104. Program for Congress consists of six points: (1) establish comprehensive national security committees, representing all committees with any jurisdiction in the field, (2) increase the amount of technical information available to Congress by additional staffs in the Legislative Reference Service of the Library of Congress, (3) members of Congress provide their constituents with more comprehensive information about the security position and problems of the nations, (4) Congress to safeguard individual freedom by providing a model of fair play in its own hearings, (5) all lobbying and propaganda activities concerning national security made a matter of public record, (6) establish a Commission on National Security and Individual Freedom if the above recommendations do not work.

to Congress for implementation and as Congress is not being a party to formulating the recommendations, it would be apt to ignore them. Administratively Lasswell has separated duties between NSC and OEP which would only divide the job, giving two heads for one job. Further, addition of three members to the NSC with no other responsibilities but protection of liberty and freedom would make the plan unacceptable to the present NSC, which has only five members (President, Vice-President, Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, and Director of OEP), in addition to the permanent administrative secretariat consisting of the Special Assistant for National Security and the Executive Secretary. Further, these three men would have to have organizational support. They could never perform their job adequately without a well-trained staff.

Lasswell's concluding recommendation is that, if his previous recommendations as already outlined did not prove workable, a "Civilian Commission on National Security and Individual Freedom" (hereafter called the Commission) be established along with a Joint Committee of Congress on Individual Freedom (hereafter called the Joint Committee). The Commission would have responsibilities to both President and the Joint Committee similar to the Atomic Energy Commission and the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. This action eliminates the main objection to Lasswell's first proposal.

The main purpose for such a Commission is increased public information, the law establishing such an agency would under my concept state that all written reports to the President as well as to the Joint Committee would be made public, except in specific cases to be covered later. Included in this concept would be that only the head of the Commission would be a member of NSC. The practice of privileged advice to the President must not be abrogated, as far as the head of the Commission is concerned. But it should be his prime duty to point out to

the President the probable adverse consequences to individual freedom or to the traditional processes of government that any NSC decision might have. The President should inform the people of any NSC decision that he supports in contradiction to these recommendations. He could do this periodically but, in accordance with Lasswell's recommendation, a portion of the State of the Union message devoted to the recommendations of the Commission would enable the public to assess the thinking of the President as well as his actions on this all-important subject. Similarly, it should be required that the senior House and Senate members of the Joint Committee report to the Senate and the House respectively, outlining the recommendations of the Joint Committee with legislation concerning the reports of the Commission. In this manner the public would be informed by an organization whose sole job would be the protection of individual liberties, and which had access to the information upon which recommendations were made and, above all, had loyalties to both Congress and the President. The President would present his views to the people, at least in the State of the Union message, and Congress would have the benefit of its own members reviewing all recommendations. The press would be fully informed and other organizations interested in government, as well as individual scholars, would also be able to assess the recommendations from the Commission, the executive branch, and the Congress. These organizations would also have a responsible government agency that would be concerned with their recommendations.

The solution will seem overly simplified to some and impossible of attainment to others. Undoubtedly the main obstacle would be getting Congress to approve a Commission that would be critical of Congress. This is a formidable obstacle, but there are advantages for Congressmen that might make it acceptable to them. One of these is in the area of CIA. Congress does not have the control

over this organization that many Congressmen believe desirable. As a member of the NSC, the head of the Commission would be privy to the counsels and assignments given to CIA. This would not satisfy Wise and Ross who, in The Invisible Government, say that the present Congressional subcommittees should be replaced with a Joint Committee similar to the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy.¹⁸ In the Atomic Energy Committee there has never been a leak of classified data and there is no reason to believe that another Congressional Committee would be any less responsive to its responsibilities. But, lacking a special Joint Committee on CIA, the presence of an agency outside CIA responsible for reviewing its actions and reporting to Congress should go a long way to satisfying the demands and needs of Congress.

Another area which should appeal to Congress is in the matter of classification of information. This Commission's main purpose would be to increase the flow of information. At present there is no government agency responsible for determining whether material should be released to the public or remain secret. Each agency is responsible unto itself. By broad category this Commission would have the responsibility to recommend declassification. The press has little confidence in the present system. The existence of an outside agency to whom the press could appeal when it felt that classification was being maladministered in the interests of an agency would certainly restore, in a great measure, confidence to the public that needed knowledge is available. The classification function of the Commission would be the only one in which it would have responsibilities directive in nature. As the Commission would be privy to the decisions of NSC, which would include those of Defense as well as those of CIA and The State Department, the Commission should not be given judicial responsibility to declassify, but each agency should be required to justify actions which disagreed with the Commission's recommendations. The Commission, as the

¹⁸ David Wise and Thomas B. Ross, The Invisible Government, p. 354.

representative of the people and Congress in these matters, would have a salutary effect. At least it should tend to stop the withholding of information which would be only embarrassing to the administration or certain highly placed individuals. Classification of information would be based solely on national interest and information would become available as soon as possible in the public interest.

Effect of Commission

The total effect of the Commission on the military-industrial complex cannot be foreseen, but it should be considerable in many areas of government. First it would have to determine what present practices and trends are inimical to the democratic processes of government and individual liberty. It would probably decide that many present practices are satisfactory and need no change. But let us consider some of the recommendations that might be made. None of these ideas are new, and some have been offered many times. Above all, they are not all-inclusive. But the Commission would develop data and reasons which would make some of them politically expedient.

The considerable empire of the armed forces to indoctrinate the general public in all phases of military endeavor would undoubtedly be an area that the Commission would scrutinize carefully. The military tie-in with industry in this vast public relations effort might result in censure or closer budgetary control. Undoubtedly the type of position retired officers could accept in industry would be scrutinized. For instance, the Commission might decide that a retired officer could accept a position as a technician or research specialist but could not accept a position in industry as a board member or a sales representative--or that retired officers could not work for a certain period of time after retirement with companies doing defense business. There

might be a limitation on the number of retired officers any company could hire depending upon the amount of government business the company did annually. Full disclosure of the duties of the retired officer in industry might be required. Retired officers could be limited to government employment in certain definite areas. Congressmen in reserve units might be asked to resign their military commissions or, at least, not to serve on any Congressional Committee dealing with defense.

As for businessmen entering government, there would be rules as to the type of government job they could accept, depending upon their former employment. The Commission might decide that to force businessmen entering government to dispose of their business holdings was desirable but that it was just as desirable for Congressmen to do the same thing. They are both public officials. At least rules would be established for the conduct of businessmen entering government and for Congressmen dealing with the Defense Department on contracts. Lobbying for defense contracts would be closely regulated and all negotiations for defense contracts would be public.

There are regulatory agencies for power, communications, railroads, etc., so the Commission might recommend that all defense contracts be removed from the Defense Department and placed under a new regulatory agency. Military requirements, specifications, and areas for research and development would still have to be controlled by the Defense Department, but under the new system, all purchasing and contracting would be done by the regulatory agency. Rules and methods for negotiating defense contracts, to include accounting procedures, would be uniform. Undoubtedly such an innovation would be resisted by the military services and by industry and, if accepted, would initially cause duplication

and might be more costly. But such a regulation would also certainly make conflict of interest more difficult, and democracy is not essentially interested in cost when perpetuation of democratic processes are at stake. Before such a recommendation would be made there would have to be evidence, which is lacking now that the present system has weaknesses.

Changes in the ways industry executes defense business and the necessary adjustments in the political sphere, mainly in Congress, will be much more difficult to attain than changes in the military side of the complex. After all, the military is a compact, closely supervised group, and it takes orders. As Hanson Baldwin says, in commenting on the Hebert Committee investigating conflict of interest,

It should recognize that the retired officer is only a very small part of a much bigger problem; that the retired officer's services are needed both by industry and Government; that very few, if any, are guilty of improper acts, and that a clarification, modernization, and codification of the conflict-of-interest laws and regulations--with discrimination eliminated--is in the public interest.¹⁹

And Mr. Stanley Hiller, Jr., in reviewing the Army-industry relationship, said that a "closer union is needed not only in the planning stages of the specialized, complex programs, but literally throughout the product's life from the cradle to the grave."²⁰ Both of these views would have to be considered but it appears that legislation is all that would be required to control the military side of the complex. Congress would be different, as it makes its own rules, and freedom of action is a fetish with American businessmen.

¹⁹U. S. Congress, House, Subcommittee for Special Investigations of the Committee on Armed Services, Hearings, Employment of Retired and Civilian Personnel by Defense Industries, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 1962, p. 136.

²⁰Stanley Hiller, Jr., "Technical Competence--Basis For Change," Army, May 1964, p. 31.

Another area in which the Commission might be influential is in the field of vertical mergers. Horizontal mergers have been illegal under the Sherman and Clayton Acts but the new type of vertical merger is driving out small businesses that cannot compete.²¹ If there is any truth to Mills' theory that a small group of men is making all the important decisions in industry and government, the evidence should be found in interlocking directorates.²² A law that would limit the number of corporations in which a person could be an active director should be investigated. The Department of Justice would still have the job of enforcing the law. The Commission's responsibility would be to indicate areas where individual liberty is threatened and to suggest to the President and Congress new laws for the Department of Justice to enforce.

Unions should come under the same Commission scrutiny as industry. There is sufficient evidence that as unions have grown they have, in some cases, become more interested in their own power than in forwarding the interests of their members. Certainly recommendations might be made which would alleviate the spiraling of wages and prices which are restricting liberties of many who are victims of the process.

Lennox McLendon, top investigator in the Baker case, says that, in his opinion, Bobby Baker was at one time more powerful in the Senate than any of the 100 elected members. His influence extended to both Republicans and Democrats.²³ The Senate reluctantly investigated Baker in regard to relations with civilians and government employees, but steadfastly refused to reveal his dealings with

²¹Richard J. Barber, "Mergers" Threat to Free Enterprise," Challenge, March 1963, p. 7.

²²Philip Olson, ed., America As A Mass Society, as quoted from the National Resources Committee, "The Structure of Controls," pps. 72-75.

²³James McCartney, "Bobby Baker's Power Appraised," Kansas City Star, March 4, 1965, p. 20. This was not at the time President Johnson was majority leader, but during the period when Senator Mansfield took over after Johnson was elected Vice-President.

other Senators. The view of Senators and Representatives that because they are elected by the people and their record is reviewed by the people at election time they should have special status and be able to operate more or less secretly and with immunity is preposterous, even though it is traditional. Election does not insure probity in a public official any more than appointment does. The same rules should apply to both. If Secretary McNamara should divest himself of all stock in Ford Motor Company, the public should know which Senators and Congressmen have personal interests in which corporations. The right of the people to know how legislators earn income in addition to their government salary should not be questioned in a democracy. The Report of the Twenty-Sixth American Assembly says:

Respect for the government requires respect for its individual officials. Each Senator and Representative and all Presidential appointees should be required to report annually their financial interests and the sources of their income.²⁴

Income tax reports of all Senators, Congressmen, Presidential appointees, military officers of general or admiral rank, businessmen and corporations doing public business should be available to the public. Maybe this should extend to all corporations for, as Gabriel Kolko aptly points out, "A corporation is now, essentially a non-statute political institution, and its directors are in the same boat with public office holders."²⁵ The public has a right to know how public officials and businessmen doing public business invest their money and increase their wealth. It would appear that individuals who do not wish to make this type of information available should not run for public office, engage in business with the government, or accept positions in the executive branch. That corporations claim that making these reports available would give valuable information to competitors should not be allowed to stand

²⁴Report of the 26th Assembly, op. cit., p. 8.

²⁵Olson, op. cit., p. 109.

in the way of the greater public interest. Profits made by corporations doing government business is a part of the information a democratic society is entitled to have, and it entails a loss of individual liberties when such information is kept secret for individual or corporate gain. There would be no law that would reduce conflict of interest quite so readily as one that would make income tax reports available for public scrutiny. There is no expectation that Congress would consider such a law on its own initiative. However, if the Commission recommended such a law and each Congressman and Senator was required to take a stand before the electorate on such an issue, undoubtedly an aroused public would see the advantages and changes might occur. There is little disagreement by Congressmen or leading political scientists with the conclusion that Congress needs reorganization and more explicit rules, but to accomplish these changes Congress needs the assistance of public opinion and recommendations from the Commission could obtain the necessary public interest. At the present time a Congressman can campaign for a bill, introduce it into Congress, have it assigned to a Committee, and this can easily be the last the public will hear about it until the next election. The public is entitled to know why and how these bills are killed in committee. Secretary Ickes recorded in his diary that the opinion of Vice-President Garner was that there ought not to be any executive session of any congressional committees. He made the point that it was all public business and that reporters should be permitted to attend any committee meeting. Still, in 1953, 39% of Senate Committee meetings and 38% of House Committee meetings were secret.²⁶ Probably the worst effect of the present system is that secrecy really does not exist. Each legislator leaks to the public his version of what happened in a committee

²⁶Wiggins, op. cit., pps. 12-13.

meeting and what he wants his public to know. The public in many cases is not only informed, it is misinformed.²⁷

The Commission might also have recommendations for protecting individual liberties before Congressional committees. While the excesses of McCarthyism have not reached the same heights again, many individuals are still tried legislatively who could not be tried legally. Lasswell claims it is necessary for Congress to provide the example of fair play in its own hearings in order to safeguard individual liberty,²⁸ and one of the recommendations of the 26th Assembly is: "Each chamber should adopt and enforce effective procedures to protect the constitutional and other traditional rights of citizens called before its committees."²⁹

Many states have given the governor the right to veto individual items in appropriation bills. Practically all students of government, except Congressmen, agree that, if the President could veto specific items of appropriation bills, economies could be made in government and this would be most applicable and

²⁷*Ibid.*, pps. 19-20. James Russell Wiggins gives seven reasons why legislative bodies in a democracy should meet in the open: (1) public business and not private business is the object of their deliberations, (2) legislative power, in a democracy, remains with the whole people, and is only yielded in part, and for stated intervals, to individual citizens acting for the whole people, (3) open proceedings enlist the intelligence of the whole community in the lawmaking process, (4) public proceedings broaden participation in government by citizens as a whole and make citizens to a certain extent participants in the government, (5) public proceedings protect the community, the state, or the nation against the possibility of wrongdoing, either by individual lawmakers who may mislead or deceive a majority or by a whole legislative body, (6) at the same time, they protect the honest and conscientious legislator from successful imputation of wrong conduct by false accusers, (7) public proceedings protect a legislative body against being made the victim of fraud or misrepresentation by witnesses appearing at legislative hearings.

²⁸Lasswell, *op. cit.*, p. 104.

²⁹Report of the 26th American Assembly, *op. cit.*, p. 7.

probably most effective in regard to defense appropriations. Congress still would have the considerable power of overriding the veto. If Congress could muster this type of support, it would be an extreme case in which the President would fail to follow the direction of Congress. The present arrangement of not spending money for particular weapons satisfies neither Congress nor the public but increases tension between Congress and the President.

The regulatory agencies also need examination from the viewpoint of the public. Walter Adams and Horace M. Gray have written a book entitled Monopoly In America, in which their thesis is that government, mainly in these regulatory agencies, fosters monopoly, quasi-monopoly, and imperfect competition by its policies.³⁰ Just because these regulatory agencies have been found necessary does not mean that they have not overstepped their original purpose and have not increased their power in ways not intended. This is a natural tendency of government. Perhaps the Commission would find means to eliminate some government controls that would restore lost competition. There could be some consolidation in government by transferring duties from present agencies to the Commission. One obvious addition to the Commission would be the Civil Rights Commission whose duties are to investigate deprivation of voting rights due to color, race, religion, or national origin and to report its findings and recommendations to Congress and the President. Only very peripherally is the Civil Rights Commission related to the military-industrial complex but it is intimately related to individual liberties and freedoms regarding the denial of equal protection of the laws under the Constitution.³¹

³⁰Walter M. Adams and Harold M. Gray, Monopoly In America, p. XIV.

³¹General Service Administration, Office of The Federal Register, National Archives and Record Office, United States Government Organizational Manual, pps. 535-536.

Every government has different methods of economic control. When dealing with totalitarian governments or democracies, business has found out that the government is a required partner in overseas markets. Tariffs which once were necessary to protect infant industries are now used for many different purposes. These commitments, both internal and external, should be reviewed from the standpoint of individual liberty and democratic processes as well as that of the image the United States desires to portray to other countries. The United States is using all its resources to convince other nations that its type of democracy is best for the most people. This includes free enterprise. The American image in these countries is important. Not only official declarations, but the actions of public officials, CIA, and the military should be reviewed from the standpoint of whether democratic freedom and liberty is the ultimate result obtained from this great increase of official Americans in foreign countries. In over 40 countries, the United States has MAAG's (Military Assistance Advisory Groups).³² Our troops are deployed all over the world. Their military job, for the most part, is unquestioned but a review by a disinterested government agency with particular attention to methods used is warranted. In addition, the militarymen stationed in foreign countries reach down into many of the communities of the underdeveloped nations to develop plans and train indigenous troops to do civilian jobs such as building roads, schools, churches, sanitary facilities, etc.

Army technicians--engineers, food handlers, automotive mechanics, communicators, medics, and others--are daily training Asian military personnel in skills important to civilian as well as military life. Ultimately this trained manpower joins the civilian economy and becomes the nucleus of a slowly growing and badly needed force of indigenous skilled labor.³³

³²The Department of the Army, United States Army and World Security, p. 70.

³³General James F. Collins, "The Army in Pacific Area," Army, December, 1963, p. 62.

The civilian work done by the military is undoubtedly worthwhile, necessary, and a job that both the Army and foreign governments recognize with pride. There are convincing arguments for increasing it rather than decreasing it. The Army has traditionally engaged in civil works in the United States and this may be one of the best ways to sell freedom and liberty, but this job and all other missions being performed overseas should be evaluated by some agency other than those performing them. If the cold war is an ideological battle and the result hoped for by the United States is the practice of United States democracy, the democratic traditions of the United States must be practiced by our official representatives throughout the world. The Commission could bring unbiased opinion to the President, to Congress, and to the public in regard to the entire field of our growing relations with other nations.

Democratic Institutions

The United States is proud of its free institutions of press, pulpit, and education. Unhampered for the most part by federal control, all have a proud heritage of independence and responsibility for informing and educating the public. The proposed Commission should have a profound effect on all three if for no other reason than that more factual information would be available.

Beginning with Thomas Paine during the Revolution for Independence and followed by Harriet Beecher Stowe and the "Abolitionists" during the Civil War period, the Hearst Press in the War of 1812, the fight for democracy in World War I, and even now President Johnson's programs for "medicare" and assistance to education the press keeps the public informed and is a powerful instrument to instigate action. There is no dearth of information on the Congressional-military-industrial complex as a distinct entity. There is also considerable

information connecting its constituent groups and showing the interrelationship between them. Faithfully reported by the press are cancellations of defense projects such as Skybolt, RS-70, MURBM and, with each cancellation, attacks follow in the trade journals, until now skepticism of McNamara's decisions in military development of weapons systems is being questioned by some.³⁴

On the other hand there is little said after such a cancellation as to the aspects of individual liberty and freedom or an evaluation of unwarranted influence by the political-military-industrial complex except by the partisans who lost contracts. It is mainly an economic debate. The 1964 Presidential campaign, with the opposing views of Goldwater recommending more manned bombers and the administration recommending primary reliance on ICMB's, is an example.³⁵ Nothing is being said about evaluating the costs of the two concepts nor about the influence of the Congressional-military-industrial complex in this debate. Maximum defense, regardless of cost, is still the persuasive political view. The political questions Americans are interested in are security and economy: how much good can a Representative or Senator do for his district or state? The press, when considered as a whole, faithfully presents all the angles of this side of the controversy particularly as it affects the area it serves. Little or no evaluation is made as to individual liberty or increased influence of the Congressional-military-industrial complex, nor is the general public interested. Economic and military security are more important than individual liberty and freedom as far as news is concerned.

³⁴Hanson Baldwin, "Slow Down in the Pentagon," Foreign Affairs, January 1965, pps. 263-264 and "New Look At Defense" - "Why Congress Worries," U. S. News and World Report, March 1, 1965, pps. 37-41.

³⁵"Weigh Super Bomber," Kansas City Times, Associated Press Dispatch, September 8, 1964, p. 13.

Americans willingly give up their liberties and freedom in order to advance their economic status by joining unions or associations which police their activities such as the Stock Exchange, American Medical Association or the American Bar Association, or by contracts such as athletes make in baseball, football, and other sports. The press faithfully reports the existence, methods and aims of these organizations. They deprive individuals of freedom and liberty but are not considered a threat to a free nation. But when it comes to individual liberty and freedom connected with the Congressional-military-industrial complex, a complex so huge that it reaches into every Congressional district in the nation, the press does not speak with unanimity nor continuity nor is it expected to. Editorial, magazine articles, and scholastic journals present a voluminous amount of material, good and bad, thoughtful and superficial, and of every shade of political belief and self-interest. There is no agency to digest this material factually and to present a program of action when necessary. What material is available comes from Congress, industry, or the Pentagon--all of which are members of the complex. The material needs to be reevaluated objectively from the public point of view. Arthur Barber says, "I can think of no major problem of national security or disarmament in which the basic information is not available from unclassified sources."³⁶ This is certainly a minority point of view and is suspect, as Mr. Barber is a Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense. But his other charge is more substantial, as he says the material is scattered in the Congressional Record and Committee reports, executive reports, newspapers, and public statements which are not being adequately researched, correlated, synthesized and presented in a manner

³⁶Kansas City Star, October 15, 1964, p. 1.

from which the interested public can draw adequate solutions.

Fulsome praise can be given the press for its ability to recognize a timely news issue and to ferret out the details. Only on rare occasions does the daily press perform this detailed type of research suggested by Mr. Barber. As has been noted, the press has little confidence at present in governmental classification procedure. Operating on the democratic theory that the people can decide if they have the information, the Commission would have as its main purpose to increase the flow of timely information to the public. The press undoubtedly would welcome an independent agency that would be sympathetic to its charges of suppression of data and which had sufficient influence to cause changes. There is no doubt that Congress and the line agencies (State Department, Defense Department, Atomic Energy Commission, CIA and so on)

tend to exaggerate the importance and secrecy of their activities and to apply higher security standards than an informed outsider would consider justified by the facts. . . . In addition, the line agencies, knowing that their decisions will be subject to review, would exercise considerably more care and discrimination than they now use; on the opposite side of the fence, journalistic playing off of one agency against another would be discouraged.³⁷

There is another possible effect that could result. I have accepted that the press of the United States is responsible. That this conclusion is not fully true is hardly arguable. The press could do much to increase its objectivity and quality. By bringing facts of irresponsibility to the attention of the public the Commission would create a healthful atmosphere of discussion within the press and might even bring some self-policing that would be beneficial. An example is the recent discussion over the actions of the press in

³⁷John P. Roche, Shadows and Substance, p. 368.

trying criminal cases by the public before a jury has acted.³⁸ There are many other areas of sensationalism and bias which could be corrected by free discussion and make our free press, which is undoubtedly one of the bulwarks of a free country, more responsive to our best ideals. Douglass Cater, a newspaperman, now a member of President Johnson's staff, makes a plea for political scientists to assess the responsibility of the press. He claims that we have government by the newspapers consisting of trial balloons and leaks.³⁹ The press is the first to declaim when it believes information it is entitled to is withheld. Still it continually withholds information the public is entitled to. By refusing to name the contact from which information is received, the press refuses the concerned citizen a vital element in assessing the reliability of the information. The Commission might be influential in these areas in assisting our free press to be more responsible.

Next to be considered are our educational institutions. W. W. Rostow, in "United States in the World Arena," says:

It is clear that the universities--as a byproduct of their normal business are a major source of the fundamental ideas on which our military hardware, our foreign policy, large segments of our domestic policy, and our living concepts of the law are based. Universities create ideas; and ideas are what we live by; what we build our machines out of; and in the end determine how we alert our basic institutions in the face of a changing reality.⁴⁰

The above statement is fully corroborated by the arms debate now in progress. This debate is covering every phase of arms, disarmament, war, peace, military strategy of all types, as well as foreign policy in a thermonuclear age.

³⁸James J. Kilpatrick, "Fair Trial - Free Press Conflict Can't Be Fully Solved," Kansas City Star, February 25, 1965.

³⁹Douglass Cater, The Fourth Branch of Government, *passim*.

⁴⁰W. W. Rostow, United States in the World Arena, p. iii.

Probably no subject has so engaged such a large percentage of the scholarly minds of the country since the adoption of the Constitution was debated and every man who could read or write seemed to understand and have an opinion on Locke, Montesquieu, and Blackstone. It is to be expected that this debate should engage so many authors, as it concerns the survival of western civilization as we know it.⁴¹ Many foundations such as RAND, Rockefeller, Carnegie, Ford, and others are financing these projects. In this connection Arthur Herzog comments,

One of the most noticeable features about American intellectual life since World War II is what might be called its institutionalization into thought centers of one kind and another, and nowhere is this more clearly true than in the kind of thinking that has been applied to the cold war. No less than three hundred study centers of all sorts now consult for the Department of Defense. The amount of brain-power such places can agglomerate is impressive. RAND, for instance, has a staff of 1,100, of whom 600 are professionals, and 280 of them Ph.D.s, enough to staff a university.⁴²

Scholarly publication and research is also being accomplished in the graduate programs of universities, particularly at Yale, Harvard, Princeton, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Pennsylvania State University, Johns Hopkins, Chicago, Ohio State, and Stanford.

The production and advice of these scholars have affected national policy. Several of the authors have been brought into responsible government positions,⁴³ and two of these books, Henry Kissinger's The Necessity for Choice⁴⁴ and Robert Osgood's Limited Warfare,⁴⁵ are credited with influencing the change in national

⁴¹Robert A. Levine, The Arms Debate. This book and its bibliography present a summary of current opinion on the entire subject without providing personal solutions.

⁴²Arthur Herzog, The War-Peace Establishment, p. 54.

⁴³Two of the principal contributors are W. W. Rostow, who is presently on the State Department Policy Planning Board and Herman Kahn who has held several government positions, principally with the Air Force.

⁴⁴Henry Kissinger, The Necessity for Choice, New York, Harper & Brothers, 1960.

⁴⁵Robert E. Osgood, Limited Warfare, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1957.

policy under President Kennedy of "flexible response" from that of President Eisenhower's and Dulles' policy of "massive retaliation." Military men are even complaining that the sacred prerogative of the military to determine strategy has been preempted by scholars.⁴⁶

While it is true that scholars deserve the major credit for bringing new ideas, theories, and many facets of war and peace in a thermonuclear age into sharp focus: it is also true that curriculums in the universities have not in the same degree kept pace with changing conditions. The military budget is 50 to 60 percent of the national budget. At a time when military influence is having a profound effect upon the nation, few colleges are giving courses specifically in military history, military policy, military security, or foundations of national power.

In a study completed in 1955 only seven percent of the universities and colleges answering the questionnaire were giving courses purely in military history or policy.⁴⁷ On the other hand as the interrelationship of foreign policy and national security is inextricable it is true that the problems of security are being given more and more attention in allied courses. The same is true of the scientific revolution. Scientific history is quite new in our society.⁴⁸ Undergraduate courses in new fields must usually wait for professors to be trained in sufficient numbers for major curriculum changes to be made. If universities follow the normal path, it will be years before undergraduates are offered specific courses in military history, security and policy in a majority of our universities. Dr. Richard C. Brown concludes,

⁴⁶ Colonel Robert H. Ginsburgh, "The Challenges to Military Professionalism," Air Force and Space Digest, March 1964, pps. 50-56.

⁴⁷ Richard C. Brown, The Teaching of Military History in Colleges and Universities of the United States, USAF Historical Studies: No. 124, p. 14.

⁴⁸ Loren Eiseley, "The Genesis of Genius," review of Arthur Koestler's, "The Art of Creation," The New York Times Book Review, October 18, 1964, p. 3.

A knowledge of military history is useful, even necessary, if our citizens are to be able to make intelligent decisions on the problems facing our country now and in the future. For young men who are to spend even part of their adult lives in military service, the study of military history can be a profitable experience. At the graduate level, for the historian-in-training a study of military history is almost imperative if he is to be able to interpret twentieth century history in a meaningful fashion. There are job opportunities for historians with an interest in military history and training in the field. Military history is interesting; it can contribute color and drama to any course in history. And, finally, military history can be of service throughout an individual's life, as a hobby or avocation.⁴⁹

The problems of war and peace in a thermonuclear age are being considered by the intelligentsia but the dialogue to a great extent is written by the intelligentsia for the intelligentsia and for those like J. F. Kennedy.

It is expected that the Commission will contract with educational institutions for studies evaluating material and performing the necessary detailed research on various projects. If successful this would create a better understanding by scholars of problems at the national level. This would appear to be a healthy development.

Arthur Barber says:

I can remember a time when facts and closely worded argument and controversial thought were the hallmark of the university scholar. Indeed, I believe I can recall a day when scholars would debate and write without a government contract or a foundation grant.⁵⁰

This implied condemnation is a most serious one for our universities. However, there are many scholarly agencies in the United States not tied to government. They are usually of two types: discussion groups which present differing opinions with no conclusions and groups, presenting conclusions and usually a plan of action. Of the first type, probably the most prestigious is the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions whose chairman is Robert M. Hutchins.⁵¹ There are many scholarly and publicly-inspired groups sponsoring

⁴⁹Op. cit., p. 12.

⁵⁰Arthur Barber, "The Citizen, The Scholar, and The Policy Maker," Background, August 1964, p. 84.

⁵¹Edward Reed, ed., Challenges to Democracy: The Next Ten Years, New York, Frederick A. Praeger, 1963.

letter government, of the second type, similar to the "American Assembly of Columbia University" whose latest report, the 26th has been previously quoted, was on "The Congress and America's Future." Both these organizations attract men of stature and learning and the foremost American leaders in all fields. It cannot be said that their recommendations and thoughts are not discussed in the press and scholarly publications. But again, it is like the intelligentsia talking to the intelligentsia, for the most part. The results of these discussions have been minimal to date. Probably the most important reason for this lack of results is that there is no requirement for government action. If any progress is to be made in correcting or controlling the Congressional-military-industrial complex through a more informed public, the organization must exert sufficient influence with Congress and the executive establishment to take cognizance of its recommendations. It must be an organization that cannot be ignored. An organization similar to the Hoover Commission to improve government administration could be the answer but it must have the continuity which the Hoover Commission lacked.

The pulpit is the last of the great democratic educational institutions to be considered. It is difficult to assess the effect of this independent and diffuse group of thinkers. Churchmen were leaders in defeating UMT by associating themselves with such organizations as the National Council Against Conscription, Fellowship of Reconciliation, Friends Committee on National Legislation, and National Council for Prevention of War.⁵² Many leaders of the church are active in peace movements almost too numerous to mention like SANE (National Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy), which advocate a variety of solutions including unilateral disarmament, non-resistance, and non-violent

⁵²John M. Swomley, The Military Establishment, p. X.

resistance. But there are also realists like Reinhold Niebuhr who contend that there is no one solution to world tensions but the problem of peace and war must be attacked on a broad front involving increased world trade, progress in education, economic development, better communication, and so on.⁵³ At the turn of the century Right Reverend William Lawrence was not alone nor considered radical when he preached that "in the long run, it is only to the man of morality that wealth comes."⁵⁴ The church as a whole has never conducted a vendetta against industry. A good portion of the church in America has always been able to make accomodation with the consensus on practically any subject. As James E. Dougherty, Catholic theologian and a member of forward strategists like Strausz-Hupe, says,

Generally speaking, the Church has always approached the problem of military power with circumspection. Recognizing that nowhere in the Gospel is military life censured, the Church is not at all sure that the meanings of the Scriptural passage on which the pacifists rely so heavily (e.g. 'they who live by the sword shall perish by it') are incontestably conclusive.⁵⁵

Churches have their own radicals and reactionaries. While undoubtedly churches as a whole are influential, they are not unified, and their leaders are as diverse in their teachings as there are political beliefs in the country. Churches are generally against the use of military power except as a last resort. The same is true of our government as well as the military within our government. However, churches should benefit as well as the press and educational institutions in a freer flow of factual information. Undoubtedly they would support the Commission in its overall efforts toward personal liberty and greater individual freedom.

⁵³Herzog, op. cit., pps. 229-251 and 88-91.

⁵⁴Earl F. Cheit, The Business Establishment, p. 53.

⁵⁵Herzog, op. cit., p. 230.

Conclusion

A huge military establishment, larger corporations growing bigger all the time, cold war showing no sign of abatement, emerging nations imbued with nationalism and creating world tensions, industrialization, scientific revolution, bureaucratization, automation, urbanization--all are making our pluralistic society more complex. Senator Fulbright says, "Foreign policy in our time is inseparable from domestic policy. It is more accurate to think of every aspect of public activity as part of national policy."⁵⁶ President Eisenhower's contention that the military-industrial complex unknowingly and undeliberately generates pressure and influence cannot be disproved.

Under these conditions individual liberties have already been lost. It is an accepted theory of a democracy that the public is entitled to be informed about its government. An agency at the top level of government whose mission is to protect individual liberty and freedom by investigating and reviewing government policies and increasing the flow of information is a worthwhile concept.

Still this Commission would be no panacea. It would not immediately correct all the misconceptions or areas needing attention which have been brought out in this thesis, some of which have been in our government for years. Still if the Commission operated as envisaged it would create an atmosphere of trust and confidence among the citizenry of the country and within our democratic institutions of education, press, and pulpit. This appears desirable.

No other agency of the government could take on this added job with the necessary degree of detachment and impartiality in addition to its present duties. The Commission would not enforce laws. As has been stated, its only directive power would be in establishing uniform classification standards. The

Commission would undoubtedly recommend laws for Congress to consider. If the laws were enacted, their enforcement would be a matter for Department of Justice and the courts. The Commission would get assistance from and might recommend changes in the operations of the Bureau of the Budget, which oversees Presidential policies, puts a price tag on them, and reviews their success each year as a new budget is prepared. GAO, which authenticates defense contracts and decides if the government has received full value, would be a source of material and statistics but the Commission would not take over its job. The Commission by recommending changes would be influential in providing a consensus which would require action which has been lacking in the past because liberties have been lost gradually. Likewise conditions requiring loss of freedom would be fully explained due to the review of the Commission.

The success of the Commission would depend a great deal upon the enabling legislation and the biggest hurdle would be getting Congress to recognize the need for such an agency. Placement of the Commission in the hierarchy of the government would be as important as the duties assigned. The head must be a member of the NSC in order to do a competent job, and similarly, as has been stated, it must report to both the Congress and the President. It could not be expected that the President would have a member of the NSC who was not only his adviser but also whom he had not appointed. Therefore the head should be a political appointee, serving at the pleasure of the President and he should be of the stature of a Supreme Court Justice. The other members of the Commission should be appointed for staggering terms so that appointments would not all become vacant under one administration. This would tend to create the necessary confidence by assuring the citizenry that the Commission was not a political instrument. This is of primary importance.

The Commission, if established, would be the means by which the nation becomes aware of the pressures generated by the Congressional-military-industrial complex so that the American goal of peace with justice could be more adequately served. The Commission could be the forum which would assist the citizenry in President Eisenhower's words to be "unswerving in devotion to principle, confident but humble with power, diligent in pursuit of the Nation's great goals."⁵⁷ In short the Commission would strive to realize America's continuing aspiration, "that all who yearn for freedom may experience it's spiritual blessings; that those who have freedom will understand, also, its heavy responsibilities."⁵⁸

⁵⁷President Eisenhower's Farewell Address.

⁵⁸Loc. cit.

APPENDIX

Farewell Radio and Television Address to

the American People. January 17, 1961¹

(Delivered from the President's Office at 8:30 p.m.)

My fellow Americans:

Three days from now, after half a century in the service of our country, I shall lay down the responsibilities of office as, in traditional and solemn ceremony, the authority of the Presidency is vested in my successor.

This evening I come to you with a message of leave-taking and farewell, and to share a few final thoughts with you, my countrymen.

Like every other citizen, I wish the new President, and all who will labor with him, Godspeed. I pray that the coming years will be blessed with peace and prosperity for all.

Our people expect their President and the Congress to find essential agreement on issues of great moment, the wise resolution of which will better shape the future of the Nation.

My own relations with the Congress, which began on a remote and tenuous basis when, long ago, a member of the Senate appointed me to West Point, have since ranged to the intimate during the war and immediate post-war period, and, finally, to the mutually interdependent during these past eight years.

In this final relationship, the Congress and the Administration have, on most vital issues, cooperated well, to serve the national good rather than mere partisanship, and so have assured that the business of the Nation should go forward. So, my official relationship with the Congress ends in a feeling, on my part, of gratitude that we have been able to do so much together.

II.

We now stand ten years past the midpoint of a century that has witnessed four major wars among great nations. Three of these involved our own country. Despite these holocausts America is today the strongest, the most influential and most productive nation in the world. Understandably proud of this pre-eminence, we yet realize that America's leadership and prestige depend, not merely upon our unmatched material progress, riches and military strength, but on how we use our power in the interests of world peace and human betterment.

III.

Throughout America's adventure in free government, our basic purposes have been to keep the peace; to foster progress in human achievement, and to enhance liberty, dignity and integrity among people and among nations. To strive for less would be unworthy of a free and religious people. Any failure traceable to arrogance, or our lack of comprehension or readiness to sacrifice would inflict upon us grievous hurt both at home and abroad.

Progress toward these noble goals is persistently threatened by the conflict now engulfing the world. It commands our whole attention, absorbs our very beings. We face a hostile ideology--global in scope, atheistic in character, ruthless in purpose, and insidious in method. Unhappily the danger it poses promises to be of indefinite duration. To meet it successfully, there is called for, not so much the emotional and transitory sacrifices of crisis, but rather those which enable us to carry forward steadily, surely, and without complaint the burdens of a prolonged and complex struggle--with liberty the stake. Only thus shall we remain, despite every provocation, on our chartered course toward permanent peace and human betterment.

Crisis there will continue to be. In meeting them, whether foreign or domestic, great or small, there is a recurring temptation to feel that some spectacular and costly action could become the miraculous solution to all current difficulties. A huge increase in newer elements of our defense; development of unrealistic programs to cure every ill in agriculture; a dramatic expansion in basic and applied research--these and many other possibilities, each possibly promising in itself, may be suggested as the only way to the road we wish to travel.

But each proposal must be weighed in the light of a broader consideration: the need to maintain balance in and among national programs--balance between the private and the public economy, balance between cost and hoped for advantage--balance between the clearly necessary and the comfortably desirable; balance between our essential requirements as a nation and the duties imposed by the nation upon the individual; balance between actions of the moment and the national welfare of the future. Good judgment seeks balance and progress; lack of it eventually finds imbalance and frustration.

The record of many decades stands as proof that our people and their government have, in the main, understood these truths and have responded to them well, in the face of stress and threat. But threats, new in kind or degree, constantly arise. I mention two only.

IV.

A vital element in keeping the peace is our military establishment. Our arms must be mighty, ready for instant action, so that no potential aggressor may be tempted to risk his own destruction.

Our military organization today bears little relation to that known

by any of my predecessors in peacetime, or indeed by the fighting men of World War II or Korea.

Until the latest of our world conflicts, the United States had no armaments industry. American makers of plowshares could, with time and as required, make swords as well. But now we can no longer risk emergency improvisation of national defense; we have been compelled to create a permanent armaments industry of vast proportions. Added to this, three and a half million men and women are directly engaged in the defense establishment. We annually spend on military security more than the net income of all United States corporations.

This conjunction of an immense military establishment and a large arms industry is new in the American experience. The total influence--economic, political, even spiritual--is felt in every city, every State house, every office of the Federal government. We recognize the imperative need for this development. Yet we must not fail to comprehend its grave implications. Our toil, resources and livelihood are all involved; so is the very structure of our society.

In the councils of government we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military-industrial complex. The potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists and will persist.

We must never let the weight of this combination endanger our liberties or democratic processes. We should take nothing for granted. Only an alert and knowledgeable citizenry can compel the proper meshing of the huge industrial and military machinery of defense with our peaceful methods and goals, so that security and liberty may prosper together.

Akin to, and largely responsible for the sweeping changes in our industrial-military posture, has been the technological revolution during recent decades.

In this revolution, research has become central; it also becomes more formalized, complex, and costly. A steadily increasing share is conducted for, by, or at the direction of, the Federal government.

Today, the solitary inventor, tinkering in his shop, has been overshadowed by task forces of scientists in laboratories and testing fields. In the same fashion, the free university, historically the fountainhead of free ideas and scientific discovery, has experienced a revolution in the conduct of research. Partly because of the huge costs involved, a government contract becomes virtually a substitute for intellectual curiosity. For every old blackboard there are now hundreds of new electronic computers.

The prospect of domination of the nation's scholars by Federal employment, project allocations, and the power of money is ever present--and is gravely to be regarded.

Yet, in holding scientific research and discovery in respect, as we should, we must also be alert to the equal and opposite danger that public policy could itself become the captive of a scientific-technological elite.

It is the task of statesmanship to mold, to balance, and to integrate these and other forces, new and old, within the principles of our democratic system--ever aiming toward the supreme goals of our free society.

V.

Another factor in maintaining balance involves the element of time. As we peer into society's future, we--you and I, and our government--must avoid the impulse to live only for today, plundering, for our own ease and convenience, the precious resources of tomorrow. We cannot mortgage the material assets of our grandchildren without risking the loss also of their political and spiritual heritage. We want democracy to survive for all generations to come, not to become the insolvent phantom of tomorrow.

VI.

Down the long lane of the history yet to be written America knows that this world of ours, ever growing smaller, must avoid becoming a community of dreadful fear and hate, and be, instead, a proud confederation of mutual trust and respect.

Such a confederation must be one of equals. The weakest must come to the conference table with the same confidence as do we, protected as we are by our moral, economic, and military strength. That table, though scarred by many past frustrations, cannot be abandoned for the certain agony of the battlefield.

Disarmament, with mutual honor and confidence, is a continuing imperative. Together we must learn how to compose differences, not with arms, but with intellect and decent purpose. Because this need is so sharp and apparent I confess that I lay down my official responsibilities in this field with a definite sense of disappointment. As one who has witnessed the horror and the lingering sadness of war--as one who knows that another war could utterly destroy this civilization which has been so slowly and painfully built over thousands of years--I wish I could say tonight that a lasting peace is in sight.

Happily, I can say that war has been avoided. Steady progress toward our ultimate goal has been made. But, so much remains to be done. As a private citizen, I shall never cease to do what little I can to help the world advance along that road.

VII.

So--in this my last good night to you as your President--I thank you for the many opportunities you have given me for public service in war

and peace. I trust that in that service you find some things worthy; as for the rest of it, I know you will find ways to improve performance in the future.

You and I--my fellow citizens--need to be strong in our faith that all nations, under God, will reach the goal of peace with justice. May we be ever unswerving in devotion to principle, confident but humble with power, diligent in pursuit of the Nation's great goals.

To all the peoples of the world, I once more give expression to America's prayerful and continuing aspiration:

We pray that peoples of all faiths, all races, all nations, may have their great human needs satisfied; that those now denied opportunity shall come to enjoy it to the full; that all who yearn for freedom may experience its spiritual blessings; that those who have freedom will understand, also, its heavy responsibilities; that all who are insensitive to the needs of others will learn charity; that the scourges of poverty, disease and ignorance will be made to disappear from the earth, and that, in the goodness of time, all peoples will come to live together in a peace guaranteed by the binding force of mutual respect and love.

¹Public Papers of the President: Dwight D. Eisenhower 1960-61, pps. 1035-1040.

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MILITARY-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX: EISENHOWER'S UNSOLVED PROBLEM

by

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Reminiscent of George Washington, President Eisenhower chose to make a farewell address. No platform is more prestigious nor more influential than that of the President of the United States. No words should or do receive more analysis. A farewell address only increased the natural interest in the President's words, because of the added hope that his eight years' experience would bring forth the distilled wisdom he had obtained, to chart a course for the future of the nation he had led with such dedication.

In one portion of this speech the President coined a new phrase--"military-industrial complex". He made four points about this complex: (1) it was immense, and it was imperative for the security of the free world; (2) its influence was being felt in every structure of our society--economic, political, and even spiritual; (3) it has a potential for misplaced power that exists and will persist; (4) and only an alert and knowledgeable citizenry can compel the proper meshing of the complex so that security and liberty may prosper together. The President's words added up to a warning against potential militarism. The subject was not new. Several prominent men and scholars had written about the effects of the cold war, with emphasis placed on the combined effect of increased military influence in all phases of American life and of the industrial base which supported this new military power. The report of the Nye Committee, which was partially responsible for the neutrality of the United States in the late thirties prior to World War II, had not been entirely forgotten. The President's words only emphasized a condition suspected by many but they were particularly important because, he, of all men, had shown particular trust, respect, and understanding to the American military and industrial leaders. He owed his success to these two spheres of American life.

The purpose of this thesis is to discuss the reasons behind the President's charge, to determine whether his statement was justified, and to ascertain to

what degree this complex represents a threat to individual liberties and freedom and to the democratic processes of the United States.

The thesis attempts to analyze the President's words and actions while in office and, simultaneously, his words regarding the complex since his retirement. The Congressional Record and Congressional Quarterly have been used to find out what Congress has said on this and related subjects. The words of military scholars and industrial economists and other social scientists have also been studied. As the subject is a current one and the President had specifically said the danger was potential, the New York Times, Kansas City Star and Times, Newsweek, U. S. News and World Report and Time Magazine have been read daily or weekly during 1964, as the case may be, and the material evaluated. To get the viewpoint of the military and industry, each issue of The Journal of the Armed Forces, Army, Airpower, Aviation Week, Business Week, and Missiles and Rockets have been reviewed for the same period. Additional trade and scholarly magazines have also been consulted.

The findings agree with those of President Eisenhower, but not with his recommendation. The thesis concludes that the military-industrial complex is not consciously operational, and that its power lies in public apathy, in lack of public information, and in the creeping erosion of its appearance. However, there are inherent safeguards against this phenomenon. On the other hand, the potential danger is greatly increased by its alliance with Congress. And, most important, some liberties and freedoms have already been lost due to its existence.

The Eisenhower recommendation of an alert and knowledgeable citizenry is unobtainable under our present political system and methods of government operation. The needed information prior to the decision is not available for the public to become knowledgeable. Decisions on defense must be taken for the most part on faith and trust. The executive branch, which includes the military, plus the legislative branch, and industry combine to increase secrecy, and information

from all three is given to the public only from the viewpoint of their self-interest.

A countervailing power is needed that will work toward informing the electorate and promote public and national debate. This countervailing power must have the support of Congress, the executive branch, and the press. A solution with modifications as first outlined by Dr. H. D. Lasswell in his book, National Security and Individual Freedom, is recommended.